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The major problem that has remained philosophically and
historically endemic to American civil-military relations has
been the antithetical nature of the military establishment to
its parent society. Evolving from this very complex relationship
are natural limitations which are inherently present in any
effort made by either the society or the military to liberalize
the military establishment and at the same time to make it more
relevant to its parent society. The problem is deeply rooted in
seventeenth century Puritan tradition which posited military
matters beyond the extent of basic self-protection as anathema
to one of their basic concepts—hard earned material success.
Following on from the inculcation of a basic liberal tradition
in America as manifested first in the Declaration of Independence
and later amplified in the Bill of Rights, the "minuteman" con-
cept came to dominate the civil-military philosophy of nineteenth
century America. There was confusion within the American
philosophy first in the War of 1812 and later in the Civil War as
to how dominant a role should the military, both in war and in
peace, assume as a partner of the civil-military equation,




In each instance of the United States participation in
foreign and domestic wars until World War II, the societal
imperative of liberalism, although compromised to some extent by
the need to raise a military force in time of war, was dominant
enough to cause rapid postwar military demobilization. Until
World War II, the military establishment was basically assigned
the functional task of exclusively engaging in battle where and
when so directed by the President. In times of non-war, it was
reduced to a size consistent with appropriations and otherwise
neglected by the liberal society. With the ending of World War
II and the onset of a new phenomenon (the cold war)
,
past mili-
tary demobilization and subsequent military neglect by the
civilian sector could not be accomplished. What ensued was a new
era of civil-military relations with the military being thrust
into a closer relationship and partnership with the civilian
society. It is basically in this era that the inherent problems
in any civil-military relationship that were initially recognized
by the Puritans became more manifest and acute. Beginning with
the close of World War II, each society has fallen more under the
influence of the other than heretofore experienced in our history.
Such a relationship has witnessed philosophical problems between
the two societies that have in recent times been further
exacerbated by the Vietnam War and the social revolution of the
1960s. Any further accommodation between the two societies will
continue to depend upon an understanding of the inherent differ-





The investigation included an analysis of historical
documents
,
various author's interpretations, and studies and
surveys. Each research method was an important link in the
entire gamut of investigation. A normative base for American
civil-military relations was established within both a historical
and philosophical context by analyzing such documents as the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of
Rights; further evidence was gathered from the pronouncements on
civil-military relations by several Presidents and other impor-
tant national figures. Having once established the normative
base, empirical evidence in the form of surveys, polls, and
studies were introduced in an attempt to balance the normative
standards with pertinent statistics gathered on American civil-
military relations and emphasizing the poHt-World War II era of
civil-military relations.
The conclusion reached was that the historical attempts
to liberalize the military establishment are not only tempered
by but regulated and subjected to the normative nature of the
American civil-military equation. Because of the basic nature
of this relationship, ignoring its existence will produce
inadequate and unrealistic analyses of civil-military relations.
Unless any analysis of civil-military relations includes an
awareness of what values can be historically and philosophically
demanded by the American public from its military establishment,
the process of recruiting men into this establishment and later
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THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
An Investigation of a Conservative Enclave in Liberal America

INTRODUCTION
The study of civil-military relations has
suffered from too little theorizing.
Samuel P. Huntington,
The Soldier and the State
The general purpose of this study is to investigate the
thesis that within the American governmental system, the values
that characterize the society and its military establishment are
philosophically and historically antithetical to each other.
Because of this, any attempts made by society to liberalize the
military establishment are immediately subjected to these origi-
nal differences, which, in turn, normally govern the final out-
come. Integral to this investigation is the development of a
theoretical framework within which civil-military relations can
be analyzed.
The source of this inquiry flows from several obser-
vations. Attempts to provide new forward looking, liberal mili-
tary programs have little chance of success unless they are
predicated on an awareness of these differences. Many times it
seoms that these differences are either forgotten or ignored.
Also, the need for intra-governmental coordination necessitates
that military planners continue to become more involved in
(2)

3matters of national security policy that were once the pero-
gatives of civilian statesmen. These military policy makers are
finding themselves thrust into situations where they have to
analyze their plans and policies in relation to those of other
civilian agencies. The expanding trend of this amalgamated
effort has shown few, if any, signs of abating and thus the mili-
tary and civilian societies appear to be overtly converging
toward a common value base. This scenario may be deceiving, be-
cause it overlooks the differences between these societies
already alluded to. The literature which continues to flow from
the pens of civil-military polemicists or from protagonists who
claim that the United States is being ruled by a "power elite"
and becoming militaristically oriented assures us that the civil-
military relationship has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction
of all participants and interested scholars.
The thrust of this investigation is to probe into the
hypothesis that there are both historical and philosophical
differences between the two societies that have remained un-
changed throughout the country's civil-military history. If
such differences do in fact exist, even a passive awareness of
them may serve to alleviate some frustrations that constantly
Russett and Stepan concluded in their study of the
military establishment vis-a-vis the civilian society that the
role of the military in America needs to be analyzed beyond the
study of behavior. "The role of ideology has been inadequately
studied by conventional scholars of civil-military relations.";
see Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan, eds., Military Force
and American Society 3New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 14.

4characterize contemporary civil-military relations. A misunder-
standing or ignorance of these differences may be one cause of
the polemical haranguing that constantly flows between the
civilian and military sectors of society. Following on from
this is an investigation to determine whether or not societal
liberalization of the military establishment will in fact pro-
vide a solution to the civil-military problem. By making such a
determination, national assets could be better utilized, new
forward looking military programs could be grounded on firmer
philosophical bases, and policies which "fly in the face of
tradition" could possibly be avoided. The entire civil-military
equation could be brought into a more realistic equilibrium.
This investigation must be limited by certain assumptions
and caveats in order to provide both the researcher and the
reader with boundaries.
1. Unless the concept of the nation-state drastically
changes , a nation that intends to maintain its independence and
sovereignty must maintain some form of military protection.
2. Each society must work out some accommodation with
its military establishment. In an authoritarian society, where
this establishment may be an integral part of the power struc-
ture, the accommodation may be different from a democratic
society in which the establishment has become relatively more
2
differentiated and a civilian-military relationship is created.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), pp. 1-2.

53. Civilian control of the military is integral to the
American governmental system not only as a result of constitu-
tional direction, but also as a requirement of the American poli-
tical system as an operating institution.
4. Many writers have made critical studies on how the
military establishment in the United States has come to influence
or even control the civilian society. These military protago-
nists have become associated with what is popularly known as the
3
"military conspiracy school." This study acknowledges the
existence of this school of literature, but because I am more
interested in the obverse situation and because there has been
so little research done there, this inquiry is directed toward
investigating the effect the civilian society has on the military
establishment.
5. Lastly, this study is not intended to be a compre-
hensive, historical analysis of American civil-military rela-
4tions, and the thoughts of political figures such as Burke,
Locke, Jefferson, and Jackson, offered herein, are in no way to
be considered comprehensive.
3The following writers are well-known members of this
school: Tristram Coffin, The Passion of the Hawks (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1964); Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1962); James A. Donovan, Militarism ,
U.S.A
.
, with a Foreward by David M. Shoup (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1970); Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and
the Military (New York: Oxford University Press"; 1956) ; Stuart
H. Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine (New
York: Random House, 1973); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite
(New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1956) ; Jack
Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1964); John M. Swomley, Jr., The Military Establish -
ment
, with a Foreward by Senator George McGovern (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964).
4
This is more than adequately covered in Huntington,
Soldier and the State.

Definitions
The following definitions are submitted as a means of
providing a common contextuality for the whole of this study:
1. Civil-Military--is used to refer to a relationship.
It is not used to indicate a dichotomous situation which one
frequently visualizes when he sees reference to a phrase like
"Russian-American" . Civil-military relations refer to the role
of the armed forces (military sector) in society (non-military
sector)
.
2. Political-Military— is a similar relationship which
refers to the role of the armed forces in making and implement-
ing the political decisions of the government.
3. Militarism— is an enveloping ethos which permeates
all of society and becomes dominant in all aspects of life. This
ethos presents a vast array of customs, actions, and thoughts
associated with things military (such as wars and armies) and
yet transcends military purposes. C. Wright Mills notes that
a militaristic environment is established when military men do
not remain as means but become ends within themselves.
4. Military way— is a method of action attributed to
the military in which there is a concentration of effort to
7
carry out specific tasks with the least expenditure of assets.
5. Liberalism— is defined in its broadest sense to mean
Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism , rev. ed. (New
York: Meridian Books, Inc. , 1959) , p. 13.
Mills, Power Elite , p. 222.
Vagts, History of Militarism , p. 13.

a paramount concern for the freedom and independence of the
individual. This becomes more evident when contrasted to
conservatism.
6. Conservatism— is a resistance to change in institu-
tional characteristics which are accorded almost reverential and
metaphysical status.
Essence of Investigation
PART I investigates the historical aspects of American
civil-military relations. It is hypothesized that the philo-
sophical differences between American society and its military
establishment have historical roots. Chapter I is a historical
synopsis of the place of the military establishment in American
society. Chapter II investigates the American civil-military
equation since World War II in view of the entry of the United
States into a dominant power position among world powers. The
initial model (Figure 1) , formulated as a result of this investi-
gation, could be as follows:











8PART II is the focal point of this study. Having once
investigated the existence of different philosophical bases in
the civil-military equation, it is logical to determine whether
the procedures of recruitment and socialization have any effect
on the "root" differences that characterize American civil-
military relations. It is hypothesized that the policies of
recruitment and socialization can be interpreted in terms of
their effect on the military establishment. The final model
(Figure 2) reflects the essence of this investigation.


















Chapter III addresses the question of the effect which the con-
cepts of conscription, which includes universal military training
and selective service, and the modern volunteer army have on the
recruitment of enlisted men into the armed forces. Chapter IV
investigates the effect of officer recruitment on the liberali-
zation of the military establishment. The institutions analyzed
are the military academies, the Officer Candidate Schools, and

9the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Chapter V investigates the
effect of officer institutional socialization on the liberal-
conservative ethic. Among the institutions analyzed are the mili-
tary academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the service
colleges, and civilian colleges as far as they provide post-
graduate education. All these institutions provide varying
amounts of academic and professional socialization. All three
chapters will include, where possible, a prognosis of the post-
Vietnam War era to determine whether or not the United States
can expect the creation of a modified or even a new civil-
military equilibrium.
PART III completes the investigation by summarizing in
both a historical and normative manner the civil-military equa-
tion as it has evolved within and applied to the American liberal





As the ship entered the uncharted minefield,
the Captain gave the order—FULL SPEED AHEAD
Anon
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM
AND THE CASE OF THE CONSERVATIVE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT THEREIN
The position of influence which a military establishment
attains within a democratic society is determined to a large
extent by the nature of the ethos of that society. Thus, it is
important in the United States, as in other democratic nations,
to understand the philosophical and historical differences be-
tween the civilian society and its military establishment; both
societies must be aware of the other's ethic if either is to
understand the problems that are a result of this relationship.
Genesis of Civil-Military Relations
Although the Puritans, who fled from religious oppression
in England in 1620 and landed at Plymouth Rock in November of




of political thought, there began to develop upon their arrival
a distinctive genus of American political thought. While
neither equality nor toleration were fundamental tenets of the
Puritan ethic, at least two elements of free government began to
emerge from the rigid and uncompromising Puritan theocratic
government. These were concepts of a covenant or compact based
on free consent and the practice of local self government mani-
fested in the local town meetings. Thus while bound, at least,
by ancestral tradition to a pattern of authoritarianism, the
Puritans introduced into the New World the rudimentary ideas of
liberalism. Their political affairs were conducted within the
parameters of a mutual covenant which they documented in the
Mayflower Compact.
. . . We, whose names are underwritten . . . covenant
and combine ourselves together into a civill body politick,
for our better ordering and preservation ... to enacte,
constitute, and frame such just and equall lawes , ordi-
nances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to
time . . . .
1
Ironically, the intolerance which the Puritans had so condemned
in England remained with the new settlers and became character-
istic of their "new" society. What did not remain in the Puritan
ethic and which was left behind in Europe were the legacies of
feudalism and clericism which had thrust the European continent
into what appeared to be constant national and religious wars.
Thus Louis Hartz theorizes that not being bound by the political
John Mabry Mathews and Clarence Arthur Berdahl,
Documents and Readings in American Government: National and
State , rev, ed. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1940) , p. 3.
The Compact was signed on 11 November 1620 by the Pilgrims
prior to their landing at Plymouth Rock.

12
traditions of Europe, the settlers embarked on a tradition that
from the beginning was liberal in manner. This liberalism never
became the captive of either Old World feudalism or socialism
which is one of the reasons for the uniqueness of the American
2
experience. If one looks upon feudalism, clericism, and
socialism as antithetical to individualism, Hartz ' s observations
certainly do merit attention. M. Morton Auerbach supplements the
Hartzian theory by noting additional factors such as a lack of
class consciousness, the rugged idea of frontierism, and a
general belief in mobility and destiny as contributing to a
liberal tradition that would be the product of a dialectical pro-
3
cess of conflict and competition that would encourage progress.
This "dearth" of political theory is what Daniel J. Boorstin
claims accounts for the "genius of American politics." American
political philosophy proceeded without the benefit of political
theory, therefore, there is a "seamlessness" of culture based on
the "givenness" of certain values in America. The American sys-
tem is a product basically of the founding fathers and not one
4tied to ancestral ideology.
2 . ....Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An
Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution
(New York: Harcourt , Brace and World, Inc. , 1955) , p~! 4
.
3
M. Morton Auerbach, The Conservative Illusion (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959)
, pp. 69-70.
4
Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 8-12. This
"seamlessness" of American politics became a cause celebre when
writers such as Josiah Royce, Henry James, and Herbert Croly
questioned the "aimlessness" and optimism of American political
philosophy; see chap. 6 passim. For a well-balanced study of
American intellectual history, refer to Boorstin' s trilogy. The

13
The Puritans were in large part responsible for the con-
tinuing of one legacy and the creation of another legacy, both
of which have carried over into contemporary civil-military rela-
tions. The intolerance which caused Puritans to dissent from
Old World authorities and which eventually drove them to the
shores of the New World was the same trait which they had depended
upon to perpetuate themselves in England. Intolerance became a
keystone of Puritan philosophy, and it was the legacy of dissent
from that philosophy manifested by such historical dissenters as
Roger Williams and Thomas Hooker that hastened the breaking of
the Puritan theocratic hold on society and quickened the rise of
a secular, democratic society. This legacy of dissent relied
strongly upon the doctrine of natural rights which recognized the
importance of the individual. In fact, the aspect of dissent
became the "Puritan's greatest contribution to the growth of
freedom in America."
While continuing one legacy, the Puritans by their ethic
created another legacy. This was a self-righteous affirmation
that material success was a sign of divine favor. Warfare,
which despoiled or impeded this steady prosperity, was therefore
anathema. The experiences of the colonists in providing for
their own protection and well-being led them over a period of
Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York: Random House,
1958) ; The Americans: The National Experience (New York:
Random House, 1965); The Americans: The Democratic Experience
(New York: Random House , 1973)
.
c
Alpheus Thomas Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest of
Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 33.

14
time to resent the practitioners of warfare. As more and more
colonists fled to America a heritage of antipathy toward a mili-
tary ethic was molded within the ethos of society. They had
fled from persecution and thus were loath to import military forms
into the new America. This philosophy dovetailed conveniently
into a larger wariness and mistrust which held all authority as
suspect of infringing on individual rights. Samuel P. Huntington
agrees that a motivating ethos of liberalism has been the well-
spring of the American political system.
Despite instances of continuing dissent and growing
friction between the colonists and the British government, rebel-
lion was certainly far from the colonist's mind. Problems con-
tinued to mount and the colonists continued to pursue the rugged
frontier life which added to their remoteness from and dis-
interest in articulating a political philosophy. The forging of
a new society and the meeting of daily problems allowed little
time for political rumination. Eventually the problems began
directly to affect the colonists. British efforts to have them
assist in financing the French-Indian War (1756-63) , the question
of "taxation without representation," and such acts as the Stamp
Act (1764) certainly added to the continuing alienation of the
two societies. By 1776, the successive stages of pamphleteering,
which witnessed Benjamin Franklin's request for parliamentary
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 144.
"Liberalism dominated American thinking from the Revolution
through the first half of the twentieth century . . . liberalism




representation of the colonies and the angry Thomas Paine crying
out for natural rights, had become bolder and bolder and
7
"comprehensive enough to appeal to all mankind."
Although it is historical knowledge that Richard Lee's
motion at the Second Continental Congress in June, 1776 to the
effect that the colonies should be free and independent was
instrumental in having Jefferson express the liberalism of the
American mind in the Declaration of Independence, it may not be
too clear what role the English philosopher, John Locke, had in
influencing Jefferson. On the one hand, it would be erroneous
to cast Locke in the role as being the prime mover in influencing
Jefferson and as being the "father of American liberalism" in
view of Hartz ' s and Boorstin's claim of uniqueness of the American
political system and of Locke's own justification of the Glorious
Revolution. On the other hand, Locke's ideas of the rights of
revolution as stated in his Second Treatise of Civil Government
(1690) has overtones of the "natural rights doctrine" documented
in the Declaration. At least two authors, Alpheus Mason and
Richard Leach, note that
in the debates preceeding the revolution, he [Locke]
supplied most of the theoretical ammunition for the
colonists. Perhaps no other single person had more „
influence on the colonial mind in the days before 1776.
Note the similarity of the natural rights doctrine as stated
here in the Second Treatise and in the Declaration below, particu-
larly in the context that both men were in some fashion







apologizing for a revolution.
Whenever, therefore the legislature shall transgress
this fundamental rule of society [misuse the rights of
people or property] and either by ambition, folly, or
corruption, endeavor to group themselves, or put into the
hands of another, an absolute power over the lives,
liberties, and estates of the people, by their breach of
trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their
hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the
people
. . . [to] provide for their own safety and
security. °
On the eve of the Revolutionary War, two factors dictated
the general negative attitude and contempt that the colonists
held for any military force. First, the relative security of the
colonies by reason of their geographical isolation did not create
a real need for a military establishment. Second, the constant
presence of British troops and their interference in colonial
matters aggravated by British demands for colonial support in the
French-Indian War, spawned an ethos of anti-militarism among the
colonists.
The colonial climax came in the adoption of the Declara-
tion of Independence on 4 July 1776. The great strength of the
Declaration was that it was an expression of what the American
mind was thinking. The overtures to liberal tenets are the
paramount aspects of the Declaration which is many times called
America's greatest liberal document.
9John Locke, Of Civil Government, Two Treatises
, ed.
Ernest Rhys, with an Introduction by W. F~. Carpenter, Everyman's
Library (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. ,?29.
10Mason and Leach, In Quest of Freedom
, pp. 65-66. Cf.
Hartz notes that unlike the French Revolution, the United States
did not have to endure a democratic revolution and thus was
thwarted in the people a revolutionary zeal that was symbolic of





We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . . ., That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the right of the People to alter or
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundations on such principles and organizing its power
in such form, as to them shall seem more likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.
H
Notably, the Declaration reveals an intensive dislike and distrust
of things military. Thus contained in the list of grievances are
the following:
He [King George III] has kept among us, in times of
peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legis-
latures .
He has affected to render the Military independent of
and superior to the Civil Power. [Implication being that
it should be subordinate.]
He has given consent to acts unacknowledged by our
laws. For quartering large bodies of armed troops
among us
.
The frustrations and aspirations noted in the Declaration
lay bare the facts that the British policy of maintaining standing
armies on American soil, attempting to involve the colonists in
subsidizing British Wars, and quartering troops within the
colonist's homes exacerbated the colonist's anti-militaristic
feelings. Military force was anathema to both the trends of
liberalism and the principles of frontierism and rugged individ-
ualism which the colonists had learned to live by. On the other
hand, the revolutionists realized they would have to fight for
their self-proclaimed natural rights. Under these circumstances,
and these only, the use of force was permissible.
Mathews and Berdahl, Documents and Readings , p. 24.

18
If the Revolutionary War proved nothing else, it
illustrated that a war, which could have directly affected the
basic future of the colonies, did not inculcate in the populace
12
a militaristic spirit. What in fact appears to have been the
case is that American revolutionists fought to preserve past
13
values rather than to force the coming of an uncertain future.
As a result of the war, the United States found itself identify-
ing with two different military traditions which are theoreti-
cally contradictory to each other: a liberal tradition manifested
by the concept of organizing citizens into a military force to
counter a threat. This was what had been done at Concord in 1775
where the colonists had been hastily organized into a "citizen
army," popularly called minutemen, to thwart the British attack.
This concept was further institutionalized and, though
12 . .
Cf. Michael Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great
Britain and the United States, 1945-1948," Political Science
Quarterly 75 (March 1960) : 36-37. In those countries where,
unlike the United States, the community has been cut loose from
its constitutional roots and the patterns of traditional obedi-
ence to authority have been disturbed, there is danger of military
intervention in civil matters caused by the impatience of military
men with governments incapable of preserving order.
Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military
Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1962), p. 2. For several interpretations of "past
values" see Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition :
And the Men Who Made It (New York! Random House, Vintage Books,
1948)
,
p. viii. "The society of private property, the right of
the individual to dispose of and invest it, the value of oppor-
tunity and the natural evolution of' self-interest and self-
assertion, . . . have been staple tenets of the central faith in
American political ideologues." Also see Mason and Leach, In
Quest of Freedom
, pp. 17-18. "Consent of the government, the
right of the majority, the idea of natural rights independent of
government and thus limiting government, and the right to revolt,
were all adopted with enthusiasm by our revolutionary fore-




periodically supplemented by military conscription, has stood as
the principle way liberal America enlists people to fight its
wars. The second tradition is based on the fact that because an
army had to be raised to counter the British, the seeds for some
form of military professionalism were sewn. Except in time of
war, this tradition lay dormant, and it was not until after the
Civil War that it became institutionalized to the point that it
could no longer be treated with benign neglect.
Before the British had departed from New York at the
close of the war, the Continental Congress had confirmed the
release of nearly all of Washington's troops and even Washington's
plea for a modest peacetime military establishment of 2,631 met
with opposition. Within six months of the war's conclusion, the
American army was down to seven hundred from a war time high of
14
approximately 35,000 reached in November, 1778. By June, 1784,
the Continental Congress seemed to agree with Mr. Eldridge
Gerry's statement that
. . . standing armies in the time of peace, are incon-
sistent with the principles of republican Governments,
dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally
converted into destructive engines for establishing
despotism. 15
At least, in this spirit it passed a resolution that called for
all troops now in the service of the United States to be dis-
charged with the exception of twenty-five privates to guard the
14 ....Charles Walton Ackley, The Modern Military in American
Society: A Study in the Nature of Military Power (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1972)
, pp. 42-43.
Library of Congress, Journals of the Continental Con-
gress, 1774-1789 , 34 vols. (Washington : Government Printing
Office, 1904-37), 27 (1928): 518.
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The anti-militarism legacy, spawned by the Puritans and
articulated by Jefferson in the Declaration, found its way into
the American governmental system' in pre-Constitutional days
through the Articles of Confederation. By the very fact that the
government would be a confederation of states, the Articles from
their very inception in 1777 depended upon a spirit of coopera-
tion among the states for any effectiveness they would have. The
viability of the confederation depended upon this cooperation and
thus the provisions for civil-military relations called for only
a state and not a national militia. Article VI called for the
states to " . . . always keep a well-regulated and disciplined
militia, sufficiently armed. ..." Article VII set forth pro-
visions for land forces to be raised by the states. Article VIII
called for the defraying of expenses for the common defense out
17
of a common treasury supplied by the several states.
The Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Con-
federation together provided a noble beginning for the American
experiment in liberalism. During this formulative period, the
tradition of anti-militarism was accepted as an essential element
in American democracy, except when the exigencies of war demanded




Mathews and Berdahl, Documents and Readings , pp. 27-30
At the same time Richard Lee had proposed his famous resolution
for independence, he had also offered a resolution to form a




colonial settlement, settlers were largely from the middle class.
Few noblemen chose to emigrate. Thus the middle class auto-
matically became the dominant class in American society. There-
fore, at least until the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the
American ethos was antithetical to the military. This ethos has
spawned throughout the course of American history (at least until
1945) a feeling of general distrust and reluctance to maintain a
professional military force and an emotional acceptance of the
"minuteman, irregular soldier" concept.
The only incident running counter to the whole trend was
the experience of Shay's Rebellion (1786), which illustrated the
inadequacy of the confederation of states in coping with an
insurrection. Max Farrand reasons that it was not sufficient to
place the state militia under central control, but that the cen-
tral government must be empowered to protect the states from
18internal disorders as well as external dangers.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was to witness a
polarization of interests between a fear that the government would
remain too weak to maintain order, and a fear that the government
would become too strong and misuse its power. Whereas the
Declaration of Independence had been the great liberal document,
the Constitution was to be the great conservative document. The
framers had learned from experience that an unqualified liberal
tradition might not be enough to support a nation. That lesson
was supported by their "Calvinistic sense of human evil and
1 p
Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the
United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), p. 49.
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damnation and [their belief] with Hobbes that men are selfish
19
and contentious." The ideological constant stressed in the
Declaration, which provided for an anti-military environment, was
now supplemented by a structural constant in the Constitution,
which recognized the necessity for a military component. From
this time forward, the liberal ideal has had to accommodate
itself to a military institution.
The various plans submitted to the convention indicated
that the exact position and function of a military force within
a constitutional framework was not clear to the framers. The
Virginia Plan offered by Edmund Randolph set forth the following
20
resolutions on the military:
That the articles of confederation ought to be so
corrected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects . . .
namely, common defense, security of liberty ....
. . . . , that the national legislature ought to be
empowered ... to call forth the force of the union
against any member of the union failing to fulfill its
duty under the articles thereof.
The New Jersey Plan offered by William Patterson countered with
21the following resolutions on the military:
That the articles of confederation ought to be so
revived ... to render the federal constitution adequate
to the . . . preservation of the union.
That the executive . . . direct all military opera-
tions; provided, that none of the persons composing the
federal executive shall, on any occasion, take command of
any troops, so as personally to conduct any military
enterprise as general or in any other capacity.
19Hofstadter, American Political Tradition
,
p. 4.






And if any state, . . ., shall oppose or prevent the
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal
executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of
the confederated states, . .
.
, to enforce and compel an
obedience to such acts, ....
In its final form, the Constitution was a compromise; more so, it
was a great conservative document that enumerated powers which
were to be specifically exercised and specifically prohibited to
22both the state and national government.
The Constitution provides for civilian control of the
military by instituting a system of checks and balances between
the legislative and executive branches. More specifically,
23Congress was given the following powers:
To raise and support armies (art. I, sec. 8(12)).
To provide and maintain a navy (art. I, sec. 8(13)).
To make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces (art. I, sec. 8(14)).
To provide for calling forth the militia (art. I,
sec. 8 (15) )
.
To provide for organizing,
;
arming, and discipling
the militia (art. I, sec. 8(16)).
The President was to be the commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
states when called into actual service of the United States (art.
II, sec. 2(1)). The civil-military provisions in the Bill of
Rights (1791) prohibited the national government from infringing
upon the raising of a well-regulated militia and the right of the
22
U. S., Constitution , art. I, sec. 8, 9, 10.
23Note how these articles corrected the list of grievances




people to bear arms (Amend. II) , and prohibited the quartering
of soldiers in time of peace or war within any house without the
24
owner's consent (Amend. III).
It should be evident that one of the central features of
the Constitution relevant to the juxtaposition of society to the
military was the establishment of civilian control over the mili-
tary institution. This was accomplished by dividing the command,
appropriation of funds, and militia functions among the executive
and legislative branches on the one hand and between the national
and state governments on the other. This in effect accomplished
a very important result in that it provided for "subjective"
civilian control and not "objective" civilian control of the mili-
tary. Subjective control describes the situation wherein the
military is "civilianized" to the degree where it loses its
autonomy and becomes politicized to the extent of being a "mirror
image" of the state's political policies. Opposed to subjective
control is objective control which describes the situation wherein
the military becomes highly professionalized, maintains its
autonomy, and becomes a tool of the state. Subjective control
civilianizes the military; objective control militarizes the
military. Thus, under the provisions of the Constitution, the
military was philosophically instituted to respond to subjective
2 5
civilian control. The framers of the Constitution thus wrote
Jefferson, who was instrumental in having the Bill of
Rights amended to the Constitution, corrected the civil-military
problems he had noted in the Declaration of Independence. See
p. 17 above.
2 5Huntington articulates these forms of control; see
Soldier and the State, pp. 80-85.
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into the document both personal and historical convictions as to
what should be the proper civil-military relationship within the
Republic. Some of the more evident reasons for their decisions
would seem to be the following: a belief that a standing army
was a threat to the Republic; the conviction that threats from
foreign invasions would be countered by providing for a standing
navy; the absence of any accepted requirements for a separate
military class or for a high degree of professionalism; the
belief that a citizen army, which proved adequate during the
revolution, could again be formed to counter a foreign invasion.
But what made the military acceptable at all was the provision
for state militias. The founding fathers conceived of the
militia as a liberal agency that would act in defense of the
individual and for local liberty against the powers of the
national government. Thus, on the individual level, the citizen
was guaranteed the right to bear arms and to refuse to quarter
troops within his home. On the organizational level, the state
militia was a counterforce to a national army. Even so, in addi-
tion to these provisions to protect the individual, the national
government was given power well beyond that given in the Articles
of Confederation by empowering the President to federalize the
militia.
As a conservative document, the Constitution subjects
society to certain restraints , which seems to demonstrate within
the minds of the founders a certain pessimism about society. The
elements of conservatism, as they apply not only to American
society in general but to the military establishment, may have as

26
its patron the English philosopher, Edmund Burke. Russell Kirk,
who is one of the more outspoken modern advocates of conser-
vatism, claims that in any political sense Burke is the founder
2 6
of conservatism as we know it in the United States. A brief
investigation of Burke's civil-military philosophy, however,
does need at least one caveat. Just as noted in the case of
Locke's influence on American political theory, Burkian philos-
ophy was not consciously thrust into the American political
system, but in a posteriori fashion was somehow reconciled with
how in fact the system had evolved. In his Reflections on the
French Revolution
,
which is one of the few historical conser-
vative works of political literature that reflects on civil-
military relations, Burke argues that society was an organic
whole composed of individuals who were incapable of functioning
apart from society. He emphasized custom, tradition, and con-
sensus of thought as opposed to individual judgment, and he
constantly mounted attacks against the assertion of individ-
27
uality. In further alluding to the military society, Burke
believed in a national hierarchy among men. Individual men were
to be revered "on account of their age, and on account of those
28from who they are descended." The evils of internal insur-
rection and the violations of personal rights by the military,
Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to
Eliot
, 3d rev. ed. , Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Reqnery
Company, 1960), p. 5.
2 7
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution , ed,
Ernest Rhys, with an Introduction by A. J. Grieve, Everyman's






while harmful, are not as destructive of society as when the
insurrection threatens to menace the very existence of the
nation. Thus the army should never act but as an instrument for
the government, for once it has acted according to its own
resolutions, the government would degenerate into a military
democracy, "a species of political monster, which has always
29
ended by devouring those who have produced it." Burke's
emphasis on things established, consensus of judgment, partner-
ship of men, and the instrumental nature of the army provides a
model for the development of the military establishment along
conservative premises.
The military system which developed within the framework
of the Constitution illustrated the poignancy of the philosophical
aspects of civil-military relations. The Republic did maintain
a small standing army until World War II; by maintaining itself
as a force-in-being, the navy did serve as a deterrent to foreign
invasion; a strong reliance was placed on federalizing the state
militias and utilizing volunteers when needed, both of which are
aspects of the "citizen army"; an officer caste system was pre-
vented by basing the recruitment and promotion of officers on
their personal achievements and not on their social characteris-
tics; and a system of civilian control through constitutional
checks and balances was built into civil-military relations.
The rise of a separate military class and the development of





War, reached their present position of power in time of peace
basically as a result of the Cold War. The military critic,
C. Wright Mills, notes that the United States' ethos of individ-
ualism and acquisition of wealth has historically "favored the
civilian devaluation of the military as an at-times necessary
31
evil but always a burden." By the same token, generals who
have become President do so only by forsaking their military
heritage because military men qua military men have never been
elected to this highest office. This, notes Huntington, indi-
cates that political power and military professionalism are
32incompatible in the American climate of liberalism.
Within the larger framework of the Constitution, the
philosophy of civil-military relations, as advocated by two of
the more prominent members of the Convention, is reported in the
Federalist Papers . Written for the ostensible purpose of
"explaining" the Constitution to those who would pass on its
ratification in New York, these papers have become famous for
their analysis of the political philosophy of the Constitution.
Several of these papers, written by either Alexander Hamilton
or James Madison, provide one with a synthesis of the
on
This point is developed more in Chapter II.
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, Galaxy Books , 1956) , p. 176.
Huntington, Soldier and the State , p. 158. Several of
the more famous generals, who have made the successful switch to
being a non-military advocate, are Washington, Jackson, Grant,
and Eisenhower. Scott, McClellan, Hancock, Wood, and MacArthur
are among the more well-known military qua military men who
were unsuccessful in their attempt to become President.
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philosophical background of American civil-military relations.
Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 6 that one rationale for creat-
ing a union rather than retaining separate states would be its
countering effect to dangers that might arise not only from the
several states but from the foreign powers. Human nature, itself,
is wicked and weak and thus prone to acts of violence. In order
to emphasize this particular point, Hamilton noted that even
among commercial republics such as the United States the drive
for mutual amnity and interest among the republics would be
effectively countered by more immediate monetary and selfish
interests. This is accounted for by the fact that republics, as
well as monarchies, are governed by men who are captives of
33jealously, rage, and avarice. In the same context of realizing
man's weakness and leaning toward violence, Hamilton confirms in
Federalist No. 8 the need for defending society with a military
force in some form. What was crucial was that this force be
34
properly instituted so as not to become too powerful. Hamilton
further contends in Federalist No. 23 that the national govern-
ment should have the power to provide for the common defense and
raise what armies and navies are needed to meet this end. These
powers should be unlimited because it is impossible to foresee
35
or define the extent and variety of national exigencies. This
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The
Federalist Papers , with an Introduction by Clinton Rossiter










call for unlimited power is better understood as a power given
to the legislature and not to the executive to create an army.
if
In any event, standing armies are dangerous to liberty. The
best substitute for a standing army is a well-trained militia
which would be a formidable opponent to a nationally raised army
which might infringe upon the liberties of the people. The
danger imposed to a people's liberty by the militia is minimal
because the people who make up the militia would be so trained
as to defend their own rights. In his concern for economic mat-
ters, Hamilton also noted in Federalist No. 29 the economic hard-
ship that would be experienced in the form of removing from the
market productive labor to supply the manpower for a standing
37
army.
James Madison discussed the need of a standing army in
Federalist No. 41 in the context that on a large scale its con-
sequences might be fatal to the rights of the people while on a
smaller scale its presence might be a nuisance. In any instance,
prudence must be exercised by society in order to reach an
38
accommodation which is in keeping with its liberties. Madisc
discussed in Federalist No. 46 the possibility of a clash over
power between the national and state governments. He concludes
that because the people are naturally closer to the state
36 Ibid., pp. 157-58. ( Federalist No. 24.)
37
Ibid.
, pp. 184-85. This economic argument has been
countered by at least one argument that military professionals





government and more biased in that direction, the national
government will only gain power that is given to them by the
people acting through the state governments. Thus fears of
uncontrolled national governmental growth are unfounded. In the
same manner, the state, through its citizens, would control the
growth of a national military force. Uncontrolled growth would
obviously be detrimental to each citizen's goals. As an addi-
tional counter, state militias by their very size and claim to
citizen's allegiance would prevent usurpation of power by a
39
national militia.
Both essayists present similar civil-military arguments.
They were convinced that some arrangements needed to be made to
provide protection to the new Republic based on man's proneness
to wickedness and violence. The decision of how to institution-
alize this protection has as a common denominator the actions of
the people voiced through their legislative bodies. There is an
acceptance of the belief that the people are the vital element in
determining both their own destiny and the viability of institu-
tionalized civil-military relations. This arrangement is essen-
tial to democratic liberalism which, through the structural con-
stant of the Constitution, provides parameters within which the
growth and influence of the military establishment is regulated.
The French aristocrat Alexis deTocqueville observed the
American political system as it had evolved by the early 1830s.
He noted, among other things, that even in a democracy where the
39 Ibid., pp. 294-300
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natural tendencies toward warlike passions become rarer as social
conditions become more equal, the hazard of war is an ever present
threat. The United States is blessed by its comparative iso-
lation from other nations, and thus its need to maintain a large
army is very minimal. Nevertheless, these factors do not relieve
the United States, nor for that matter any democracy, from the
necessity of maintaining an army. For this reason, it is neces-
sary to inquire into the nature of the army in a democratic
40
society. Tocqueville notes that in a democracy armies are
usually led by those who have the least to lose in battle. They
are not the aristocratic landlords, and eventually, they become a
society within themselves. He discovered a basic incompatibility
between a military and a democratic society. When a man becomes
an officer in the military, he breaks his relationship with the
democratic society. In order for this same person to advance in
rank, he must be successful at what he is trained to do best--win
at war. Thus the goal of advancement by employing means, which
are at odds with a democracy, sets him apart from the society he
is trained to defend. Tocqueville concludes that within a demo-
cratic society there is a dichotomy. The people want peace which
provides them with an environment that favors industry and gives
each man a chance to succeed. Concurrently, the democratic army
wants war which provides the military man with the proper
environment to utilize his training and allow him to advance in
40 .Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America , ed. J. P.
Mayer and Max Lerner, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper




rank. The inherent differences are summarized by Tocqueville
as follows:
All citizens, being equal, constantly conceive the
wish and discuss the possibility of changing their condi-
tion and increasing their well being; that inclines them
to love peace, which favors industry and gives everyone
a chance to bring his little undertakings to conclusion.
On the other hand, the same equality makes military honors
seem more valuable to those who follow the career of arms,
and by making these honors within the reach of all, causes
soldiers to dream of battlefields. In both cases the
taste for enjoyment is equally insatiable and ambition in
both cases equally great. Only the means of gratifying it
are different. 42
What in fact is being described by Tocqueville is the
inherent presence of the "seeds" of militarism even in armies of
a democracy like the United States. Tocqueville, like Hamilton
and Madison, realized the need for a military establishment
within a democracy, but all three realized the inherent incom-
patibility of such an establishment with liberalism. Thus with
the liberal zeal manifested in the Declaration of Independence
now structured in the Constitution which articulated the basic
civil-military realtions that were philosophically acceptable to
the new nation, the genesis of American civil-military relations
was all but complete. The basic incompatibility between the two
systems was incorporated into the American political system.
What has happened to the civil-military equation since 1787 can
best be described as a series of equilibriums that reflect the
fluctuations between various modes of subjective and objective







a conservative military establishment within a liberal society.
An overview of the history of civil-military relations from the
eighteenth century until well into the twentieth century should
illustrate the difficulty in attempting a philosophical recon-
ciliation between the two societies.
Development of Civil-Military Relations
One of the first manifestations of how the ideas of the
framers of the Constitution would be translated into policy was
evident in January, 1790 when the Secretary of War, Henry Knox
presented to President Washington for submission to Congress an
elaborate plan for organization and training of a militia under
federal control. He proposed a militia composed of all able
bodied men between the ages of eighteen and sixty. Within these
age limits, various groups were to be formed and trained to
different degrees of readiness. The concept was based on the
idea of the "citizen army" and not on a standing army. Knox's
militia was to be a United States militia and not simply con-
43geries of state forces. The immediate drawback of the plan
was its unpopularity with Congress. The spirit of the country
was oriented toward the Revolutionary War concept of having
"minutemen" spring into action without the need for formal mili-
tary training. In addition, both the foreign threat to American
peace and citizen interest in spending time or money on military
43
U. S., Congress, American State Papers: Documents ,
Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States
,
Military Affairs, vol. 1, 1st Cong., 1st sess.— 15th Cong., 2d




matters were minimal. The result was that neither Washington nor
Knox could persuade the Congress to act on the original plan.
Final action was in fact delayed until May, 1792 when a much
diluted version of Knox's original plan passed Congressional
approval.
. . . 44The Militia Act of 1792 became the foundation of the
permanent military policy of the United States and affirmed the
basic concept of the "citizen army." All able bodied men between
the ages of eighteen and forty-five would, unless specifically
exempted, be liable for military service in the state militia.
The states were also given the task of organizing and training
the militia. The weaknesses of the act were immediately evident.
Prospective militiamen had to furnish their own weapons and
ammunition. No provision was made for specifically enforcing the
requirement for universal training, which had been specifically
stipulated in the act. What the act did confirm was the histori-
cal philosophical antipathy toward a national military establish-
ment. The Congress might have followed the rationale, as pos-
sibly did the founding fathers, that the state militia would act
not only as a liberalizing force in military matters, but as a
counterforce against both national intrusion on individual rights
and the formation of a national army. The state militia would
also counter any rise in militarism and conduct the defense of
the nation against invasion.
44Militia Act, Statutes at Large 1, 271-74 (1792)

36
In March, 1794 a Congressional committee reported to the
House of Representatives their viewpoints on revising the Act of
1792.
. . . they are impressed with the importance of a
more energetic system . . . but in viewing this subject,
as applied to the Constitution . . . they have their
doubts how far Congress can . . . make any important
alterations or amendments to the present law [Militia
Act of 1792] . . . the right of training the militia is
constitutionally reserved to the states . . . the com-
mittee are of the opinion that no amendment is necessary
to act for establishing an uniform militia throughout
the United States. 45
Acting on the recommendations of the committee, Congress passed
no further legislation modifying the Act of 1792. The threat of
war with France prompted the passage of the Militia Act of
46
1798, which only modified the Act of 1792 to the extent of arm-
ing the state militias at government expense. In fact, even
though the Act of 1792 was amended and modified to meet the
exigencies of future wars or confrontations (as it was in 1798)
,
the act remained as the basis for American military policy until
the passage of the Militia Act of 1903.
The national figures most associated with advancing a
positive military policy in the last decade of the eighteenth
century were Alexander Hamilton and George Washington. Both
advocated the concept of a small but professional cadre of regular
army men which could be expanded, when circumstances dictated,
and supplemented by new recruits. Actually, they advocated what
U. S. , Congress, American State Papers , p. 66.
46Militia Act , Statutes at Large 1, 576-77 (1798)
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was to be the beginning of the expansible army concept later
recommended by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, to President
Monroe in 1820. One other concrete recommendation was Hamilton's
plan to establish a military academy as an institution to study
the art of war, a plan which came to fruition during Thomas
47Jefferson's tenure as President.
With the election of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency
in 1800, the hopes of Washington and Hamilton for establishing
an institutionalized cadre of professional soldiers would appear
to be eclipsed by the Jeffersonian spirit of liberalism which was
anathema to standing armies. Jefferson had been most direct in
his condemnation of standing armies and the quartering of troops
within the colonists' homes. Now as President, Jefferson was
cast not only in the role of philosopher but also of policy
maker. Paramount to Jefferson's liberalism and thus contributing
to a better understanding of his civil-military philosophy was
his concern for the individual. Based on his observations, the
governments, constitutions, and laws that ensue from the vesting
of power are entitled to respect and obedience only as they ful-
48
fill the function of aiding the freedom of the individual.
Within this context, his attitude toward the Constitution as a
document that provides parameters would be ambivalent. He would
U. S. , Congress, American State Papers , pp. 133-44.
4 8Jefferson's theories on the individual not only follow
closely his ideas as documented in the Declaration of Independ-
ence, but closely parallel those of John Locke's "Second




be a strict constructionist when he believed acts of the people
were destructive of personal freedom; he would be a liberal
interpreter of it when such acts threatened to impede the develop-
ment of the freedom and individuality of the people. Within the
ethos of Jeffersonian sanctification of the individual was
developed his theory of civil-military relations. Jefferson was
aware that both internal and external threats necessitated the
establishment of some military institution. What form this
institution was to take has become a matter of historical record.
In view of his pre-eminent regard for the individual
determining his own destiny and the belief that a standing army
was antithetical to the tenets of democracy and liberalism,
Jefferson wanted to maintain a militia in time of peace to cope
with emergencies; in time of war he advocated the creation of a
regular army, but only for the immediate purpose of defeating the
enemy after which time it would be disbanded. This was opposite
to the philosophy of Hamilton who wanted a small, but well-
trained professional force in peacetime that would be supple-
mented in war time by the militia. In fact, both plans are
infeasible in a liberal society, but for different reasons. The
basic tenets of liberalism were against having any standing army
in peacetime and thus Hamilton's plan was unacceptable. The
creation of a "citizen army" in time of peace was contrary to the
principles of the general public and their sentiments and thus
from its inception Jefferson's plan was not very popular. The
result was a compromise and not a clear victory for either side.
In effect it established the general relationship which the
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conservative military establishment would have with its liberal
society until at least 1945. The regular professional forces
were to be limited in size in peacetime (usually by the amount of
money appropriated for military strength) and supplemented in war-
time by volunteers and militia forces. This allowed the liberal
society to control the military establishment in both peacetime
and wartime. Liberalism had no use for objective civilian control
and Jefferson's policies were certainly no exception to this
relationship.
Jefferson's liberal distaste for a professional military
and his high regard for a universal militia accounted for most of
his pronouncements and actions on civil-military matters during
his Presidency. In a letter to Samuel Adams (26 February 1800)
,
Jefferson noted that the lesson to be learned from Napoleon's
takeover of the French Republic was the inherent danger of having
49
standing armies. Jefferson's First Inaugural Address (4 March
1801) reaffirmed his general philosophy by noting that a well-
disciplined militia would provide the best safety in peacetime
50
as it would in wartime until the regulars could relieve them.
Jefferson continued to reiterate his basic policy throughout his
tenure as President. In his First Annual Message to Congress
(8 December 1801) , he observed that he did not conceive it either
needful or safe to maintain a standing army involved in garrison
49
Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson ,
comp. and ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 10 vols. (New York: Knicker-
bocker Press of G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), 7 (1896): 425-26,
50Thomas Jefferson, Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson ,




duty as a defense against invasion because in essence these num-
bers would be inadequate to the task. Instead, the only force
that would be feasible to defend against any point of attack
would be the militia. Jefferson followed up both of these state-
ments with positive action. Despite the tension with France dur-
ing the early part of his administration, he allowed attrition to
reduce the authorized strength of the army to fall from 5,438 to
3,794. And even though he had authorized by 1808 the strength
of the army to increase to 10,000 on the eve of the War of 1812,
51President Madison had only 6,686 men under arms. Likewise,
where the army in 1802 had thirteen field grade officers for
combat units, by 1809 only nine remained. As James Jacobs notes,
"Jefferson believed that the army had little need of those beyond
52
the grade of captain." In his Sixth Annual Message to Congress
(2 December 1806) , Jefferson again indicated what his beliefs
were on a standing army in the context of his time of an armed
Europe.
Our duty is, therefore, to act upon things as they are,
and to make a reasonable provision for whatever they may
be. Were armies to be raised whenever a speck of war is
visible in the horizon, we never should have been without
them. Our resources would have been exhausted on dangers
which have never happened, instead of being reserved for
what is really to take place. 53
To provide for a defense, Jefferson recommended the following:
Weigley, Towards an American Army , p. 28.
52James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army ,
1783-1812 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 385.
53Foner, Writings of Jefferson, p. 375.
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A militia so organized that its effective portions
can be called to any point in the Union, or volunteers
instead of them to serve a sufficient time, are means
which may always be ready yet never preying on our
resources until actually called into use. 54
He reiterated this position in his Eighth Annual Message to
Congress (8 November 1808) by noting that, "For a people who are
free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed
55
militia is their best security." Even after he had retired to
Monticello, Jefferson still advocated a militia force. In June,
1813, he noted that in keeping with his idea of a "citizen army,"
military instruction should be made a regular part of college
education. "We can never be safe till this is done." In a
letter to John Eppes in September, 1814, Jefferson proclaimed
that
. . . the truth must now be obvious that our people
are too happy at home to enter into regular service, and
that we cannot be defended but by making every citizen
a souldier [sic] as the Greeks and Romans who had no
standing armies. . . . 57
By urging signing of legislation that provided for estab-
lishing a military academy at West Point in 1802, it would appear
that Jefferson had at least tacitly agreed with Hamilton's idea
of a professional army corps. This is not totally true because
the Academy was conceived of as a school to produce engineers
Ibid.
55Ibid., p. 394.
56Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson , ed.
H. A. Washington, 9 vols. (Washington: Taylor and Maury,
1853-54) , 6 (1854) : 131.
57Ford, Writings of Jefferson , 9 (1898): 484-85.
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and not military professionals. Moreover, the initial enrollment
of less than a dozen cadets would hardly pose a threat to the
civilian society. Before the Civil War, the Academy had become
one of the top-rated engineering schools in the country, but
other than preparing its students for engineering duty it did
not give them any training in the liberal arts nor did it provide
them with the essentials of military science.
Even though the Constitution had given Congress the
powers to provide for and maintain a navy, Jefferson's naval
policies followed closely those which he applied to standing
armies. Both policies not only led to a reduction in government
expenditures and a lightened tax burden but they manifested
Jefferson's refusal to use force in international relations. In
the wars with the Barbary pirates, Jefferson wanted to employ
ships of the line to protect American interests in the Mediter-
ranean, but beyond this, five of the seven frigates directed to
be "mothballed" were to be brought to Washington where they could
58be kept under the eye of the executive. When peace had been
made, Jefferson withdrew American shipping from the Mediterranean.
In order to forestall any future foreign naval engagements, he
induced Congress to provide for 278 auxiliary gunboats, which
were to replace ocean going frigates, that could be hauled up on
the beach in peacetime and run into the water in time of war.
Jefferson's most poignant manifestation of his refusal to become
involved in international troubles may have been his self-
imposed blockade in 1807.
5 Q
Foner, Writings of Jefferson , p. 339.
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What is evident in Jefferson's pronouncements and
actions is his penchant to maintain a non- involvement attitude
which could possibly preclude infringement upon the rights of
the individual. This could account for his aversion to standing
armies and belligerent navies. His citizen-soldier concept
reaffirmed the founding father's ideas about the pre-eminence of
the militia as a firm counter to a standing army. At the basis
of his civil-military philosophy was his underlying emphasis on
natural rights, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, sub-
sumed in the rubric of liberalism and manifested in his never
ending quest to protect the individual. Citizen-soldiers and
gunboat-sailors provided the proper protection for the United
States. Jeffersonian democracy provides the interpreter of
American political history with philosophic ideas by which to
judge the future course of civil-military relations.
The geographical isolation of the United States comple-
mented by Jefferson's liberal civil-military policy of non-
involvement in foreign affairs, a small standing army, and a gun-
boat navy, possibly added to the legend, spawned in the Revolu-
tionary War, that America enters its wars unprepared and then
only when provoked. Within the context of this overall liberal
ideology, which dictated to a large extent the nature of civil-
military relations, the conservative Constitution through its
checks and balances made objective control of the military
virtually dependent upon excluding the military from political
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59power. Other than expanding its size to meet the exigencies
of the time (War of 1812, Mexican War, Civil War), the military
establishment of the pre-industrialized era remained both small
and under the subjective control of the larger society. Thus
because of a lack of external threat, being isolated from the
wars and problems of Europe, and in receipt of meager Congres-
sional appropriations, few problems arising as a result of civil-
military relations developed prior to the Civil War in the Ameri-
can political system.
During the pre-Civil War period, there were perhaps two
other persons, John C. Calhoun and Andrew Jackson, who in their
own way challenged the existing state of civil-military relations
which had been developed under Jefferson.
The expansible regular army concept as proposed by
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun to Congress in 1820 was not an
original idea but had been part of George Washington's sentiments
60
on post-Revolutionary War military policy in 1783. The concept
received little or no popular support when it was first proposed
by Washington nor was it made part of the Militia Act of 1792.
As noted by Russell Weigley, the War of 1812 brought few suc-
cesses for the regular army and even in these cases military
Huntington, Soldier and the State , p. 14 3. Huntington
does note one major exception Fp~. 147) to this dominant philosophy
which was founded in the conservatism of the South. Here, prior
to the Civil War, the idea of military professionalism was
fostered.
60Weigley, Towards an American Army, pp. 11-14.
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policy had to be improvised to meet the situation. Against
this background, Calhoun offered the expansible army concept to
Congress on 12 December 182 for national defense based on a
regular army. In his famous "Report on the Readiness of the
Army" Calhoun set forth his concept. The army had two tasks
—
garrison duty in peacetime and defense of the nation in wartime.
Calhoun considered the latter was the more important of the two
tasks. On this premise, he proposed the establishment of a small
peacetime army with provisions for an organization for a wartime
army. At the outbreak of war, the professionals would form the
cadre of the army that would be expanded by the filling in the
ranks with volunteers and militia. Calhoun's plan ran counter
to not only the sentiments of the time but to basic philosophical
differences. The wars in Europe had ended; the Battle of New
Orleans in the War of 1812 had largely vindicated the concept of
the "citizen army"; and the American people were not only unwill-
ing to support a regular army but they also had a basic distrust
for a professional officer corps. Against this background, the
dominant liberals in Congress rejected Calhoun's plan. As
Huntington notes, Calhoun's concept ran counter to the basic
tenet of American liberalism "that professional military offi-
cers are permissible only when they command small military
Russell F. Weigley, ed. , The American Military :
Readings in the History of the Military in American Sqcj ety
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 9,
62John C. Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun , ed.
W. Edwin Hemphill, 7 vols. (Columbia, S. C. ! University of
South Carolina Press, 1959-73), 5 (1971): 480-90.
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forces and that large military forces are permissible only when
6 3they are commanded by non-professional soldiers." In 1821, as
a possible indication of added rebuttal to Calhoun's efforts, the
army was reduced by two regiments.
Andrew Jackson's philosophy of popularistic democracy
carried Jefferson's liberal civil-military policy practically to
the point of liberal indifference to military affairs. In his
First Inaugural Address (4 March 1829) , Jackson reiterated
Jefferson's liberal civil-military policy by noting that armies
were dangerous to free government in time of peace. The bulwark
of our defense lay in the national militia. As long as the
government is administered for the good of the people and regu-
lated by their will, it could be defended by a patriotic
64
militia. But Jackson was more interested in matters other than
military problems and to these matters he seemed to direct the
national attention. Under Jackson's tenure as President the
country witnessed westward expansion, further decentralization
of American life, and the beginnings of industrialism. Jackson's
indifference to military affairs has been described by Samuel
Huntington.
Jefferson wanted to educate all citizens to be
soldiers; the Jacksonians assumed that all citizens could
be soldiers without training. Technical competence was
required of the good Jeffersonian officer; militant enthu-
siasm of his Jacksonian counterpart. In contrast to
Huntington, Soldier and the State , p. 217.
James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 , 10 vols. (Washington:
n.p. , 1896-99) , 2 (1896) : 437-38. Note the similarity with
Madison's Federalist No. 46 on pp. 30-31 above.

47
Jeffersonian technicism, the Jacksonian approach to
military officership was distinctly anti-intellectual. *>5
Jackson's attitude found a natural target in an institution estab-
lished by Jefferson--the Military Academy at West Point. His
quarrel was with the method of cadet selection which he claimed
fostered and perpetuated an elitist group of officers. His
popularistic philosophy led him to attempt to close the Academy,
and although this failed, Jackson was successful in originating
the concept, which was eventually formalized in 1843, that led
to the Congressional appointment system still in effect at all
three military academies. Although President Jackson's role in
articulating American civil-military policy is not as prominent
as that of Jefferson's, it should be noted that as the President
who expanded liberalism in the growing Republic he demonstrated
the effectiveness of subjective civilian control. Carried to
its logical conclusion, Jackson came as close as any President
in effectively eliminating the military from the power structure
of society.
Only the South seemed to be outside the ethos of
liberalism as epitomized by Jefferson and Jackson. Here the con-
servative attitude, an agrarian economy, and a tacit allegiance
to feudal romanticism helped to support a professional military
ethic. The South was in many ways an illiberal island in a
liberal society. The combination of these factors led the South
to be more sympathetic to the military profession than the North,





and possibly helps to explain how the South in pre-Civil War
days came to dominate the ranks of the military. While Southern
dominance over pre-Civil War military professionalism did not
alter the basic American liberal attitudes of Jefferson and
Jackson, the Northern victory in the Civil War, which allowed
the liberals to once again revert to the policy of ignoring mili-
tary policy also allowed Southern conservatism to slowly re-
emerge to help pave the way for post-Civil War military reform.
The Southern contribution was in the form. of ideas shaped within
the Jefferson-Jackson liberal institutions of organization,
education, and advancement. As Huntington notes, "The roots of




While the Civil War had only temporarily halted Southern
influence on military professionalism, the prevalence of business
pacificism made the postwar era one which witnessed almost uni-
versal American hostility toward all things military. This
syndrome, which had its origins in Puritan hostility to warfare
as anathema to prosperity, resurfaced on the eve of the industrial
revolution and was articulated by such business pacifists as
William Graham Sumner and Andrew Carnegie. The hostility of
American society to the military establishment resulted in the
isolation of the military from the society they served. Con-
currently, the resurgence of the growth of military profession-







which remained basically untouched by societal inputs. Within
this environment of isolation and absence of political power,
the age of military professionalism was born. Troubled by
neither war nor politics, the profession was able to develop a
distinctive military orientation.
The creative core of this professional growth included
such famous military officers as General William Sherman,
General Emory Upton, and Admiral Stephen Luce. William Sherman
(1820-91) made such institutionalized reforms as introducing
liberal education into the West Point curriculum and establish-
ing professional training schools. Of equal importance was his
overall influence on the army as- its commanding general from
1869-83, during which time he set the tone of tough-minded pro-
fessionalism. Emory Upton (1839-81) was a great reformer who
was instrumental in increasing professionalism through the
establishment of a strong regular army. Stephen Luce (1827-
1917) was the forerunner of the creation of naval professionalism
and the founder of the Naval War College. These officers were
not only assisted in their efforts to institutionalize military
professionalism by their isolation from society but by the
emergence of a new era of industrialism. The nation was expe-
riencing a technological revolution which could dictate to a
large extent the way future wars would be fought. The military
professionals saw in this a need to create a new concept of pro-
fessionalism. This era of pro "essional growth and its dominant
syndrome of objective control may have been a reaction by a con-




a reaction of an inherently conservative group against
a liberal society, rather than the product of a great
conservative reform movement within society. . . . In
these origins lie much of the reason for American hos-
tility to the profession as an essentially alien body . 68
(Italics mine.
)
An aura of estrangement and alienation from civilian
society settled over the military community. Concurrent with the
rise of technology and industrialism was a rise in commercialism
and an accompanying laissez faire attitude. The antithetical
attitudes which laissez faire presented to military profession-
alism compounded the already isolated situation that marked
civil-military relations. Laissez faire was a competitive system
which glorified in the seeking of an economic operating level
through individual competition. On the other hand, conservative
professional military beliefs glorified subordination, loyalty,
duty, discipline, and obedience. Opposed to the Social Dar-
winists was the concept of group as advocated by the military
professionals. What was in fact developing was the modern day
problem of civil-military relations. This appeared in the form
of a struggle for an accommodation between subjective control
which was so evident in pre-Civil War days and objective control
that was thrust upon the American military establishment because
of its post-Civil War isolation from society. As the United
States entered the twentieth century, the question of which con-
trol should be dominant to the exclusion of the other was no






equilibrium between the two. While the military strove toward
a more professional institution, personnel strength of the armed
services continued to decline in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century. On the eve of the Spanish-American War, the army
numbered less than 25,000.
The war thrust the United States into an era of expan-
sionist and international policies that did not permit immediate
postwar demobilization as had been the case after previous wars.
Congress raised the authorized strength of the army from 65,000
in 1899 to 100,000 in 1901. Americans were being brought to the
realization that internationalism demanded a comparable military
force. Military reform measures in the postwar era further con-
flicted with reform liberal ideas of military subjective control.
In 1903, Congress passed the "Act to Promote the Efficiency of
the Militia," which was the first major military reform legis-
lation passed since the Militia Act of 1792. Part of then
Secretary of War Elihu Root's efforts to modernize the military
establishment led to the passage of this act which, among other
things, provided for an increase in the size of the regular army,
creation of a general staff, and federalizing of the state
6 9
Louis Morton, "Civilians and Soldiers: Civil Military
Relations in the United States," in Theory and Practice in Ameri -
can Politics
, ed. William H. Nelson (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press for William Marsh Rice University, 1964), p. 130.
70Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia , Statutes
at Large 32, Part I, 775-80 (1903). Events in the Spanish-
American War such as the dispatching of winter uniforms to the
troops in Cuba led to Root's concerted effort to have the mili-
tary exert more control over military policy. This act, more
popularly known as the "Dick Act," was one such result.

52
militia (now called the National Guard) in time of war and making
them an organized reserve force of the army in time of peace. By
passage of a single act, the professional military now exercised
control over virtually the entire military manpower force of the
nation. In effect, a standing army was created without increasing
public resentment because by utilizing the state militia, the
historical imperative of a "citizen army" was honored. Arthur
Ekrich notes that by 1920 the peace time citizen army based on
the concept of state militia under local control had been con-
71
verted into a federalized militia and reserve force. One reason
for this quiet but fundamental change was the possible relation-
ship which existed between the need for the development of a new
military technology and a need for a new "breed" of trained and
educated military men to master the new weapons of war. If the
holocasts of the World War I Verduns did not lay to rest the
romantic American idea of the revolutionary minuteman being a
latter day Cincinnatus, they certainly spawned a necessity for
the combining of technology with professionalism. By viewing the
Act of 1903 in the context of the post-Civil War era rise in
military professionalism exercised through objective control, it
seems to explain the retreat of the military, with its newly
found force and power, further into itself as it developed a more
extensive professional ethic. All the time this retreat was
going on, the military became more and more isolated from the
society it was designed to defend.
71Arthur A. Ekrich, Jr., "The Idea of a Citizen Army,"
Military Affairs 17 (Spring 1953): 35.
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With the entry of the United States into World War I,
American liberalism, under its leader Woodrow Wilson, again
entered the international political arena. The liberalism of a
Jefferson and a Jackson did not embody any real security function.
The Spanish-American War was too one-sided to make this omission
obvious. Liberalism in relation to civil-military relations had,
until this era, been concerned with countering a rise in mili-
tarism within the state. But in the twentieth century the
threat had been given a second dimension, that of a threat to
national security. Although it was not made readily apparent
until World War II, the functional imperative of security was
beginning to oppose the societal imperative of liberalism. One
observation of why American liberalism faltered when applied by
Wilson to the international setting after World War I was because
the elements of American liberalism were incapable of implemen-
tation in international relations. Liberalism had not been given
a security function because it had presupposed external security.
This assumption, while valid in the United States for at least a
century, had little applicability in Europe. Because the Ameri-
cans had been successful at solving domestic problems with liberal
solutions, an attempt was made to reduce international problems
to domestic problems. Once again there were too many premises
that were assumed in domestic affairs that could not be assumed
in international affairs. Finally, the use of American liberal
standards in the conduct of foreign policy led to unreal evalua-
72
tion of foreign situations. Wilsonian efforts at promoting a
7 2
Huntington, Soldier and the State , pp. 149-51,
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lasting peace guided by American liberal tenets were headed for
failure. When the United States refused to enter the League of
Nations, the nation entered an era of isolation, and the military
establishment retreated even further into a more isolated enclave.
73The National Defense Act of 1916 made every adult, in effect, a
militiaman with a primary national obligation; by the 1933 amend-
74
ment to this Act, all distinction of control between the army
and the militia was basically abolished. While the world stood
on the precipice of war in the late 1930s, the American military
and civilian societies were struggling for some type of
mutuality.
At least one observer of civil-military relations saw a
definite problem in providing for an equilibrium between the
imperatives of liberalism and security. Harold Lasswell saw
within the confines of the Sino-Japanese conflict, started by the
Mukden incident in September, 1931, the rise of the "garrison
state." He may well have been the first to recognize and report
this phenomenon, which was to further deepen the military split
with the liberals. Within Lasswell' s model, the specialist in
violence (the military) would become the dominant group in
society. This position was not actively sought by the military
but was the result of an attitudinal configuration in the popu-
lation which is supportive of a vastly larger role for the
73National Defense Act , Statutes at Large 39, Part I,
166-217 (1916) . See especially sec. 57 on the composition of
the militia.
74National Defense Act Amendments , Statutes at Large 48
Part I, 153-62 (1933-34).
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military in segments of national life. It would not come about
by military seizure of power but rather as the result of an
accretion to power brought about by prolonged international ten-
sion, as was the case in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Economic
and scientific investigation was to be an integral concomitant
to military consumption. For obvious reasons, it is difficult
to forecast or predict who and how many considered Lasswell's
model a trenchant prediction for the future. World War I had
not been very receptive of Wilson's liberalism and it appeared
to take a gargantuan effort on behalf of President Roosevelt to
awaken the nation to military threats on the eve of World War II.
Despite the potential threat to the United States, how could the
liberals condone and participate in another basic irrational,
inhuman act as they had already done in World War I?
By liberal standards, there is paradoxically enough a
compatibility between liberalism and war. In effect, when all
efforts have failed to produce peace, the liberals look to the
military to conduct the war to total victory by using the
resources available in a rational manner. Once victory is
achieved, the power given to the military is to return to the
liberals. The war vindicates the mutual exclusion and division
Harold D. Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison
State Versus the Civilian State," China Quarterly 2 (Fall 1937):
643-49.
76 Huntington, Soldier and the State , p. 317. The uncondi-
tional surrender policy announced at Casablanca in 1943 would be
compatible to both the liberals and the conservatives in explain-
ing the war to the general public. To the liberals, the mission
to eradicate the threat to freedom must be made in the most rapid
and efficient manner possible; to the conservatives, the elimi-




of labor which is present in the pre- and postwar eras between
the civilian engaged in politics and the military engaged in war.
The bombing of Pearl Harbor made the liberal crusade credible by
giving liberals cause to invoke such tenets as survival and
remaking the world safe for democracy. Once the crusade had been
properly conducted and the power reverted to the liberals, the
familiar scenario once again stipulates either the elimination of
the military establishment in the societal power structure
(extirpation) or for a return of the military to a structure of
subjective control (transmutation) . The liberals entered the
post-World War II era with hopes of recreating a Jeffersonian type
of liberalism in a world that was militarily speaking "light
years" removed from what it had been in 1940. The cold war and
the atomic bomb cast immediate shadows over the liberal hopes for
a return to a pre-World War II civil-military relationship.
The twentieth century is not without its observers and
critics of civil-military relations. A survey analysis of the
viewpoints of several of the more notable writers will serve to
show how the dichotomy initially noted by the Puritans has
remained an enigmatic problem since. In addition, such a survey
will demonstrate how the problems of civil-military relations
have persisted over the years. One should note the great
similarity in the following observations even though they speak
from different professions or disciplines. Also each of the
following writers is convinced of the irreconcilability of
societal and military traits the modern world creates:

Samuel Huntington (political scientist)
57
77
A conclusion is drawn that a conservative label has been
affixed to the political orientation of the military which
emphasizes irrationality, weakness, evil in human nature,
continuing war, the cautious and conservative view of
state policy, the supremacy of society over the individual,
and obedience as the highest military order. The military
ethic is pessimistic, collectivist , historically oriented,
power oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, and pacifist,
(pp. 69, 79)
Liberalism's hostility to the military ethic includes
individualism (dignity) vs. group (man is weak); peace
(natural) vs. conflict (natural); self-expression vs.
obedience; reason vs. experience; war permissible (univer-
sal principles) vs. war permissible (abstract principles).
If the military is necessary, civilians must control
liberal principles because the national defense is the
responsibility of all. (pp. 90-94)
Conservatism's accommodation with the military elite
includes the theory of group, recognition of history,
acceptance of existing institutions, distrust of grand
designs. (pp. 90-94)
Liberalism is united in its hostility toward the military
profession. Neither the pacifist nor the crusader like
the function of the military, which is the security of the
state. The military contaminates the pacifist's peace and
the crusader's crusade. (p. 153)
Some of the major components of conservatism as it is rele-
vant to the military are—truth exists in concrete experi-
ence and not in universal propositions; community is .,„
superior to the individual; evil is rooted in human nature.
79
Allen Guttmann (political scientist)
No matter how much the American soldier departs from the
conservative model, the ideals of military discipline are
basically antithetical to the Jefferson tradition of
individual rights. A soldier may have many liberal be-
liefs, but when he is commanded to fight against the
enemy, he must. (p. 114)
77
Huntington, Soldier and the State .
78 Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology,"
American Political Science Review 51 (June 1957): 456.
79Allen Guttmann, The Conservative Tradition in America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Clinton Rossiter (political scientist)
58
80
The humanitarian function of government under the conser-
vative ethic will always remain secondary to the duties
to insure tranquility, secure property rights, establish
justice, and raise the level of morality. (p. 35)
The conservative places the society before the individual,
(p. 36)
Conservatism is a thankless persuasion because it counsels
caution rather than adventure and reacts rather than acts,
(p. 63)
It is easy to be a conservative of temperment but hard to
be a conservative of the intellect. (p. 239)
81Morris Janowitz (sociologist)
The military officers in the United States have tended to
have conservative ends concerning the military establish-
ment. This is manifested in a belief in the inevitability
of interstate conflict and the lack of concern for the
social and political consequences of war. (p. 22)
On the basis of a single question asking officers to
identify themselves as conservative, semi-conservative,
semi-liberal, or liberal, Janowitz found that the basic
orientation was predominantly conservative. He also found
that conservatism increased with higher positions in the
military hierarchy and concluded "the higher rank means
longer organizational experience, greater commitment to
the organization, and more selecting out of deviant
perspectives." (pp. 236-39)
8 2
Adam Yarmolinsky (political scientist)
The military group-oriented value system runs counter to
the egalitarian, individualistic, humanistic ideals of
American civil society. (p. 398)
Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thank-
less Persuasion , 2d ed. , rev" (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).
Rossiter's thesis is that the United States is a country liberal
in political thought and conservative in political practice;
see p. 269.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social
and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971)
.
82Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its





In summary, the above authors all view the tenets and
values of the military ethic as conservative in nature and thus
oriented toward such general concepts as group solidarity,
natural conflict within human nature, recognition of history,
obedience as the highest order, and reliance on experience.
Opposed to these concepts is the liberal ethic which primarily
emphasizes the concept of the free individual which is basically
contrary to the conservative nature of the military ethic.
It has been over three hundred years since the Puritans
demonstrated their antipathy toward a military ethic and almost
two hundred years since Jefferson sanctified the individual in
the Declaration of Independence. The current literature on civil-
military relations, as exemplified by the above writers tends to
confirm the initial views of the Puritans and Jefferson on the
philosophical dichotomy that has historically existed between
the civilian society and its military establishment. The passage
of time has not altered this basically incompatible relationship.
One additional viewpoint of contemporary liberalism was
reported by the President's Commission on National Goals in its
1960 study. The commission reaffirmed the Jeffersonian tradition
by noting the paramount goal of the United States "is to guard
the rights of the individual, to ensure his development, and to
83
enlarge his opportunity." In being more definitive, the
commission commented:
83President' s Commission on National Goals, Report (New
York: Columbia University Press for the American Assembly,
Spectrum Books, 1960), p. 1.
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The status of the individual must remain our primary
concern. All our institutions
—
political, social, and
economic—must further embrace the dignity of the citizen,
promote the maximum development of his capabilities,
stimulate their responsible exercise, and widen the range
and effectiveness of opportunities for individual choice. 8 ^
Of course the viability of the credo of liberalism is not beyond
85the realm of questioning, but assuming that the concept of
individualism remains as the foremost element of liberalism,
then the basic philosophical differences with the military ethic
remain intact.
In conclusion, a historical investigation of the philo-
sophical differences between the liberal American society and
its conservative military establishment have revealed that such
differences have exacerbated civil-military relations throughout
American history. Because the mission of the military is to pro-
tect society, the carrying out of this effort presupposes that
the military will take on certain institutional characteristics
that are traditionally conservative and thus per se will come into
conflict with the liberal society. Among the other consequences




8 5For several viewpoints on the dismay facing liberals
see Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York:
New American Library, Inc., Mentor Books, 1955) in which he sur-
veys the decay of natural rights and admonishes the American
public to reassert them; Henry Kariel, "The Ideological Vacuum,"
Nation
,
18 April 1966, pp. 449-52, in which he notes that the
ideology which Locke, Adam Smith, and Madison articulated as a
guide to our public sector has not carried over into the private
sector and thus there is a "vacuum" created between private
actions and public goals; Theodore J. Lowi , The End of
Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public
Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. , 1969) in
which Lowi notes that the evils spawned within the liberal ethic




civil-military equation. The functional imperative of security
made this a task with a high priority. Chapter II analyzes this
new scenario in the context of recognizing that the military,
while an illiberal island in a historically liberal society,




POST-WORLD WAR II CIVIL-MILITARY EQUATION
The political scenario within which World War II was
fought was in consonance with the general philosophies of both
liberal and conservative Americans. To liberals, the war was a
crusade against fascism to be fought to a rapid and hopefully
successful conclusion with the least expenditure of national
resources. This had previously been the historical hopes of
American liberals in wartime, and World War II was no exception.
The crusading nature of the war was made evident by such slogans
as "Remember Pearl Harbor" and "I Shall Return." Following on
from victory, liberals would then hopefully preside over the dis-
mantling of the military force. Eventually their hopes would
include that any remaining military force would be brought under
the subjective control of society. Likewise, the conservative
tenet that man was evil and irrational was borne out in the
American' 9 belief about the enemy, and thus the elimination of
these evil forces could be legitimized through the conservative
institution of the military establishment.
As in previously fought wars, the liberal idea of crusade




on man's irrationality, and once again the exigencies of war were
able to bridge the historical and philosophical differences
between a liberal America and its conservative military estab-
lishment. The unconditional surrender policy announced by the
allies at the Casablanca Conference in 1943 pleased both liberals
and conservatives.
Although liberals were satisfied with the philosophical
ramifications of the war, there was one factor of the wartime
environment which concerned them. This was the presence of mili-
tary control over virtually the entire civilian sector of govern-
ment. Both Robert Sherwood, the biographer of Roosevelt and
Hopkins, and Cordell Hull, wartime Secretary of State, noted the
trend toward militarism, possibly not in the classic Lasswellian
sense of turning the country into a garrison state, but to a
degree never before experienced in American history. Sherwood
noted Roosevelt's penchant for military solutions and his com-
plete confidence in the Army Chief of Staff, General George
Marshall. Hull was piqued at being ignored by Roosevelt who
turned to the military and not to the State Department for war-
time advice. In retrospect, historical facts belied the liberal
fears about the postwar military influence based on World War II
experiences. However, what liberals, as well as most other
Americans, could not have anticipated was the genesis of the cold
Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate
History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 11.
2 Cordell Hull, Memoirs , 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1948), II: 1109-11.
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war and the effect it would have on the future of American civil-
military relations.
As had happened at the conclusion of other wars in which
American forces were directly involved, demobilization of the
military establishment proceeded at a rapid pace after the sur-
render of Japan in September, 1945. Of a wartime high of 11.6
million military personnel on active duty when the war ended in
the summer of 1945, 3.8 million were on duty as of June, 1946
and only 1.7 million as of June, 1947. The rapid postwar mili-
tary demobilization could serve to alleviate the fears that
American liberals might have had about the postwar American
society. What many Americans could not have predicted was that
the world in the postwar era was to be a vastly different one
than that which had been the scene of the bloodiest conflict in
history. The war had spawned, among other things, immense
technological changes, a world wide realization of human rights
and human needs, and the belated entry of the United States into
a position of power within the international community. Thus the
combination of these factors produced new international commit-
ments and responsibilities in a nation which, in a historical
context, was basically committed to a policy of liberalism within
its own boundaries. As Chapter I noted, one of the failures of
American liberalism in World War I was the absence of a security
3function in the liberal ethic. Now after World War II the
security function had to be recognized and rendered effective.
i




For the first time in American history, a return to the status
quo ante bellum was not possible as far as military policy was
concerned. If the United States, either by choice or by default,
was to enter into international politics and agreements, it had
to have a military force-in-being to make its position of
influence legitimate.
Although an institutional reorientation between society
and the military establishment was an immediate postwar task, the
historical, philosophical question would remain basically the
same. How was the liberal society to provide for its military
security when this required the maintenance of a military force
fundamentally at odds with liberalism? The war had obviously
changed, at least, peripheral civil-military relationships. It
had produced a civil-military interdependence that Walter Millis
notes generated a mutual interdependence between the two socie-
ties. The soldier realized his dependence on industrial produc-
tion, scientific effort, and public support of the war. The
civilian became aware of his dependence on the soldier not only
in conducting the war but in arriving at decisions that were now
4both political and military in nature. Whatever hopes the
liberal had in returning to a prewar arrangement of a small mili-
tary force under objective civilian .control , which would ignore
the problem of security, were slowly frustrated first, by the
international implications of the United States' monopoly of
atomic weapons, then the political confrontation between capi-
talism and communism in the cold war, and finally the passing
Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein,
Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), pp. 140-41.
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of the United States' monopoly of atomic weapons. Before
analyzing the postwar events that either directly or indirectly
affected civil-military relations, an investigation of the civil-
military options available to a liberal democratic country com-
mitted to internationalism will illustrate the dilemma faced when
liberalism confronts the institution of a standing and influen-
tial military force.
The growth of the military establishment in World War II
to great strength and power (on both the domestic and inter-
national scenes) seemed to convince some liberals that the garri-
son state model, first posited by Lasswell in 1937, was an actual
possibility in the United States as the conflict became more and
more protracted. This possibility Was incorporated in the claim
that the wartime military-industrial complex was but the first
step toward a final garrison state. To those liberals, it came
to seem quite possible that society might be dominated by the
military, an arrangement antithetical to liberal tenets. Other
liberals drew from the war the hope of eliminating the military
5forces as a force-in-being in peacetime. Such hopes, for the
most part, were overtaken by the events of the cold war. Within
the two extreme options of a garrison state and having no military
force at all, two models have evolved which depict different ways
of addressing the dual imperatives of maintaining both national
security and a liberal society. One model (proposed by Hunting-
ton) excludes the military from any integration with society
because of basic theoretical differences; the second model
5 Samuel Huntington has called this procedure extirpation,
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(proposed by Janowitz) proposes a closer integration between the
two societies premised on the fact that the military must be
aware of and support the norms of society.
Samuel Huntington argues that when society is pre-
dominantly liberal in its orientation,
military professionalism and civilian control are maxi-
mized by the military renouncing authority and influence
and leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from
the general life of society. *>
To protect the liberal society from military threat, Huntington
believes that the military should be isolated from the rest of
society. By isolating the military, a society protects its
values. The ideological problems of the American attitude of
attempting to impose liberal solutions in military as well as in
civil matters constitutes the gravest threat to American military
7
security.
Opposition' to Huntington's viewpoint is voiced by Morris
Janowitz, whose view is that the military must be more closely
Q
integrated with society in a type of constabulary effort. This
effort recognizes that the protection of the society is a product
of both the professional officer's defense of his nation and his
commitment in the role of a citizen-soldier to the democratic
values of society. The military establishment, as a social
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 94.
7 Ibid., p. 457.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social




system, must be able to adapt itself to its environment, sustain
its existence, and adjust to change within the environment. In a
developmental context, the professional soldier must be accorded
a position in the democratic society under the assumption that
his fundamental difference from the civilian is recognized. If
we destroy the differences between the two societies, we run the
risk of creating new forms of hostility and unanticipated
9
militarism.
Both models recognize the requirement that a realistic
civil-military relationship must consider in simultaneous fashion
both factors of national security and liberalism. Janowitz
advocates subjective control and the fashioning of the military to
"mirror" society. Huntington prefers a military separate from
society and thus given to objective control and the development
of military professionalism. As events of post-World War II
have indicated, the fusion of political-military relations within
the American governmental system has precluded to a great extent
the objective control advocated by Huntington. Thus what has been
spawned by the exigencies of security and the cold war is a fusion
model that has tended to blend military and political policy
while at the same time attempting to adjust or "civilianize" the
military to the norms of society. Talcott Parsons recognized
that when external environments of the system change, in this
case the international involvements of the United States, there
q
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Develop-
ment of New Nations; An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. lis.
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must be an interchange between the environment and the organi-
zations within the environment. In the analagous situation,
the military establishment must also change and seek adjustment
to affect a new equilibrium with the changing society. Because
of the nature of the conservative military ethic vis-a-vis the
liberal society, any adjustments must be made with full aware-
ness and understanding of the philosophical differences between
the two societies. The extreme of integration is a solution
that borders on an irresponsible analysis of historical differ-
ences. The extreme of exclusion has not been possible in view
of the cold war. Military adjustment to societal norms must be
considered in the light of philosophical reasons and not based
on expedient policies. The events of the post-World War II era
will verify the problems manifest in any American civil-military
equilibrium and should illustrate that any adjustment to this
equilibrium must fall within the Huntington-Janowitz models.
The closer one adhers to Janowitz ' s theory, the more aware one
must be of the historical differences that symbolize American
civil-military relations. Likewise, adherence to Huntington's
theory is contrary to the present state of affairs.
Liberal hopes to return to prewar civil-military rela-
tions were at one time buoyed by hopes that the United States'
monopoly on nuclear weapons would lead to demobilizing to a pre-
war level of military strength. However, these expectations
were soon overtaken by the course of events. The uncertainties
10Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 111,
Free Press, 1951), p. 482.
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of internationalism appeared initially to produce in the pre-
Korean War era an uneven pattern of results that could not
entirely satisfy either the military or the civilian societies.
Russia drew down the iron curtain in Eastern Europe (1946) and
overthrew a duly elected government in Czechoslovakia (1948)
.
The United States instituted the Marshall Plan (1948) , airlifted
supplies to Berlin (1948-49) , and entered into its first major
peacetime alliance by entering into the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (1949) . All these events took place against a
background of the demobilization of the United States' military
machine (1946) , a thwarted effort at establishing Universal
Military Training (1947-48) , and a temporary end to conscription
(1947) . This seemingly paradoxical situation, which witnessed
the increase in cold war tensions with simultaneous reduction
in the American military force and posture, is partially
explained by the liberals determination to return civil-military
relations to one of subjective civilian control from the wartime
relationship which had produced a military establishment that
had virtual autonomy.
A postwar attempt, other than demobilization and ending
conscription, to return the military to subjective control and
to make the military more like and possible "mirror" societal
norms, was contained in a report which was the result of an
investigation ordered by the Secretary of War Robert Patterson
in 1946 to study officer and enlisted relationships. The
U. S. , Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of
War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man~Relationships , S. Doc. I9~6
,
79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, pp. 1-23.
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investigatory board, named the Doolittle Board after its chair-
man, retired Lieutenant General James Doolittle, was convened for
the purpose of investigating complaints which enlisted men made
against officers in World War II. One of the areas of complaint
and subsequent examination was the lack of democracy in the army.
The board recognized that democracy was not part of the military
establishment because order and discipline, which may at times
subvert democratic principles, were essential to military opera-
tions. The real problem which the board noted was not to change
the ethos of the military but was centered in the disappointing
quality, in some cases, of professional officer leadership. In
its report, the board recommended certain liberalization policies,
such as the elimination of some rank distinction and privileges
based on rank. The recommendations were never implemented into
the military organization in the spirit with which they were pro-
posed, and thus an attempt in the postwar period to inject
egalitarian policies into the military establishment was
generally unsatisfactory. Whether the military believed it could
conduct its duties apart from the influence of civilian society,
as manifested in its ignoring of the Doolittle recommendations,
and return to an objective control syndrome remained a subject of
concern in the future. By the time Congress commenced its debate
on the proposed National Security Act of 1947, the cold war had
reached the point where objective control would have questionable
viability as a policy and the thrust of subjective control and




In view of the lessons learned in World War II, the com-
mand and organizational structure for conducting future wars,
which involved American military forces, was in need of review.
Thus in the spring of 1947 hearings began before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on the proposal to establish a consoli-
dated national military establishment. The tenor of the hearings
was directed toward the purpose of examining the pragmatics of
defense, the implementation of specifics which included the pro-
posed unification of the armed services under a single civilian
head, and the creation of ancillary institutions (such as the
Central Intelligence Agency) to assist in the execution of a
12
national defense policy. Even though the act proposed to con-
solidate the armed forces and subject them to a more direct
civilian control, the hearings, which extended from March to
May, did not evoke any discussion or considerations about the
philosophical implications of creating a single military estab-
lishment from the viewpoint of the effect it would have on civil-
military relations. While leading military officers (including
Eisenhower, Nimitz, Marshall, and Halsey) all agreed on the
philosophy of civilian control, not one officer, nor for that
matter one civilian, referred to the historical dichotomy that
has existed between civilian and military core values. The pas-
sage of the National Security Act in July, 1947 injected into the
American governmental system for the first time in its history a
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
National Defense Establishment, Hearings before the Armed
Services Committee on S. 756. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.
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civil-military doctrine that would confine all future civil-
military relations within the concept of subjective civilian con-
trol. Even the reassertion of professionalism and its objective
control factor, which is periodically undertaken by military
commanders, would still be limited by the guidelines established
by the act.
Liberals were encouraged by the provisions of the
National Security Act and its main provisions for subjective
civilian control. Their hopes for a "controlled" military
establishment were short-lived, however, because with the inten-
sification of the cold war, the establishment would grow in size
from an average pre-Korean size of 1.6 million men under arms to
a post-Korean War average of 2.5 million. With the growth of
the military forces, the military again became the major spender
of national resources, resources which liberals had always
wanted to deny the military in peacetime. Any hopes the liberal
had placed in the National Security Act as an effective control
over military influence were confounded first by the expan-
sionist policy of Russia, then by her development of nuclear
weapons, and finally by the Korean War. The shift to protracted
wartime conditions, the maintenance of a standing army as a fac-
tor in international politics, and an economy becoming more
dependent on wartime conditions were all antithetical to liberal
beliefs. Despite these basic anti-liberal conditions, liberals
understood that the functional imperative of security had to be
recognized in addition to their concern for maintaining a
societal imperative of liberalism. To liberals, if a military
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force had to be maintained, the National Security Act provided
adequate fusion of political-military policy which was controlled
by the civilian society. The polarization and alienation of the
two societies that occurred after the Civil War and World War I
was now replaced by a "fused" society caused by the exigencies
of national security. The two societies, which had always dealt
with each other at arms length, were now cast as partners in pro-
viding national security. This partnership of convenience
spawned an alliance in which the legally controlling civilian
society had sought to inject its liberal tenets into the military
establishment, and which had seen develop a military institution
that has been influenced by various degrees of "civilianization"
and professionalism. The relationship brought about as a result
of the cold war had exposed the military establishment to closer
scrutiny by society than it had heretofore experienced. Like-
wise, subjective civilian control, which had been clearly evident
in liberalization and civilianization attempts, has presented a
civil-military dilemma that has constantly surfaced for
re-examination.
One of the first instances of that dilemma happened with
the occurrence of the Korean War, a war the United States fought
for various reasons, including retaining "prestige," protecting
"vital" interests, and maintaining "national security." These
objectives contain certain factors which are subject to varying
interpretations, some of them irrational. The rational policy
of carrying war to its logical conclusion, which had been up to
this time victory in the American ethos, was what the military
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establishment had been trained to follow. In the Korean War,
the hiatus between civilian and military societies became evident
when the two warring powers entered into negotiations. It was
possibly at this juncture that the military realized that its
"fighting" autonomy was no longer sacred and that the combat
function of the military had been merged with political negotia-
tions. This may have been evidenced by the fact that after the
cease fire, military operations became a bargaining instrument
for political negotiations. Destruction of the enemy or uncondi-
tional surrender were no longer objectives. The Korean War
settlement was a milestone in American civil-military relations
because at this juncture the fusionist relationship appeared to
be completely institutionalized. The military rubric of national
defense was being replaced by the new and apparent idea of
national security and vital interests. Once we had replaced
victory—known in the military lexicon as exercising complete
control over the enemy—by thrusting such factors as vital
interests and prestige into the concept of national security, we
limited the effectiveness of the military establishment.
Bernard Brodie notes that in this case initial goals of victory
or the use of flexible response is threatened by the "dogma of
13prestige." In Korea, and later in Vietnam, the policy of
applying restraints on the battlefield, limiting the rules of
engagement, granting sanctuaries, and restricting the use of
nuclear weapons while it may be correct political doctrine may
1 3
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York:




be costly vis-a-vis military effectiveness. The Korean War
satisfied neither the liberal society nor the military estab-
lishment. The war violated the liberal dichotomy of war or
peace, and the negotiations and sporadic fighting which followed
the cease fire in July, 1951 further aggravated liberal tenets.
Concerning the military dissatisfaction with the war, Huntington
noted that, except for Ridgway, virtually all field commanders--
MacArthur, VanFleet, Stratemeyer, Almond, Clark, and Joy
—
shared a feeling of frustration and a "conviction that political
14
considerations had overruled the military."
The Korean War, while not ending in the liberal hopes
of total victory or unconditional surrender, did satisfy liberals
in that it ended total reliance on American foreign policy on
President Truman's conservative doctrine of "containment"
(conservative in the sense of not being the liberal idea of
total war or total peace) . The war was the culmination of the
public's indignation at a policy that had been pursued since
World War II and which was basically anti-liberal. What liberals
were critical of was the utilization of a considerable amount of
the national resources to continue a policy of containment which
emphasized stalemate and not crusading standards. The Korean
War was fought, as noted by Huntington, according to a Clausewitz
15
scheme rather than by a Ludendorff style. In the former case,
the war would have been the extension of politics while the





latter would have opted for total victory followed by a return
to the imperative of subjective control or complete extirpation
of the military. The fusionist policy pursued in the Korean
War, a policy which produced great morale issues at home, was to
come back to produce similar problems in the Vietnam War.
Unlike President Truman's, President Eisenhower's
approach to foreign policy was of a liberal nature in that he
believed there should be a distinct dichotomy between absolute
war and absolute peace. His administration was against per-
sistent limited engagements and in pursuance of this policy he
made a radical change from the conservative policy of containment
to the liberal policy of massive retaliation. Although liberal
hopes were obviously encouraged by Eisenhower's liberal foreign
policy and his reduction of military personnel during his term
in office from a Korean War high of 3.6 million in 1953 to a
low of 2.5 in 1959, the aspect of massive retaliation did not
reduce military preparedness. The combination of the ever pre-
sent threat of future "brush wars," the continuing cold war
threat, and the need for an adequate military force to legitimize
massive retaliation forced the United States to maintain the
largest peacetime military force in a constant state of war
17
readiness it had heretofore witnessed. While liberals
welcomed the status of fusion and its subjective civilian control,
The Eisenhower administration narrowly escaped becoming
involved in the ongoing conflict in Indochina in 1954
17Within the period 1954-65, the




the military establishment was becoming more and more the target
of civilianization and in the process was witnessing a decline
in professional standards.
An indication of the magnitude of officer dissatisfac-
tion was noted in the report by Admiral J. P. Womble to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel in
18October, 19 53. The report was the product of a request by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense to study the
growing concern of many officers as to whether they would make
the military service a career. The problem was stated as—why
had the military lost its attractiveness as a lifetime career?
Several of the more relevant findings of the committee corres-
ponded directly to the effects of subjective civilian control.
The committee noted that public respect for authority had
declined and was further assisted in that direction by the
i
Korean War. Also popular and political reform measures had
resulted in a reduction of the distinction between ranks and
19percipitated a drop in espirit de corps. There was an overall
reduction in professional standards. For example, authority and
responsibility was being shifted from commissioned and non-
commissioned officers in the lower grades and centralized in
higher grade officers; incompetent personnel were being promoted
1
8
J. P. Womble, Jr., "The Womble Report on Service
Careers," Army Information Digest , 9 February 1954, pp. 24-36.
One must read the report in the context that the Korean War was
still fresh in the minds of the committee.
1
9
Cf. with the egalitarian recommendations of the
Doolittle Report; see pp. 70-71 above.
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to positions in which they performed inadequately. Because of
this, officers were no longer being attracted to the military as
a lifetime occupation. Professional autonomy had been subsumed
into a civilian ethos.
To illustrate how liberals would view a return to
service autonomy and perogatives , Morris Janowitz notes that any
return to past perogatives and traditions recommended by the
Womble committee would cause the military to lose its most crea-
tive intellects. Using all means available, a return to the past
must be blocked; the role of ceremony, exaggerated professional-
ism, and organizational rigidity are responses more identified
with an isolated military establishment than one which had become
a part of society and depended more on manipulation than command
ability. In concluding his criticism, Janowitz proposed a
fraternal type organization to replace the hierarchy structure
of military command.
Further effects of subjective control and the exercise
of fusionist policy which directly affected civil-military rela-
tions because of basic philosophical differences were manifested
in the fact that the more civilianized the military became, the
more it began to adopt the bureaucratic principles of civilian
society. The obvious conflict with any extensive bureaucrati-
zation is that the mission unique to the military is to combat
the enemy physically, a task which does not adhere to the bureau-
cratic model. Despite the conflidt, the military adoption of
I
2
Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational
Authority," Administrative Science Quarterly 3 (March 1959): 486.
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bureaucratic methods was not without major consequences affecting
the authority structure of the military. There was a trend away
from the military system based on traditional authority to one
placing greater emphasis on persuasion and individual incentive.
The change in organizational authority witnessed a shift from a
concern for rigid discipline to one for individual initiative.
Coupled with the shift in authority structure was the adoption
of manipulative techniques which to a great extent depended on
lateral relationships rather than the formal chain of command
responsibility. Manipulation engenders a certain amount of
arbitrary action which may eventually be destructive of the
highly structured command relationships. Janowitz noted that
such manipulation could be destructive of professional
standards.
Another indication of the result of fusionist policy,
which was closely associated with bureaucratic methods, was the
shift in post-Korean War days of the military stress from a pre-
paration for battle to that of a deterrence of violence, which
automatically involved the military in the business of political
warfare. Military specialists schooled in international affairs
and trained to work on joint military staffs were being sought
throughout the services. There was an obvious attempt to have
the military achieve a parity with civilian counterparts on the
subject of national security and in the process acquire a
penchant for accommodation, bargaining, and manipulation--all
21Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 12-13.
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traits normally not connected with the military mode of opera-
tion. The decision-making process of arriving at a solution
through compromising and bargaining is for the most part alien
to a mind trained to give clear and unequivocal answers. Thus
according to one source, the politics of bargaining may strike
22the military mind as inefficient or even immoral. The problem
which the military faces if it adopts the tactics of manipulation
and bargaining is that the decision-making authority is removed
to the lowest level and will eventually undermine the authority
23
structure.
In addition to the bureaucratic interpenetration caused
by the fusion of military and political policies in the cold war,
the military realized by the early 1950s that it had not only to
produce combat commanders and specialists, but a "whole corps of
military statesmen, capable of filling . . . innumerable
24political-military staff positions. ..." The war colleges
and staff schools turned more and more away from the function of
training commanders for success in battle and more in producing
men capable of filling staff positions. The fusion of military
and civilian organizations tended to play down the traditional
military approach and in effect created a need for military
bureaucrats and managers who began to look like civilian
22 . .
Michael Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great
Britain and the United States, 1945-1958," Political Science
Quarterly 75 (March 1960): 37.
2 1Janowitz, "Changing Patterns," pp. 483-84.
24Millis, Arms and the State, pp. 360-61.
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organization men. Adam Yarmolinsky notes that in this situation
the syndrome of the military hero was replaced by the military
25
manager. Included in this civilian influence is the practice
now engaged in by all services of attempting to provide the
officer with an extramilitary professional identification and
with it a secondary specialty beyond his primary task of command.
The eventual effect of this, as Yarmolinsky noted, was a policy
that might encourage shorter military careers, an effect which
is "antithetical to the professionalizing developments of the
2 6
military that have evolved in the near past.
"
The process of civilianization and subjective control
continued on into the 1960s and was exemplified by the flexible
response doctrine and the systems analysis approach to military
problems. The military sacrifice of professionalism made in the
1950s in response to becoming more politically adept did not cease
in the early 19 60s. Concern about the low level to which military
professionalism had declined in deference to the rise of the mili-
tary commitment to political-military forms normally can be stated
in the rubric that the fusionist challenge must be countered by
making the military more professionally expert. To accomplish
this, the military schools would have to assume a key role and
seek to develop within the service a professionalism which can
2 5
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compete with the lay specialist. The American military estab-
lishment entered the decade of the 1960s well aware that its
professionalism had been impaired by the trends of civiliani-
zation that had gone unabated since the end of the Korean War.
In fact, the basic problem confronting civil-military relations
since 1945 had been the difficulties experienced by the military
in becoming subjectively controlled by society. Many of these
difficulties focused around the difference in how each society
carried out its tasks, each with a different value system.
Following the example of past American civil-military history,
the era again illustrated the philosophical dichotomy that dic-
tates the limits of a civil-military accommodation. While the
external factors of the cold war had generated the post-World
War II civil-military relationship, the decade of the 1960s
introduced into the civil-military equation the domestic variable
of a "social revolution" in which the military establishment
found itself the very target of societal unrest and disillusion.
Societal changes in the 1960s, some of which were
directly related to the Vietnam War, were to affect directly the
civil-military equation in a way never before experienced. The
decade of the sixties was one which some believed witnessed a
change in society's order of priorities and values. Such changes
in turn challenged the philosophy of civil-military relations.
It was an era of "self," epitomized by an explosive que^t for
consciousness. Charles Reich in The Greening of America notes
27Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military
Professionalism," Foreign Affairs 42 (January 1964): 263.
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that if the new consciousness were allowed to proceed to its
natural end, the corporate state of the pre-19 60s era would be
replaced by a new system which typified non-adversary and non-
hierarchy. The new consciousness was seen as an attempt to
escape from the conformity of the old consciousness—the corpo-
rate state. As Reich put it, ". . . our whole system of
hierarchy, authority, and law depends upon a consciousness that
accepts the system; it all collapses the moment people refuse
2 8
to obey." The generation of the sixties was attempting to
escape from the conformity of previous generations. At the
heart of the revolution were doubts expressed by youth that
large bureaucracies can respond to the needs of the people, and
although the revolution did not initially have the Vietnam War
as its prime mover, the war both accelerated and exemplified
the complaints of the revolutionists. There were questions asked
about the morality of the use of force; the military was often
depicted among other things as an insensitive institution; there
was a great desire for personal freedom and a rejection of
obedience and symbolism based on "establishmentarianism. " Much
of the revolt and dissent, though directed for the most part
toward society in general, was anathema to the military syndrome
of conformity, symbolism, obedience, responsibility, and bureau-
cratic exactness. The same society from which the military
enlisted its personnel to fill its ranks was evidencing a revolt
against the basic elements upon which the military establishment
2 8Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York:




depended for its effectiveness. The question was not whether
the military establishment would cease to exist because of the
societal state of affairs but whether the new generation of
military personnel would instill the new consciousness into the
military system, and would the institutionalized policies of
recruitment and socialization reduce, for the most part, any
cataclysmic effect this new consciousness might have on the mili-
tary? PART II will investigate the ramifications of these pos-
sibilities. In a similar vein, Alvin Toffler's concept of
future shock, which is defined as the human response to over-
stimulation and which is characterized by a society caught up in
transience, novelty, and diversity, provides an ominous future
for a military ethos that by its very nature is vitally concerned
29
with the concepts of duty, honor, and country.
One manifestation of intra-service difficulties spawned
by the cold war and magnified by the social revolution and the
Vietnam War of the 1960s is noted by Sam Sarkesian in his classi-
fication of officer groups since World War II. One group is
called the traditionalists who were the senior service officers
who saw duty in World War II and in Korea. The orientation of
this group was toward conventional wisdom with emphasis on the
heroic role, traditional techniques, and unquestioned legitimacy
of the military role. This group was possibly the most isolated
from the youth of the day. The middle group were the transi-
tionalists who were commissioned after the Korean War and who
2 9




witnessed military involvement in political-military operations
such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic affair,
and Vietnam. Their careers were wedded to unconventional
experiences. There was a much greater degree of flexibility in
their intellectual approach, with 'closer ties to academic circles
intermingled with professional experience. The last group were
the modernists who were the product of the Vietnam War and were
characterized by domestic dissent, youth culture, anti-military
sentiments, and campus disturbances. The common factor in
the social revolution and its effects on the military establish-
ment is the decline in public authority, which may be harmful to
both civilian and military values.
In the 19 60s, a growing number of people, including
adults, discovered the attractiveness of "direct action" as a
means of coping with events or conditions of which they dis-
31
approved. Depending upon one's own values, this phenomenon
may be seen as a sign of healthy democracy in which individuals
who feel they have been unfairly treated have the alternative of
acting on their complaints. This activism serves to underscore
the likelihood that traditional authority is much less reliable
as a means for accomplishing goals than it was before. As
Sam C. Sarkesian, "Political Soldiers: Perspectives
on Professionalism in the U. S. Military," Midwest Journal of
Political Science 16 (May 1972): 242-43.
31National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968). Note Chapter 4
wherein the commission members concluded that one of the major
causes of the civil disturbances was the prevailing societal




Theodore Lowi notes, "the requirement of standards has been
32
replaced by the requirement of participation." He also noted
a decaying respect for symbols and a crisis of public authority
which were at the root of the problem of a liberal state which
33failed to cope with the social revolution. Whether the
decline of liberalism is as complete as Lowi leads us to believe
it is, the combination of the decline and the social revolution
could well affect the military ethos which constantly stresses
obedience and the requirement of standards noted by Lowi. As an
authority-oriented institution, the military could be adversely
affected by both the declining legitimacy of authority in Ameri-
can society and society's declining interest in socializing its
youth into at least some acceptance of the need for authority in
a balanced relationship of rights and authority.
A natural result of a crisis of authority compounded by
the United States involvement in unpopular wars produced a rise
in anti-militarism among the youth of America. Some of the
impacts of this anti-militarism have a bearing on the armed
forces of the future. Richard Rosser notes that even those who
are pro-military may think twice before joining the military
34because of certain trends which include the following:
32Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology ,
Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 85.
33 ....Ibid.
, pp. xin-xiv.
Richard Rosser, "American Civil-Military Relations in
the 1980's," Naval War College Review 24 (June 1972): 19-20.
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The shift in societal values toward increased
individualism, equality, and cultural and educational
opportunities
.
The nature of the commitment and the question of
loyalty is in conflict with a profession that demands a
degree of commitment, professionalism, sacrifice, and
leadership which increasingly diverges from that demanded
by other sectors of an advanced democratic society.
What the social revolution of the 1960s has injected into
the military ethic is a certain amount of skepticism, which is a
healthy check in any democratic society, including the military
sector. The cause of the skepticism is most likely the result
of societal pressures which forced the military establishment to
subject itself to both external and internal examination of how
it can adapt itself to the behavioral patterns of a changed
civilian society. The military thus stands on the threshold of
possibly the greatest pressures in its history to adopt many of
the liberal standards of society. While the adoption of selected
societal traits may prove to be the most popular course of action
for the military to follow, its very standards and purpose for
existing may be compromised to the level of rendering the insti-
tution functionally ineffective. Once again the solution to the
dilemma of the civil-military relationship of the 1970s lies
somewhere in between the earlier solution proposed by Huntington
and Janowitz. For that matter, while the exact solution has yet
to be devised, the parameters remain the same as always: return
to traditional professionalism and affect some withdrawal from
society, or discard traditional values and embark on a course
that may severely impair or negate cohesiveness and discipline.
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One of the final products of skepticism was the effort
made by the military to "humanize" itself in view of the criticism
leveled against it by both the opponents to the Vietnam War and
the protagonists of the rising ethos of societal self-conscious-
ness. All services, have taken some steps to eliminate regula-
tions that the services believed were either demeaning or
irrelevant to combat effectiveness and troop morale. Many of
the better known innovations consist in allowing new modes of
dress and personal appearance, allowing beer in the barracks,
installing "hot lines" for complaints, and posting recruiting
ads that are directed to appeal to the recruits, such as "Today's
Army Wants to Join You." Without becoming semantically involved,
these innovations are directed to making the services more
"human," but they do little or seemingly little to negate the
conservative military tenets of obedience and duty. Thus with
the appearance of these innovations, it appeared that the mili-
tary establishment was going "mod" and becoming liberated. Some
believed that the tenets of the 1960*s era
—
permissiveness, dis-
sent, self—were now part of the "liberal" military ethic.
Liberalization was confused with humanization. Much of the
literature decrying the demise of the military institution con-
fused these two ideas. In the wake of the humanizing effort
there was dissent which indicated that well-known persons were
confused over the difference. Admiral James Calvert, Superinten-
dent of the Naval Academy, 1968-72, believed in the humanizing
changes but did not want the academy to adopt in a wholesale
fashion the ideas outside the academy's world. Admiral John
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Hyland, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 1967-70,
questioned how far can the system permit absolute freedom of
dress, speech, and still maintain discipline. S. L. A. Marshall,
a noted army historian, contended that if the army continued to
take a relaxed route, it would rapidly approach, if it had not
35
already, the reduction of discipline to the danger point.
Many of the humanistic changes which the military made as a
result of the 1960s and the Vietnam War raise the question whether
allowing beer to be consumed in the barracks is different from
allowing beer in the foxholes or at the front lines where mili-
tary effectiveness is truly measured. Until the "humanizing"
efforts of the services are placed in their proper perspective
and not equated with liberal tenets that would question such
basic concepts as military obedience and loyalty, the military
establishment will be constantly plagued with misconceptions about
the trend of the changes.
While skepticism produced humanizing factors within the
military establishment, the impact of the Vietnam War in concert
with the movement of the 1960s introduced the element of dissent
into the armed forces in the form of soldiers refusing to go into
combat, military personnel passing out anti-war literature,
recruits refusing to go overseas, military men deserting to
foreign countries, and the practice of articulating one's dis-
sent in the war zone by "fragging" those in command or refusing
to go on combat missions.




What has compounded the problem of humanizing the military
is the process by which the military tends to adopt societal norms
in a selective manner and not knowing in many cases whether the
selective process will detract from the combat effectiveness of
the military. Once the liberal elements of dissent and permis-
siveness are confused with the humanizing elements of treating
the individual other than as a statistic, the fighting effective-
ness of the armed forces may be impaired. What must be examined
and resolved is what is considered discipline. Adam Yarmolinsky
does not believe discipline encompasses the military salute or
the white glove inspection, but rather whether it produces an
3 6
awareness of the rules of engagement. The military should
review the demands of discipline which center around appearance,
cleanliness, respect for tradition, and rank. Often these
requirements conflict with constitutional rights. First amend-
ment freedoms may be abridged when servicemen are prohibited
from attending off-duty political rallies. When an enlisted
man is forced by a superior's order to settle a financial debt,
the serviceman may be denied his individual freedom on a matter
that has little if any military interest. Here, as in the case
of the military confusing humanization and liberalization, the
military must further distinguish between what is and is not
important to discipline. Discipline must always be a means
toward combat efficiency and morale. It must never be used as
an end in itself.
36Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its
Impact on American Society
,
abr. ecL (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 360-61.
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The Vietnam era as well as the era following it have
been the subject of both studies and pronouncements, but there
is little consensus about the future civil-military equation.
Thus to predict what it will be, one must extrapolate such a
relationship from the profile of the military establishment as
of the early 1970s. One indication of future civil-military
relations was the idea voiced by President Nixon in his state-
ment on the foreign policy for the 1970s. His central theme was
a more complete explanation of his Guam doctrine of 1969:
The United States will participate in the defense and
development of allies and friends, but . . . America can
not and will not conceive all plans, design all the
programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the
defense of the free nations of the world. ^'
In the same document there was no indication that strategic
planning for the 1970s would decrease military spending or the
importance of the military establishment. Thus while attempting
to strike a parity with Russia on weapons control, the country
would not be allowed to fall prey to weakness. Preparations must
be made for the unannounced and unsuspected as well as for the
3 8possible battles of the future.
Such statements possibly portend a major shift in United
States military doctrine. Samuel Huntington supports the need
for re-examination of American foreign policy in the post-
Vietnam era because, as he notes, the strategy of deterrence
adopted as a counterpart to the foreign policy of containment
Richard M. Nixon, U. S. Foreign Policy for ^ the 1970 's ;







after World War II is in need of revision due to the decrease
of public support for military burdens and an achievement of
39parity by the major powers. Foreign policy pronouncements do
reflect the mood of the country and elicit responses, particu-
larly by institutions such as the military establishment, which
is charged with providing the national defense input to national
security policy.
One of the first in-depth studies conducted by the mili-
tary which attempted to look at the 1970s civil-military equation
was conducted by the Army War College in 19 72 at the request of
the Army Chief of Staff. The completed study was appropriately
40
entitled Army Tasks for the Seventies . The officers who com-
posed the study group recognized the spirit of the 1970s by noting
that the life style of American society would require basic adjust-
ments within the army. Among the more basic changes suggested
were greater personal freedom, additional privacy, and enhanced
job satisfaction. It was also noted that growing affluence had
changed attitudes toward work and education which necessitated
41
adjustments in training. The army, it suggested, had to
understand the society it was pledged to defend in order to main-
tain its institutional legitimacy. Likewise, the army should
39Samuel P. Huntington, "After Containment: The Func-
tions of the Military Establishment," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 406 (March 1973) : 1.
40
U. S., Department of the Army, Army War College,
Army Tasks for the Seventies (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U. S.






not question societal values because the army qua army is amoral
and is only concerned with being an instrument of governmental
policy. To allow otherwise would allow the army to become an
instrument of its leaders and not of the nation. The group
noted, in conclusion, that the professional army of the 1970s
must mold itself to fit the world as it will be and must remain
42
relative to the norms of the time. While the group more than
likely was aware of the dominance of "self" as a prime motif of
the 1960 's social revolution, the study did not distinguish
between humane and liberal factors as they pertain to the mili-
tary. As a result of this, one is led to believe that the army
—
and the entire military establishment— should adopt to the ethos
of the time. What elements of this ethos they should adopt and
still maintain their viability were not made specific in this
study. This is basically the problem that perplexes the military
establishment of the 197 0s. Without attempting to be critical
of the study, it is evident that the group did not consider their
recommendations in light of the historical differences between
the societies that limits the degree of accommodation. This
problem is recognized by academic as well as by military writers.
Adam Yarmolinsky states that
Military training and discipline clash with the demo-
cratic and egalitarian values of civilian society at many
points. The military's group-oriented value system based
on rank consciousness, unit loyalty, desire for combat,
unquestioning patriotism, and instant response to command
runs counter to the egalitarian, individualistic, inquiring








One facet of the Army War College study considered in a
positive manner what should be the role of the army in the
1970s, assuming that it is not involved in a war. The group
received 3,900 responses to 4,200 inquiries from a broad sample
of the army officer corps, which included eight training schools,
two ROTC units, and West Point. The survey asked twelve ques-
tions, all of which dealt with the Army tasks for the 1970' s.
The following is the rank ordering of the replys to the question
as to how much should the Army become involved. Rank orderings
were also made on how much will the Army become involved, and
how important to you is this issue. It is considered that the
should reply is a proper indicator of future desires.
Rank Ordering Question
1 Function as a force capable of performing both as
a force in being and as a cadre.
2 Participate directly in the solution of social
problems within the Army through programs such
as drug abuse rehabilitation centers and race
relations programs.
3 Function as a force in being to deal with mid-
intensity situations not so obviously critical as
to require mobilization.
4 Function as a cadre for skeleton formations
designed to be brought up to strength in the event
of general or partial mobilization.
5 Provide advisory groups or training assistance to
developing countries to assist them in improving
their indigenous military capability to deal with
local low-intensity warfare.
6 Provide Army forces to man the nation's ABM
defenses
.
7 Participate directly through use of troops and
equipment in the solution of the nation's environ-
mental problems such as pollution control,




8 Provide in-service remedial education for
individuals who could not otherwise meet the
Army's educational requirements.
9 Provide additional high school ROTC programs.
10 Participate directly by providing assistance in
the solution of the nation's law-and-order
problems by working directly with local law
enforcement agencies in riot control and related
matters.
11 Participate directly in the solution of social
problems in the civilian community.
12 Participate directly in the solution of the
nation's educational problems by direct involve-
ment in existing civilian educational systems.
Note that the respondees ranked as the number 2 priority that the
army should participate directly in the solution of social prob-
lems within the army through programs such as drug abuse,
rehabilitation centers, and race relation programs and that they
ranked as number 11 that the army should participate directly in
44
the solution of social problems in the civilian community.
In conclusion, the group noted that whereas there may be a
balance between using the army as an instrument of both foreign
and domestic policy, the latter role should not jeopardize the
former. The army was not to engage in any domestic program that
45
could in any way deter or erode combat effectiveness.
The Army study is basically the manifestation of the
armed services philosophy of avoiding civilian involvement, except
in exceptional humanitarian instances, in such efforts as pol-
lution abatement or civic action for the needy. While seeing the
44







need of remaining sensitive to societal norms, the services for
the most part have resisted being placed in a civic action role
because it would not only divert its resources to missions other
than that of military security, but it would be exposed to
politization which could further confuse its mission. What one
may not realize is that the professional soldier is in the last
analysis a military commander and not a business manager. Morris
Janowitz observed late in the Vietnam War (1971) that although
the difference between the military and civilian bureaucracies
46had narrowed, there are the following limits to civilianization:
Self-conception and professional ideology are counter-
forces to civilianization. The preparation for battle and
the actual battle remain a central military value.
With a dependence on nuclear deterrence and the main-
tenance of a force-in-being, civilianization efforts do
have natural limits and boundaries. The incorporation of
such weapons into defense policy creates an organizational
climate which is military and distinct from non-military
institutions.
The influx of civilian behavioral standards can lead
to results that could modify considerably the traditions,
ceremonies, and rituals of the military.
With the termination of hostilities in Vietnam and the
movement away from a conscription based army to the all-volunteer
concept, the civilianization trend and the concept of subjective
control has been lessened by a general societal disinterest in
military forms. Historically, Huntington notes that in the
decade following World War I
it was only slowly that officers were disabused of the
illusion [that their views were reflective of the true
will of the American people] . By the end of the decade,
46 jJanowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. xi-xxi.

98
however, it had become impossible for them to maintain
their identification with the community. 47
Some of the more obvious manifestations of the post-Vietnam era
"inward" turn of the military include the all-volunteer concept,
which shifts the basis of recruitment from a broad-based popula-
48tion to a narrower one. Very likely the anti-militaristic
ethos which expanded to great proportions in the Vietnam War will
subside but will not disappear because society has always looked
upon the military with some disdain. If the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) and the United States detente with Russia
and China reach an accord which is satisfactory to all parties,
the prospects of continued future peace could well lessen public
interest in military forms. Thus the military may again face
the social isolation which could well signal the military retreat
into a professional enclave and the concomitant development of a
new professionalism.
A result of the development of a new professionalism could
be a reaffirmation of the historical dichotomy between societal
and military values which could negate the "humanizing" gains
made by the military during the Vietnam War era. The risk of
returning to a period of complete restoration of "pre-humani-
zation" values is noted by Robert Gard, who observes a willingness
on behalf of the military to interpret "current reality to find
familiar prescriptions appropriate to a different situation
which blocks a willingness to meet the challenge of social
detail.
47Huntington, Soldier and the State
,
p. 287.




change." Possibly the best analysis of the problem which
challenges the post-Vietnam civil-military reformers is stated
by Sam Sarkesian:
The military is aware of the changing environment in
which it must operate, but as yet there does not appear to
be an established institutional response to the problems
that have emerged. A number of military men have been
struggling to reconcile traditional techniques and orienta-
tions with the new environment. Some new institutional
frameworks have been developed, but in the main there
appears to be no agreement as to the most effective way
to maintain institutional efficiency while recognizing
individuality and responding to a changing domestic poli-
tical culture. Undoubtedly, guidelines will be estab-
lished and institutional characteristics will be changed
only with individual orientation, but the eventual outcome
is not yet clear. 50
It is possible that the factors which will determine the outcome
of the new civil-military relationship were recognized in early
American history but which for the most part have been neglected
or ignored by those who want to change or adjust the civil-
military equation. The liberal factor of individualism has
remained philosophically opposed to the conservative military
factors of reverence for the group and the past.
In summary, the military establishment in the post-
Vietnam era again finds itself in search for a proper equilibrium
with society. Any such equilibrium must consist of a respect for
the historical difference in the institutional core values.
Neglect of these values can only lead to arbitrary and expedient
actions which will only continue to waste national resources with-
out coming to grips with the real problem of civil-military
relations.
Robert G. Gard, Jr., "The Military Profession," Naval
War College Review 26 (July-August 1973): 14.
Sarkesian, "Political Soldiers," p. 241.

PART II. RECRUITMENT AND SOCIALIZATION
By and large, the American people get the kind of




ENLISTED RECRUITMENT AND THE LIBERAL-
CONSERVATIVE EQUATION
Introduction
Having investigated and established in PART I the
existence of different philosophical bases in the civil-military
equation, PART II will investigate whether the factors of
recruitment and socialization have any effect on the "root" dif-
ferences that characterize American civil-military relations.
The investigation is focused primarily on the post-World War II
era but will of necessity include material of past history and
events. This is done with the intention of showing that the
liberal civil and conservative military dichotomy has basically
remained constant throughout United States history. It is the
purpose of PART II to indicate the presence of this dichotomy




functions rather than to make a thorough historical investigation
of each element of recruitment and socialization.
Policies of recruitment and socialization can be inter-
preted in terms of their effect on the military establishment.
The policy of conscription, as operationalized through both uni-
versal military training and selective service, while acceptable
to the military establishment as a valid way of recruiting
enlisted military manpower, has never been generally acceptable
to liberal America. Universal military training has never been
established in the United States, and selective service has been,
of necessity, the product of several wars (Civil, World Wars I
and II) . Only from 1945 to 1973 was it offered as part of the
American governmental system as a way of recruiting military man-
power, then it was accepted only because it was considered neces-
sary as a way to maintain adequate military manpower in view of
cold war hostilities. With the termination of the selective
service system in 1973 and the establishment of the volunteer
army concept, a method was finally found that is in consonance
with the maintenance of the historical dichotomy between the con-
servative military establishment and the liberal civil society.
The volunteer army concept is obviously in consonance with
Samuel Huntington's concept of objective control which encourages
the growth of military professionalism. Such a return to mili-
tary professionalism would re-establish the concept of objective
civilian control in which the military would become more a "tool"
of society rather than being a "mirror" of society. In the pro-
cess, the conservative traits of the military establishment
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would become more evident as they became more removed from the
liberalizing effects of civilian society.
Chapter IV investigates the recruitment of officers into
the armed forces through the procurement sources of the military
academies, Officer Candidate Schools, and the Reserve Officer
Training Corps. Although the recruitment process is carried on
in a liberal environment, the liberalization of the officer's
political attitudes has not taken place to the degree one would
expect.
Indeed, it is likely that the recruitment methods used
to secure both enlisted and officer personnel are integrally
subjected to the historical philosophical differences that con-
tinue to separate the military establishment from the civilian
society and which, to a large extent, dictate any accommodation
and thus the resultant equilibrium between the two societies.
That accommodation lies somewhere between the integration model
of Janowitz and the segregated model of Huntington. Within the
factor of recruitment, initial independent observation will serve
to illustrate how certain preconceptions about recruitment per se
are relevant to the individual factors of enlisted and officer
recruitment which are then analyzed in more detail.
Morris Janowitz, writing in The Professional Soldier in
1960, noted that in relation to the change in military technology
which brought many civilians into the military sector, che con-
stant flow of civilians into and out of the military is a power-
ful influence against military traditionalism and the
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authoritarian spirit. To Janowitz , such a trend has modified
the military profession in that it has democratized the officer
and enlisted personnel recruitment base. There is little, if
any, evidence to refute the observation noted by Janowitz that
in the American military system, skill and not social class has
2been the base for recruitment. In a similar vein, Janowitz
notes that political attitudes among the military officers have
become more representative of the larger society because of the
changes not only in social composition of the services but of the
increased contact between civilian and military personnel.
Political beliefs of these officers are a "refraction of civilian
3
society wrought by the recruitment system. ..."
Against this pattern of seeming homogeneity of civil-
military interests is the argument that although the military
establishment is a very "open" profession (open in the context
of having recruitment based on a broad population base and pre-
mised on skill and not social background) , this does not produce
officers and enlisted men who, though part of society, are going
to always reflect the principles of that society. In fact, the
services place restraints upon this "open" recruitment by requir-
ing certain minimum standards such as a definite amount of formal
education as a prerequisite for induction into the armed forces.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and
Political Portrait (New York! Free Press, 1971), p. 32.
o
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Develop-
ment of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964) , pp. 117-19
.
Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 234.
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Concomitant with such prerequisites is the possibility that the
military way of life may appeal to a prospective member and thus
one's "self-selection" into the armed forces could bear more
relevance in the determination of attitudes than would the
impact of the institution whose duty it is to socialize prospec-
4tive members. As William Lucas notes, before any officer puts
on a uniform, he already has implanted within him the values of
the society from which he is drawn.
Popular American attitudes toward the armed forces
are both an element in the formation of the attitudes of
individual military men, and the environment in which the
military community must operate.
5
There is no reason to believe that the same would not hold true
for enlisted servicemen. Supplementing the formation of this
attitude is the concept that the intellectual heritage of the
United States is basically in favor of the citizen-soldier and
against a standing army and military professionals. This is
basically the product of the liberal concept of the military
establishment, which includes a general distrust of the profes-
sional soldier and a belief in the positive, crusading nature of
the military in time of war followed by its decline after peace
is achieved.
These observations are part of the inquiry into the factor
of recruitment and thus provide pertinent parameters within which
4Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its
Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Pub-
lishers, 1971)
, p. 223.
William Ashley Lucas, II, "The American Lieutenant: An
Empirical Investigation of Normative Theories of Civil-Military





proper research can be made of the recruitment function. The
argument by Janowitz is in agreement with his concept of a mili-
tary closely integrated with society in a type of constabulary
force. The arguments by both Yarmolinsky and Lucas on the other
hand are in consonance with Huntington's concept of a military
establishment that does not "mirror" society and is the product
of objective control. In this situation, the military estab-
lishment becomes a highly refined professional force that func-
tions as a "tool" of society. The accommodation established
between the civilian and military sectors of society determines
whether the military will more likely "mirror" or be a "tool"
of the civilian society.
Conscription
Conscription is the process whereby members of a politi-
cal entity or other population are selected and compulsorily
inducted into the enlisted ranks of an armed force organization.
Within the United States there are two major types of
conscription—universal military training and selective service.
Each will be investigated in the context of its effect on the
civil-military equation.
Universal Military Training
Universal military training (hereafter referred to as
UMT) is the process whereby the males of a civilian population,
For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 67-68
above.




upon reaching a certain age—usually eighteen—are compelled to
undergo a period of military training of perhaps from four to
twelve months. Following this training, the trainee is placed
in the military reserve force for a period of time, from six to
seven years, and is required to attend periodic training sessions.
Of the fifty-four foreign nations which had military organizations
in 1947, only two countries, Switzerland and the Union of South
Africa, had compulsory military service in that both nations
utilized a militia system based on universal military training.
It would be similar to what George Washington would have called
a "well-organized militia." Of the remaining fifty-two countries,
forty-six had compulsory military service in the form of a selec-
tive service system and six countries utilized an all-volunteer
concept.
In the United States, however, although there have been
three major periods when UMT has been a national issue (colonial
times and preceding and during World Wars I and II) , there has
never been a tradition of UMT. In periods of war, the nation
has traditionally relied upon the use of volunteers, supple-
mented, on occasion, by a selective service method for providing
additional needed manpower. A system of UMT by its very nature
has seemed antithetical to the American liberal tradition, which
calls for the expenditure of sufficient national resources in
wartime to ensure victory as rapidly as possible and once victory
is achieved, military demobilization and utilization of the same
resources for programs providing for the relief of man's social,
political, and economic problems. To liberals, while wartime
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conditions may demand that a nation resort to the mobilization
of its manpower for military service through a conscription sys-
tem, peacetime conditions call for total reliance on volunteers
to man the ranks of the armed forces. Liberals singly reject the
idea that all male citizens have an obligation to serve in the
armed forces. Conservatives recognize the need to maintain a
level of military readiness, either by maintaining a large stand-
ing army or by training a large reserve force.
A number of critics of UMT have emerged from the civilian
sector of society, more specifically, from labor, farm, education,
and religious organizations, many of which are more liberal than
conservative. Several of these more well known organizations
are as follows: labor—National Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
International Association of Machinists, American Federation of
Labor--Congress for Industrial Organizations; farm—National
Grange, National Farmers' Union, American Farm Bureau;
education—American Association of University Professors,
National Education Association, American Council on Education;
religion—Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America,
denominational church bodies, including Methodist, Presbyterian,
Congregational, Friends, and Latter Day Saints. Two other
organizations of national importance opposing UMT have been the
Womens Christian Temperance Union and the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People. Liberals customarily
voice the following complaints about the idea of UMT: the
existence of UMT in peacetime not only can lead a nation into
a false sense of security about itself but may prompt a nation
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into being militaristic and thus prone to becoming involved in
g
war; UMT is basically un-democratic; the costs of maintaining
a UMT system would be prohibitive; UMT is contrary to the tradi-
tional American "minuteman" concept; UMT will result in a pre-
dominance of the military in government, whose growing influence
would affect the social structure of the country; discipline,
which is thrust upon the American youth in a military institu-
tion, is antithetical to the self-disciplinary ethos of
liberalism; the concept of utilizing the military establishment
to educate youth in matters other than those of direct military
interest is contrary to the American educational system; UMT is
inconsistent with membership in international peace keeping
organizations such as the United Nations; the total destruction
now available through nuclear warfare makes mass armies trained
under UMT unnecessary.
What advocates there have been of UMT have been from the
military complex itself, veterans' associations, federal admin-
istrative officials connected with security or defense matters,
and big business associations. More specifically, these have
included the following: veterans—Disabled American Veterans,
American Legion, National Guard Association, Veterans of Foreign
Wars; big business—National Association of Manufacturers and
the United States Chamber of Commerce. Conservative proponents
of UMT counter with the following arguments: preparedness, not
gMost critics, in this case, are prone to confuse the
concept of democracy with liberalism. It would definitely be
democratic in that all would serve; it would be anti-liberal in
that UMT prefers a group over an individual ethos.
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unpreparedenss, is the best defense against war; bringing the
young males of America together for a specified period of train-
ing will not only have military benefits but will benefit youth
in such non-military areas as morality, health, and character
building; having the young male population spend a period of
time in military training will not lead to a militaristic state,
anymore than having millions of soldiers under arms in World War
II led to militarism; because a large standing army is both
expensive to maintain and unacceptable to many Americans, a
large reserve force established through UMT is vital to military
preparedness.
Of the two opposing arguments herein developed, neither
has squarely addressed itself to the responsibility of the Ameri-
can citizen to the state. Under the liberal tradition, the
state is the servant and not the master of the people. Whether
this concept has led liberals to preclude the institutionali-
zation of UMT in the American system is difficult to determine.
One of the main considerations given to the institution of UMT
should be the realization that its passage into law would make
it a permanent feature of American life, and thus that it would
affect every group and every individual life. But the complete
thrust of this philosophical change has seldom been considered.
In the final analysis, the liberal ethos of the American politi-
cal system has somehow influenced any debate over whether to
install a UMT system as part of the American governmental system.
An examination of the three major periods of American history will
confirm that UMT has not affected the "root" differences in
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civil-military relations because it has been adverse to the
liberal tradition and thus never adopted.
The first colonists coming to America in the seventeenth
century maintained within each colony military forces for the
, 9purpose of providing home defense. There were at least 777
provisions in the acts of the thirteen colonies that required
military training or service of the male colonists.
Compulsory acts were passed in emergency [emergencies]
,
similar acts [were] passed in peacetime to be put into
effect in wartime, and acts requiring military training
in peacetime when hostilities threatened and when hostili-
ties did not threaten [were also passed].
H
What in fact evolved from the need to provide for a home
defense was what has commonly been called the common militia to
which men were compelled to join by their colonial governments.
The belief was commonly held that service to their colonies was
12
an "essential unquestioned incident of their citizenship.
Service included irregular drills, two to six training days per
year, and muster drills where the citizen was inspected for his
fitness for duty. According to historian Herbert Osgood, the
Puritan ethic encouraged the maintenance of the common militia
because the "Puritan belonged to the militant type of humanity,
and considered the defense of his inheritance, by force of arms
a
"Voluntary and Compulsory Military Service in England
and America," Congressional Digest 20 (August-September 1941):
194.
Selective Service System, Military Obligation: The
American Tradition
,
comp. Arthur Vollmer, Special Monograph no.












13if necessary, as nothing less than a religious duty." The
Puritan ethic also posited the belief that material success was
a sign of divine favor. Warfare which would impede this progress
was thus anathema. The Puritans, while believing in a modicum
of effort at colonial self-defense, had fled from the persecu-
tions of the Old World and were loath to import military forms
into America.
The colonist's participation in any militia activity was
limited by the fact that the maintenance of even the most modest
livelihood demanded most of the colonist's time and effort.
Under these circumstances the colonists had little option other
than to organize a crude stand-by militia force for basic self-
protection and survival. Within this context it may be a miscon-
ception to consider the colonial period of military self-
protection as the genesis of an American tradition of an implied
military obligation. Colonial history has confirmed the fact
that where military training periods interfered with making a
living, the training was simply reduced or omitted. Farmers who
lived a great distance from the training camps of their companies
were excused from attending drills. Training periods were
limited to six days per year in Massachusetts and Connecticut,
and the other colonies had much the same limitations.
Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seven-
teenth Century , vol. 1: The Chartered Colonies. Beginnings of*
Self Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), p. 497.
For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 13-14
above.
Osgood, The Chartered Colonies, pp. 498-503,
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In view of these requirements, the small portion of one's
life dedicated to military duties, which were designed for one's
own self-protection, does not support the claim that the colonial
period generated acceptance or use of an obligatory military
tradition to defend even their own immediate domiciliary area,
to say nothing of going outside it.
Thus the existence of a loosely organized militia in
colonial times for the purpose of self-defense did not ipso facto
provide the basis for a tradition of obligatory military service.
It is through the anti-militaristic attitude spawned by the
Puritans and articulated in the Declaration of Independence that
one can comprehend the strength of the liberal tradition in
America. There was no legacy which justified military forms be-
yond those needed for immediate self-defense measures. Even
under the Articles of Confederation protection to colonists was
exercised under the concept of voluntary cooperation and in the
extreme the use of the state militia.
This could account for the fact that traditional American
involvement in war comes only after the nation is attacked or
given no other option by the warring power. This could also
account for the fact that America fights this year's wars with
the last war's weapons, the implication being that once the war
is over, peace again becomes the focal point for all national
efforts. Both are basic liberal tenets.
The apparent anti-conscription ethos which was part of
the colonist's life style did not however, deter future efforts
by the advocates of UMT to establish UMT as part of the American
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military establishment. An early post-Revolution statement on
military service was made by George Washington in 1783. His
proposal was later made part of the Knox Plan of 1790.
It may be laid down as a primary position, and the
basis of our system, that every citizen who enjoys the
protection of a free Government, owes not only a propor-
tion of his property, but even of his personal services
to the defense of it, and consequently that the Citizens
of America (with a few legal and official exemptions)
from 18 to 50 years of Age should be borne on the Militia
Rolls. . . . 16
Although the Knox Plan provided only for compulsory summer mili-
tary training over a three year period, the Militia Act passed
by Congress in 1792 provided no such compulsory service, but
merely stated that male citizens between eighteen and forty-five
17
shall be enrolled in the militia. Liberals could take comfort
in the fact that Congress viewed military duty in a non-conscrip-
tive, individualistic terms. As Emory Upton noted,
during the Revolution the Government shifted upon the
States the responsibility of providing men, arms, and
even the daily supplies for the troops; but under the pro-
visions of this law [Militia Act of 1792] , both Government
and States went one step further, and shifted upon individ-
ual citizens the responsibility of providing their own arms,
horses, and equipment. No penalty was enacted for a failure
to procure such supplies, Congress having no power to
enforce it, and the States were therefore left to apply such
penalties by way of fines as their legislatures might see
fit to impose. Even had the citizen been willing to fur-
nish at his own cost that which it was the unmistakeable
duty of the Government to provide, the further execution
of the law depended wholly on the voluntary and concurrent
George Washington, The Writings of George Washington ,
ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1931-44), 26 (1938): 389. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the Knox Plan of 1790 and the Militia Act of 1792
see pp. 34-35 above.
17Militia Act , Statutes at Large 1, 271-74 (1792).
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action of the States, without which a uniform solution
throughout the United States would be impossible. 18
Although the Congress at this time was more than likely
aware of the past military legislation of the colonies, there was
little reference made to it during the debate on the Militia Act.
Two plausible explanations for this omission could be that the
legislators focused their attention more on the provisions of
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution under which
they were formed rather than on the history of colonial legis-
lation. The Revolutionary War and the Constitutional convention
were fresh in the memories of those who possibly had misgivings
as to the constitutionality of something like a UMT system.
Even though the Presidential pronouncements of both
Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson fall outside the period of
colonial history, it is important to understand that these
liberal Presidents both advocated the enrollment of youthful
males in some sort of a UMT program. It would appear from the
following message of President Jefferson that he was interested
in having all males required to serve in the militia. In his
annual message to Congress on 3 December 1805, he said,
In the meantime you will consider whether it would
not be expedient, for a state of peace as well as of war,
so to organize or class the militia, as would enable us
on a sudden emergency, to call for the services of the
younger portions , unencumbered with the old and those hav-
ing families. Upwards of three hundred thousand able
bodied men, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six
years, which the last census shews [sic] we may now count
1 8
Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States ,





within our limits, will furnish a competent number for
offense or defense, in any point where they may be
wanted, and will give time for raising regular forces
after the necessity of them shall become certain, and
the reducing to the early period of life all its active
service, cannot but be desirable to our younger citizens
of the present as well as future times, inasmuch as it
engages to them in more advanced age a quiet and undis-
turbed repose in the bosom of their families. I cannot
then but earnestly recommend to your early consideration
the expediency of so modifying our militia system as, by
a separation of the more active part from that which is
less so we may draw from it, when necessary, an efficient
corps fit for real and active service, and to be called
to it in regular rotation. 19
President Jackson was not as specific as Jefferson on
the necessity for the citizen-soldier, but he still advocated
20
to a lesser degree the need for a popular militia. In his
annual message to Congress on 7 December 1835, Jackson stated
his views.
A large standing military force is not consonant to
the spirit of our institutions. . . . That just medium
which avoids an inadequate preparation on one hand and
the danger and expense of a large force on the other is
what our constituents have a right to expect from their
Government. This object can be attained only by the
maintenance of a small military force. ... A classifi-
cation of the population offers the most obvious means of
effecting this organization. Such a division may be made
as will be just to all by transferring each at a proper
period of life from one class to another and by calling
first for the services of that class, whether for
instruction or action. . . .21
None of the attempts made by Jefferson and Jackson to have UMT
Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson ,
comp. and ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 10 vols. (New York: Knicker-
bocker Press of G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), 8 (1897): 392.
For a detailed discussion of Jackson's views on the
military ethic see pp. 46-47 above.
21James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 , 10 vols. (Washington: n.p.
,
1896-99)
, 3 (1897): TUT.
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institutionalized as part of the governmental system were suc-
cessful. It was not until the World War I era that UMT again
became a national issue.
In the summer of 1913 the army commenced a movement
designed to encourage UMT legislation by establishing volunteer
citizen training camps in Plattsburg, N. Y. By the summer of
1915, attendance had reached 12,000, most of the trainees being
either professional men or businessmen. Walter Millis notes that
these camps were not practical schools for teaching the rudiments
of warfare, but were "seminaries whence propagandists for pre-
22paredness might be distributed through the civil population.
The "Plattsburg Movement," as it was called, did not of itself
succeed in establishing UMT, but it did encourage future con-
gressional attempts to pass legislation on the subject.
In his annual message to Congress on 8 December 1914,
President Woodrow Wilson, while confirming the liberal tenet of
a volunteer military service, advocated such training as good for
discipline and the physical development of its participants.
Such a conviction, if placed in practice, would have extended
military training into an area that was basically anti-liberal
because it infringed upon the rights of the individual in non-
military matters. Wilson reaffirmed the principle of not having
a large standing army by noting, "we shall not turn America into
a military camp. We will not ask our young men to spend the
22Walter Millis, Road to War: America 1914-1917
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), p. 95.
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23best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves." In
true liberal fashion, Wilson then stated that the American policy
would be to provide
a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for
the training may be made familiar with the use of modern
arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the
maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage
such training and make it a means of discipline which our
young men will learn to value. It is a right that we
should provide it not only, but that we should make it as
attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to
undergo it at such times as they can command a little
freedom and can seek the physical development they need,
for mere health's sake, if for nothing else. 24 (italics
mine.
)
In December, 1915, Senator George Chamberlain (D-Ore.)
introduced S. 169 5 which provided for the military and naval
training of the citizen forces of the United States. Contained
in the bill was a provision that all males between the ages of
twelve and twenty-three were liable for training. Congress was
obviously not in the mood to accept any form of conscription,
and the bill was never favorably reported to the Senate by the
Senate Military Affairs Committee. Another abortive attempt to
establish UMT was contained in the National Defense Act of 1916,
Section 54 of which authorized the Secretary of War to maintain
training camps for the
military instruction and training of such citizens as
may be selected for such instruction and training, upon
their application and under such terms of enlistment and
U. S. , Congress, Senate, Annual Address of the
President of the United States to Congress, 63rd Cong., 3rd




regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
War. 2 5
Citizens were never selected to attend the training camps.
The last attempt in the World War I era to settle the
issue of whether or not to establish UMT was made in the immediate
postwar period of 1919-20. No less than eight bills were intro-
duced in both the 65th and 66th Congresses that called for the
26
establishment of UMT. Although the bills varied in respect
to their mandatory training periods from between three and
twelve months, the essential issue remained the same--should
military training be made compulsory in peacetime? The question
was hotly debated along the lines similar to those debated in the
era of Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson. Again the proponents
called UMT democratic, it constituting the equivalent to a
citizen army. Again the critics called UMT un-democratic,
un-American, wholly unnecessary in peacetime, and charged that
it could not but result in making militarism a way of life in
the United States. The final debate over UMT began on 5 April
1920 and centered around Section 51 of the proposed Amendments
to the National Defense Act of 1916, which called for all male
citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to be
25National Defense Act , Statutes at Large 39, sec. 54,
194 (1916).
26
S. 5485 introduced by Senator Harry New (R-Ind.), 31
January 1919; S. 2691-H.R. 8068 introduced by Senator George
Chamberlain (D-Ore.) and Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.),
31 July 1919; S. 2715-H.R. 8287 introduced by Senator James
Wadsworth, Jr. (R-N.Y.) and Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.),
5 August 1919; S. 3423 introduced by Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen
(R-N.J.), 13 November 1919; S. 3792 introduced by Senator James
Wadsworth, Jr. (R-N.Y.), 28 January 1920; H.R. 12775 introduced
by Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.), 26 February 1920.
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inducted into the army or navy for four months training.
Senator William Kirby (D-Ark.), who led the debate against UMT,
27
moved to strike out the provision. In order to move the
debate to a vote, Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.), who
was an avid proponent of UMT, moved on 8 April 1920 to amend
the bill to provide that the training be voluntary instead of
2 8
compulsory. On 9 April 1920 by a vote of 46 to 9 with 41 not
29
voting, the Frelinghuysen amendment was passed. The Amend-
ments to the National Defense Act of 1916 (referred to as the
National Defense Act of 192 0) , which were approved on 4 June
192 0, did not change any of the basic provisions of the 1916
act in reference to voluntary military training.
Universal military training had for the first time in the
era of modern warfare been considered and rejected. Even though
its proposal followed closely the most widely spread war known
to man up to that date, the fact that it was again peacetime and
the era of "normalcy" had returned could have led to its defeat.
In a post-mortem of the UMT defeat in 1920 former Senator and
then Representative James Wadsworth (R-N.Y.), who had himself
2 7
U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Kirby speaking for the
Army Reorganization Bill, S. 3792, 66th Cong., 2d seas., 8 April
1920, Congressional Record 59: 5318.
28
U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Frelinghuysen speaking
for the Army Reorganization Bill, S. 3792, 66th Cong., 2d sess.
,
8 April 1920, Congressional Record 59: 5329.
29 '
U. S., Congress, Senate, Vote on Senator Frelinghuysen'
s
amendment to the Army Reorganization Bill, S. 3792, 66th Cong.,
2d sess., 9 April 1920, Congressional Record 59: 5402.
30Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 ,
Statutes at Large 41, sec. 55, 780 (1920).
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proposed two bills in favor of UMT, S. 2715 in 1919 and S. 3792
in 1920, testified in 1945 about the political atmosphere sur-
rounding the legislation in 1919 and 192 0. As Wadsworth
reflected,
it was a Presidential year, 1920. . . . The political
leaders of both parties in the Congress of that day came
to me and came to my colleagues of both parties on the
Military Affairs Committee [Senator Wadsworth was then
the Chairman] and stated that if we dared propose such a
thing to the Senate, it would be kicked around as a poli-
tical football by both parties and would be so discredited
that it would not have a chance of adoption by either the
Senate or the House. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, we were
subdued primarily from political considerations, not as a
result of innermost convictions, and the proposal was
dropped. 31
But it is equally likely that the vote on 9 April 1920 resulted
from the ideological commitment of the United States to what by
then had become traditional civil-military policy. Liberals had
not yet been confronted with the imperative of having to provide
for a nation secure from foreign threat. Once again the United
States in 192 0, as it had in all previous postwar eras, did not
turn to peacetime conscription as a way to replace the large
standing army. Within the liberal ethic of total war or total
peace, the nation once again disarmed the military establishment,
From a manpower level which had numbered 199,573 in 1916, it
had risen to 4,791,172 by 11 November 1918, and by 30 June 1922
had again been reduced to 257,623.
After the World War I era, the nation again followed its
historical philosophy of maintaining a conservative military
o -I
,
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs,
Universal Military Training, Hearings before the House Committee




enclave manned by volunteers from the liberal civilian society.
From 1922 to 1939, the nation maintained an armed force of
between 225,000 and 300,000 personnel, and the issue of UMT was
seldom, if ever, discussed either in or out of government
circles.
It was during World War II that the UMT issue again
became a national topic of debate, only this time the magnitude
of the war effort and the prognosis of the postwar era indicated
that the United States might have to maintain a larger military
force than it had heretofore been accustomed to in peacetime.
Thus for the first time in United States civil-military history,
liberals were to be confronted with the task of not only attempt-
ing to maintain a peacetime liberal ethic but of trying to
operationalize the fact that the nation now had a security func-
tion to perform. Despite the massive effort by the advocates of
UMT, who for the first time used the argument that the system was
necessary for national security reasons, the congressional hear-
ings that extended sporadically from 1945 to 1948 over whether
to institute UMT ended in defeat for UMT. Instead, the nation
turned to a selective service system for supplying military man-
power in peacetime.
Universal military training received support from such
persons of power as Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Marshall, in a War Department
circular dated 25 August 1944, told his staff to
assume for purposes of planning, that the Congress will
enact legislation (as an essential foundation of an

122
effective national military organization) , that every
able-bodied young American shall be trained to defend
his country. . . . 32
President Roosevelt in his State of the Union message to a joint
session of Congress on 6 January 1945 noted, "I am clear in my
own mind that as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace
in the future, we must have universal military training after
33the war. ..."
In June, 1945, even before the cessation of hostilities
in August, Congress had commenced its first of what were to be
eventually five hearings on the basic issue of UMT—should the
United States adopt as a matter of broad policy a system of uni-
versal training in the postwar period? The last of the hearings
was conducted prior to the passage of the Selective Service Act
on 24 June 1948. In addition to these hearings, a Presidential
Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training submitted a
report to President Truman on 29 May 1947 urging the adoption of
universal training, and on at least two separate occasions later,
President Truman spoke in favor of universal training. It is of
interest to note that for the first time in the legislative
history of compulsory training the concept of UMT was being made
a part of a larger concept called universal training. It is
possibly upon this very point that universal training and with
32George C. Marshall, War Department Circular No. 347 of




U. S., Congress, House, State of the Union message
from the President of the United States, 79th Cong., 1st sess.,
6 January 1945, Congressional Record 91: 95-96.
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it UMT was eventually defeated in 1948. President Truman in his
Memoirs noted that on 22 October 1945 he sent to the Congress his
recommendations on one aspect of a program on national military
security. This was a universal training plan for peacetime.
What it was not may be extremely important.
This was not a military training program in the con-
ventional sense. The military phase was incidental to
what I had in mind. While the training was to offer
every qualified young man a chance to perfect himself
for the service of his country in some military capacity,
I envisioned a program that would at the same time pro-
vide ample opportunity for self-improvement. Part of the
training was calculated to develop skills that could be
used in civilian life, to raise the physical standards of
the nation's manpower, to lower the literacy rate, to
develop citizenship responsibilities, and to foster the
moral and spiritual welfare of our young people. 34
(Italics mine.
)
What President Truman's universal training plan proposed was
obviously an indoctrination and training in matters of both
military and non-military value. The fact that the government
was to become involved in promoting certain non-military inter-
ests may have given the critics of UMT just cause to widen the
parameters of their criticism to include the government's inter-
vention into the spiritual and moral lives of every eligible
male trainee.
In addition to the new criticism, critics again made
complaints that were similar to those voiced many times before
by every generation of Americans. But unlike all past postwar
situations, the critics encountered an entirely new problem of
how to counter the UMT argument now that the new world wide
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , vol. 1: Year of Decisions
(Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday and Company, Inc. , 1955) , p. 5Tl.
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commitments and internationalism of the United States are in
fact a reality necessitated in part by the cold war atmosphere.
This imperative of national security prompted the protagonists
of UMT to claim that an adequate military force had to be main-
tained in order to fulfill United States commitments. To the
proponents of UMT, postwar political conditions were more
favorable than ever before in United States history for the
adoption of a universal training system. Opposed to this was
the view that any such drastic change to the political system and
heritage had to be viewed with great concern. The adoption of
any universal training program would affect the very fabric of
traditional American culture. Furthermore, the effects, while
not immediately visible would in the course of generations,
35
"become cumulative even if they have grown imperceptibly."
To the protagonist of UMT, the thrust of postwar military policy,
considering the world situation, could be countered by either a
large standing army which would not be in accord with American
tradition or by the maintenance of an adequate reservoir of
reserves through a universal training program. The lay public
was not given any other options. It appeared that the proponents
of UMT would at last be successful in having the training made
part of the American governmental system.
Thus with the beginning of a new era in national defense,
the "battle lines" were again drawn between the critics and the
Halford L. Hoskins, "Universal Military Training and
American Foreign Policy," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 241 (September 1945) : 61.
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proponents of universal training or, to put it another way,
between liberal and conservative views.
From the very first congressional hearing held by the
House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy on Universal
Military Training from 4-19 June 1945 to the last one held by
the Senate Armed Services Committee in March-April 1948, groups
that have been previously mentioned either criticized or supported
the UMT concept. The issue again, as before, was over whether
the United States should adopt peacetime conscription by a uni-
versal training system. In thousands of pages of testimony con-
ducted over a three year period, the common factor 'that prevailed
was that neither group changed its position nor did their argu-
ments vary from those they had previously put forth.
37The House Select Committee recommended that, based on
the future needs of national security, Congress should adopt a
system of UMT which should only provide training and not require
38
any military service. In November-December, 194 5 the House
39
Military Affairs Committee conducted hearings on H.R. 515,
which proposed that military and naval training be provided to
all male citizens who had attained the age of eighteen years.
36
For a listing of these groups see pp. 107-08 above.
17
U. S. , Congress, House, Select Committee on Postwar
Military Policy, Universal Military Training
(
Hearings before
the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy on H. Res. 465 .
79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945.
U. S., Congress, House, Report of the Select Committee
on Postwar Military Policy , H.R. Doc. 857, 79th Cong., 1st
sess., 1945, pp. 2-3.
U. S. , Congress, House, Hearings on H.R. 515 . 1945.
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Although the hearings produced favorable support for UMT 1 legis-
lation, no action was taken on any recommendation for UMT, and
the 79th Congress (3 January 1945 - 2 August 1946) was unable to
produce any UMT legislation. The 80th Congress (3 January 1947 -
31 December 1948) held five hearings on UMT matters. Two of
these hearings were devoted to investigating the War Department's
publicity and propaganda campaign in relation to UMT. The hear-
ings inquired into the criticism that certain civilian groups
made over the funds being spent by the Army in publicizing its
40
views in support of UMT. The House Armed Services Committee
41held hearings on UMT in June, 1947, and though the mood of the
committee seemingly favored UMT, no report was made. In July,
1947 a House Subcommittee on the Armed Services held hearings
42
on H.R. 4121 and favorably endorsed a proposal for UMT. No
40
U. S. , Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Departments, Investigation of War Department
Publicity and Propaganda in Relation to Universal Military Train-
ing, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Publicity and Propaganda
of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments . 80th Cong., 1st sess. , 1947. U. S., Congress, House,
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Investi-
gation of War Department Publicity and Propaganda in Relation to
Universal Military Training, Hearings before the Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments . 80th Cong. , 2d sess.
,
1948 . The criticism centered around the money spent by the Army
in developing its Fort Knox Experimental Unit which was to be
the prototype of how the Army would operate UMT. The unit was
disbanded once the legislation was defeated in 1948.
41
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Full Committee Hearings on Universal Military Training . 80th
Cong. , 1st sess. , 1947.
42
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Universal Military Training, Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 412TT doth Cong.
,




action was taken on the recommendations of either committee.
Just prior to the above hearings, the President's
Advisory Commission of Universal Training reported. It seemed
to base its findings on the presupposition that in the American
democratic system there is an obligation of service which can
be fulfilled by adopting universal military training. The com-
mission concluded that
the only basis on which universal training should be
accepted, in our opinion, is a demonstration that it is
needed to insure our safety in a world in which peace is
not yet secure. We are convinced that such training is
an essential element in an integrated program of national
security. . . . 4 3
Evidently President Truman's concept of universal train-
ing embraced the commission's idea of a much larger security
program whose essential elements included the following: a
strong, healthy, educated population; a coordinated intelligence
service; scientific research and development; industrial mobili-
zation and stock piling; regular armed forces; and universal
44
training. Universal training was not to be given a priority
over the other elements, but conceivably it would give young men
training in the traditional aspects of military life, teach them
to work as a group, allow them to fulfill an obligation to their
country, and fill the depleted ranks of the national guard and
45
the military reserve, all at the same time. One of the major
President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training,
A Program for National Security (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1947)
, p. 2.






objectives of the program was to integrate into the program,
without sacrificing military objectives, the maximum advantages
in terms of health, education, character development, and train-
46ing for citizenship. Citizenship training was to be con-
47
sidered as important as the military training phase.
The commission report, which was favorable to the estab-
lishment of UMT, reflected the public's sentiment as expressed
in public opinion polls. In March, 1947, 66.5 percent of those
questioned by the Gallup Poll favored UMT. The highest per-
centage registered by Gallup on the same question was 75 percent
in November, 194 5. The National Opinion Research Center in
March, 1946 registered 73 percent in favor of UMT. In the
Purdue Poll conducted in February, 1946, among 8,000 high school
48
students in thirteen states, 69 percent favored a UMT program.
By the time that the next hearings were held on UMT in
49March-April, 1948, the question confronting the Senate Armed
Services Committee was -whether to establish UMT and concurrently
re-establish the selective service system which had expired on
31 March 1947 or have either UMT or selective service. Once
again, the sides polarized around historical arguments with the
military interest groups favoring UMT and civilian groups








U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Universal Military Training, Hearings before the Committee on
Armed Services. 80th Cong. , 2d sess., 1948.
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favoring its defeat. President Truman, in an address to a joint
session of Congress on 17 March 1948, requested among other
things prompt enactment of universal training legislation because
of the critical situation in Western Europe. The President left
no doubt as to his desires. "Universal training is the only
feasible means by which the civilian components of our armed
forces can be built up to the strength required if we are to be
50prepared for emergencies." The mat ter which attracted the
most attention and consumed most of the time of the 80th Congress
involved the overall problem of how to provide manpower for the
armed forces. The debate had begun in the first session with a
bill introduced on 18 July 1947 by Representative Harry Towe
(R-N.J.) and approved eight days later by the House Armed
Service Committee. The measure provided for six months of train-
ing in the National Security Training Corps for every qualified
youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The Towe bill
was blocked by the House Rules Committee and was never sent to
the House for a vote. A similar bill was introduced in the
Senate by Senator George Malone (R-Nev.) and was rejected by a
voice vote on 9 June 1948. Thus after three years of debate, the
move to establish UMT was effectively defeated. What eventually
was voted into law and was signed by President Truman on 24 June
1948 was the Selective Service Act of 1948, which provided for
U. S., Congress, House, Address of the President of
the United States, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 17 March 1948,
Congressional Record 94: 2997.




peacetime conscription by use of the selective service system,
but it did not provide for any UMT system. Section 1. (c) of
the Act stated that
the Congress further declares that in a free society, the
obligation and privileges of serving in the armed forces
and the reserve components thereof shall be shared
generally, in accordance with a system of selection which
is fair and just, and which is consistent with the
maintenance of an effective national economy. 52
With the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948,
the hopes of the advocates of UMT were thwarted but not ended.
The expiration date of selective service under the Act was 1950
and thus during the Korean War a further opportunity was present
for change. Instead, new legislation extended the draft until
1951. In 1951, the Universal Military Training and Service
53Act was passed which further institutionalized the draft by
extending it until 1955. One of the provisions of the Act pro-
vided for the establishment of a National Security Training Com-
mission, whose purpose was to submit within four months to both
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees a plan for a
National Security Training Corps which was the operationalization
of the concept of UMT. If the plan were to be approved, then the
commission would exercise general and continuing supervision over
the corps. The commission did not hold public hearings over the
merits and drawbacks of a UMT program because it believed that
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Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and thus
54there was no further need to entertain any further debate.
Likewise, the commission believed that whereas the obligation to
bear arms in defense of the country had always been implied, it
had by the Act become explicit.
The initial report submitted by the commission to Con-
gress in October, 1951, contained much of the rhetoric which had
been used to support UMT in previous congressional hearings.
The commission believed that the societal imperative of security
could best be provided for through a UMT program. In summarizing
its beliefs, the commission stated that UMT provided the country
with an in-depth trained military manpower force which could
preclude the need for maintaining a large standing army.
Neither this report nor any future reports submitted by
the commission produced any congressional legislation that con-
cerned UMT. Possibly the internal conflict between military and
societal values hindered the commission's investigation from its
outset, but it was not until its 1953 report that such a conflict
surfaced in its report. Whether the commission realized it or
not, statements made by the commission in regard to its beliefs
were historically antithetical to each other. In one instance,
the commission seemed to confuse the difference between individual
rights and military discipline.
National Security Training Commission, Universal
Military Training: Foundation of Enduring National Strength
(Washington: Government Printing Of f ice , 1951) , p. 6.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 68.
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The individual is our highest value. Accordingly,
we believe that when the individual submits to military
discipline he does so not as a means to the military
end, but to help maintain his own and his Nation's
liberty. 57
The trainee would be accorded basic rights and any program for
defense must be fully aware of the dignity of the value of
individuals.
At no point do we suggest that the military training
be altered. It must be realistic, unvarnished, and well-
disciplined. We speak here only of the rights which will
not intrude on military discipline. The trainee will be
under military discipline 24 hours a day. 58
The very presence of military discipline at all times and the
concept of group solidarity are both antithetical to what the
commission proclaimed was its highest value—the individual. No
amount of rhetoric can alter the differences between the military
and civilian philosophies. Contained within this philosophy are
the very seeds of ineffectiveness which plagued the commission's
work. Unable to reconcile these basic differences, its charter
was drastically altered by the passage of the Reserve Forces Act
59
of 1955, Chapter 8, Section 262(e). The commission was now to
report to Congress with respect to the welfare of members of the
Ready Reserve Forces undergoing six months active duty for train-
ing. In its final report, dated 30 June 1957, the commission
concluded that the reserve program was a success and thus, with
the concurrence of President Eisenhower that its objectives were
57National Security Training Commission, Twentieth
Century Minutemen; A Report to the President on a Reserve Forces
Training Program (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1953),
p. 101.
58 TV - ,Ibid.
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achieved, it was terminating its existence. In retrospect,
the commission never accomplished its initial goal of getting
congressional approval of a UMT program. This can be credited
possibly to the mood of the post-Korean War era, but some
credence must be given to the fact that the historical dichotomy
between the liberal society and its military establishment must
have been a major factor that contributed to the demise of any
attempt to establish UMT.
The most recent review of the UMT concept was conducted
as part of the investigation on military manpower by the
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service in 1967. That
commission considered the possible use of UMT as a supplier of
manpower for the Vietnam War. There was some support among its
members to use it as a method for correcting the fact that from
one-half to two-thirds of the eligible population did not
experience military service under the selective service system.
But when it tested its proposal against its charter to determine
the most fair and workable way of providing the nation with mili-
tary manpower, universal training was rejected because the com-
mission believed that there was no military requirement for it.
Even though the present system needed change, the commission
concluded that "compulsory service should not be the means for
59
Reserve Forces Act , Statutes at Large 69, sec. 262(e),
601-02 (19F5~n
National Security Training Commission, Final Report to





The Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procure-
ment, formed under the chairmanship of retired General Mark
Clark to investigate the various sources of available manpower
for military use, in a report made to the House Armed Services
Committee on 28 February 1967, noted its view on the feasibility
of instituting a UMT system as an alternative to the current
selective service system. Its opinion was that
the term 'universal' embodied far-reaching implications
that should be faced, and that universal military train-
ing envisioned every qualified American male serving
actively in the military establishment. The Panel felt
that the public would not look with favor on, nor long
tolerate maintaining the mammouth training base that uni-
versal military training would entail, and that the
public would sharply resist maintaining on active duty
infinitely more men than were required for all military
commitments short of all-out war. 62
Thus, it appears now as in the past that UMT, as a
method for providing military manpower, remains adverse to liberal
tenets which have historically precluded its establishment as
part of the American governmental system. The adoption of a UMT
system, by its very nature, is still seen as affecting the "root"
differences between the civilian and military societies and for
this reason it has never been accepted as part of the American
political system or its resultant liberal society.
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In
Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve ? (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967)
, p. 16.
Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procure-
ment
, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Repre-
sentatives, 90th Cong. , 1st sess.. 28 February 1967 (Washington:






While liberal America has never resorted to using UMT as
a peacetime measure for maintaining a military force, it has
resorted to, on occasion, the utilization of a selective service
system, at first to enlist manpower for wars as they arose and
since 1945 to provide the needed manpower for a standing military
force that has been deemed vital to continuing national security
interests. How acceptable is the selective service system to
liberal America is the next topic of concern.
Selective Service
Selective service is a process whereby, under law, the
manpower needed for the military forces of the United States is
selected from the population in accordance with a prescribed
plan and inducted into the armed forces. Like universal military
training, the concept of selective service is antithetical to the
American liberal tradition; but unlike universal military train-
ing, it has been normally utilized to raise military manpower
for wars since the nineteenth century. In this analysis of
selective service, the term conscription will be used inter-
changeably with the term selective service because of the popular
acceptance of either term as meaning basically the same thing.
If the reader remembers that selective service is technically a
form of conscription, this should present no problem in the
analysis of selective service.
From 1940 until 1973, Americans grew up in an era of
military selective service. The argument was advanced that selec-
tive service was essential to the preservation of the American
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system. The thrust of this investigation is to place the con-
cept of selective service in its proper perspective by showing
the political history of selective service. If the institution
had become acceptable to most Americans , then the endless debate
that it has produced at critical junctures in American history
would have seemed senseless. In fact the institution of selec-
tive service has always provoked debate, most of which has cen-
tered around it as antithetical to individualism. One of the
first issues to examine in any investigation of selective service
is whether or not selective service is part of the American
tradition.
In a general overview, one can say that it seems after
the fact that in 1814 that the nation would rather have perished
than accept selective service; in 1863, with the national sur-
vival again at stake, a conscription law was passed, but it was
bitterly and violently resisted; again in 1917 and 1940, con-
scription was instituted but only as a temporary measure and
again with stormy opposition. After World War II, it became
institutionalized on the grounds of national security, and that
institutionalization only ended in 1973. Many of the factors
that caused the reluctance to accept selective service while
either in the throes of war or on the verge of becoming involved
in war have remained historically constant. Protagonists of
selective service have for the most part been aligned against
the liberal tenets of American society. To the protagonists,
selective service is a sine qua non of citizenship. Following
on from this are the individual claims that citizen's rights and
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duties are inseparable; there is nothing undemocratic about
utilizing selective service which in fact "spreads" the responsi-
bility for national defense evenly among the population; defense
must be a concern of every citizen, and the military draft is a
necessity particularly when the armed forces are unable to obtain
volunteers in the quantity needed. The advocates of selective
service have only to point to the Civil War and World Wars I and
II for proof of their claims. Conscription had to be resorted
to in all these wars because no matter how strongly the people
may have been imbued with the liberal ideology and the horrors
of war, that attitude could not be sustained during war. Even
though the South and the North seemed to have sufficient
volunteers at the beginning of the Civil War (1861) , both had
eventually to resort to conscription, the South in 1862 and the
North in 1863. Woodrow Wilson's pronouncements on the purpose
of World War I, such as "make the world safe for democracy,"
did not deter the establishment of a selective service system
within a month after the United States entered the war. An
awareness of past history may have helped President Roosevelt to
convince a reluctant Congress to establish a selective service
fifteen months before the United States entered World War II.
The anti-conscription forces on the other hand have
historically countered with a philosophy of the anti-military
ethic of the American political and social system. This is
normally manifested in the issue of the individual's obligation
to support and defend the state versus his personal freedom. The
historical genesis of an anti-militaristic ethos, discussed in
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Chapter I, has been closely associated with the history of selec-
tive service. The adversaries of conscription claim that con-
scription, in general, abridges the rights of the citizen, and
in more specific terms it has the following faults: it does not
teach democracy because in the military, decisions are made in
a chain of command situation where people are told what to do
and what not to do; conscription overlooks the paramount goals
of the citizen's heritage of individual rights and democratic
ideals; one of the hallmarks of a citizen's freedom is that he
not be subjected to conscription; the claim made by the apol-
ogists that the military teaches cooperation is countered by the
critics, noting that this cooperation is usually "optionless" or
"forced"; the claim that the military builds strong character
and good habits is often challenged for its validity; the claim
that the military teaches obedience and discipline are countered
by questioning whether these are relevant in all respects to
civilian life; finally the claim that the military matures people
is often questioned by its critics.
Thus the civil-military rivalry spawned by the history
of selective service has been the result of the same old conflict
between the advocates of a societal imperative of liberalism and
the advocates of the imperative of security and victory in war.
The dichotomy between the two is not nearly so evident as one may
be led to believe, and in the final analysis the liberal concept
of maintaining the liberty of the individual has remained
For a detailed discussion of the historical matters
concerning universal military training, see pp. 110-16 above.
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constant, only to be changed in times of great wartime crisis
where the "crusade" becomes synonomous with liberalism. Liberal
acceptance of the duty to render personal military service has
been accepted, but only under certain circumstances. Accept-
ability does not mean desirability, and thus the institution of
selective service has been formulated not as an acceptable and
desirable way of life but as being necessary in time of war.
When selective service has been enacted in the United States,
it has normally been under conditions of existing or impending
war, and when it was continued after World War II it was claimed
as being necessary for national security under the then perceived
cold war conditions. Within this context, the tradition of
selective service being part of the American ethos is subject to
question.
While in both world wars, the United States has seen the
necessity of resorting to a selective service principle, in
peacetime the right to retain such a system has been vigorously
disputed. In essence, the existence of selective service has been
based on pragmatics. Likewise, the promptness with which the
draft was either terminated or debated after the termination of
hostilities in both world wars indicates that it was basically
used as a wartime measure and was not accepted as a permanent way
of American life. Even with the future of the Union at stake in
the Civil War, Northern citizens successfully resisted conscrip-
tion until it became evident in 1863 that the critical shortage
of volunteer manpower made conscription mandatory. Aversion to
conscription has been tempered with the involvement of the
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United States in external wars, where the pragmatics of the
i
situation have demanded the utilization of a selective service
system. The advocates of selective service note that compulsory
service is not a departure from traditional American philosophy;
it has been tolerated from early colonial times in times of both
war and peace. In colonial times, the enemy was the Indian, and
later on international confrontations and wars provided the
64justification. The tenuousness of the position held by the
advocates of selective service is the obvious impossibility of
equating the conscription of men to fight internal wars with
conscripting troops to settle international disputes. A militia
formed of local citizens to defend one's property or to restore
peace locally is different from an army conscripted to engage
in overseas warfare.
Having viewed the arguments both for and against selec-
tive service, and keeping in mind the American liberal commitment
to individuality and the realization that some mandatory method
is needed to raise manpower to fight wars, attention is now
directed to the political history of selective service in the
United States in an attempt to accentuate the philosophical
differences that have characterized its existence and to show that
it affects the "root" differences between a liberal society and
its conservative military establishment.
Selective Service System, Military Obligation , pp. 1-3.
For a further discussion of colonial statutes which were relevant
to compulsory military service see pp. 110-12 above.
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Russell Weigley, in his History of the United States
Army, noted that
in general the colonial militias [made up of volunteers
and draftees] were not a reliable instrument of offensive
war distant from their own firesides. The reasons are
evident. Few men came to America to be soldiers. More
likely, they came in part to escape soldiering. 65
The history of the Puritan ethic in the United States would cer-
tainly confirm to a large extent the anti-militaristic nature of
the colonists, particularly when it came to going beyond defend-
ing their own homes and safety. During the course of the Revolu-
tionary War, despite the encouragement of bounties, it was diffi-
cult for the states to fill the militia quotas in the continental
army. Although a militia draft was authorized by the Congress
and by several states, it was a highly distasteful measure and
opposed by the majority of eligible draftees. As Arthur Ekirch
notes, once the soldier entered the continental army, he was too
imbued with "ideas of individual liberty and equalitarian demo-
6 6
cracy to take kindly to strict military discipline."
Possibly the first reference made in the post-Revolu-
tionary era to the draft was that of George Washington on 2 May
1783 in his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment." In that
statement, Washington considered a large standing army as
dangerous, but felt that a few troops are "not only safe, but
67indispensably necessary." These troops, distributed about the
Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army
(New York: Macmillan Company, 19 67), p~. 12
.
66Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military
(New York: Oxford University Press
-
] 1956) , p. 15.
67Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington , 26 (1938): 375.
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colonial frontiers and consisting of four regiments of infantry
and one regiment of artillery (a total of 2,631 officers and
non-commissioned officers) , would be for all intents and purposes
considered continental troops who were enlisted for three years
C a
from the ranks of eligible male citizens. Washington did not
use the word "drafted" and did not argue for national conscrip-
tion as a means for filling the ranks of the army. In the post-
war era, the Continental Congress did little to encourage the
maintenance of a continental army and it was not until the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 that the issue was again made
part of the public debate.
At the Constitutional Convention, no direct reference was
made to any type of compulsory national military service. So far
as can be implied from James Madison's notes of the convention,
it is neither assumed nor implied that the military powers given
to Congress really included the authority to force a person into
the national army. Madison's comments touched on only several
69
of the military powers given to Congress. Additional analysis
was provided by Madison and the other authors of The Federalist .
Possibly the first affirmative action taken at the Convention
which was relevant to the clause "to raise armies" occurred on
18 August 1787, when Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts moved
that the phrase "and support" be added after the "raise." The
68
Ibid.
, pp. 378-79, 381, 390.
The military powers granted to Congress and defined in
the Constitution are found in Article 1, section 8 (11), (12),




amendment was approved without opposition. After the Conven-
tion agreed that the phrase "to provide and maintain a navy"
was preferable to the phrase "build and equip fleets," they
agreed to use the existing Articles of Confederation phrase, "to
make such rules for the government and regulation of the land
71
and naval forces." Likewise, on 18 August, George Mason moved
that the Congress be given authority "to make laws for the regu-
lation and discipline of the Militia of the several States
72
reserving to the States the appointment of the Officers.
Arguments by Oliver Ellsworth and John Dickinson opposed the
idea on the ground that the states should not relinquish their
power over the militia. In turn, their arguments were opposed
by Pierce Butler and James Madison, both of whom thought the
central government should be responsible for the common defense.
The argument was resolved in favor of the dual arrangement pro-
vided for in Article 1, section 8 (16) of the Constitution.
Although the debate on various clauses respecting the militia
continued into September, there was little debate on the clauses
that would indicate any basis for the implied power to conscript.
After the Convention, in The Federalist , Alexander
Hamilton ( Federalist No. 23) argued that the power of raising
armies should be without limitations; that the government, in
70
Max Farrand, ed. , The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787 , rev. ed. , 4 vols. (New York: Yale University Pr^ss,






carrying out the task of national defense, should not be tied
73down with constitutional shackles. Again in Federalist No. 24
Hamilton argued that it would be improper, even in peacetime,
to restrain congressional discretion over the military estab-
74lishment. James Madison in Federalist No. 41 posed the ques-
tion as to whether it was essential to give "an INDEFINITE POWER
of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintain-
ing both in PEACE as well as in WAR?" He answered in the
75
affirmative in both instances. Beyond these few statements
by those members of the Convention, there is nowhere any dis-
cussion of national conscription.
The first militia plan was submitted by Secretary of War
Henry Knox to both President Washington and the Congress on
18 January 1790. His intention was to produce the most efficient
system of defense compatible with the intent of a free people.
The answer was not a standing army which could not in peace "be
considered as friendly to the rights of human nature . . . but
an energetic national militia is to be regarded as the capital
7 6
security of a Free Republic." To supply manpower for this
militia, Knox proposed
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The
Federalist Papers , with an Introduction by Clinton Rossiter









U. S., Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the




that every man of the. proper age and ability of body, is
firmly bound by the social compact to perform, personally,
his proportion of military duty for the defense of the
state . . . all men of the legal military age should be
armed, enrolled, and held responsible for different
degrees of military service. 7'
On 26 April 1790, the Committee of the Whole on the State of
the Union was discharged from any further consideration of the
78Knox Plan. It was not until the War of 1812 that one finds
the first instance where the national government attempted to
claim authority to enlist, without regard to state boundaries,
men to enter a national army. This was a claim that went beyond
Knox's concept of "citizen obligation" and was the first time
that Congress gave really serious attention to the possibility
of conscripting men into the military service.
There was bitter internal opposition to the War of 1812.
This opposition was shared by the New England Federalists, who
feared that the war would destroy their maritime commerce, and
by the Jeffersonian Republicans, who could not forget the tradi-
tions of their party. One of the lessons to be learned from the
war was that a nation should realize the internal problems
generated when the war is not given real support by the populace,
When the vote was taken to declare was in June, 1812, the House
of Representatives voted 74-49 in favor, with 14 abstaining, and
the Senate voted 19-12 in favor. Clearly this did not indicate
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reluctance to back the war was indicated in the difficulty which
the government had in recruiting volunteers to fill the depleted
ranks of the military. Against this background and with the war
at somewhat of a stalemate, Madison called the Thirteenth Congress
into its third session on 19 September 1814 to discuss such
measures as must "be deemed meet for the welfare of the United
79States." One such measure was the matter of raising manpower
to supplement the military force of 38,000, whose recent
accomplishments did not give prospect to new military victories.
Adding to the downward turn of events of the war was the fact
that Congress had to meet in temporary offices since its usual
accommodations had been destroyed when the British destroyed the
Capitol on 24-25 August 1814. By 17 October, the Acting Secretary
of War, James Monroe, had submitted to Congress what was to be
80the first reasoned statement on national conscription. Monroe
attached explanatory statements which set forth four alternate
plans. Plan One—have the free male population of the United
States between the ages of eighteen and forty-five formed into
classes of one hundred men with each class furnishing so many
men. This in essence was direct national conscription. Plan
Two—classify the whole militia of the United States and give
the President the power to call into service whatever classes,
79
U. S., Congress, Proclamation by President Madison
calling the Thirteenth Congress into its third session, 13th
Cong., 3rd sess., 19 September 1814, Annals 3: 8.
80
U. S., Congress, A Bill to provide for the further
defense of the frontiers of the United States by authorizing
the President to augment the present military establishment,
13th Cong., 3rd sess., 27 October 1814, Annals 3: 482-83.
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or portions thereof, he considered necessary for periods of not
more than two years. Plan Three—exempt from military duty
every five men who together could provide one substitute. Plan
Four—raise the bounty in land for those volunteering. Monroe
recommended adoption of either Plan One or Two and commented on
both. Monroe commented that in Plan One, Congress was given
power by the Constitution to raise armies and that no restraint
should be imposed on the exercise of this power. Continuing,
he noted
the idea that the United States cannot raise a regular
army in any other mode than by accepting the voluntary
service of individuals, is believed, to be repugnant to
the uniform construction of all grants of power. . . .81
In commenting on Plan Two, Monroe noted that drafting men from
the militia would not be unconstitutional because the
men are not drawn from the militia, but from the popula-
tion of the country; when they enlist voluntarily, it is
not as militiamen that they act, but as citizens. If
they are draughted [sic] it must be in the same sense. 82
On 22 November 1814, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of
19-12, and on 14 December, the House also passed it by a vote of
83-73. The bill in its final form utilized the guidelines of
Plan Two in that it authorized the President to call upon the
states and territories for their respective quotas of militia
to defend the United States against invasion. The differences
between Senate and House amendments could not be resolved, and









discharged from any further action on the bill. The last move,
in retrospect, was only academic, because on 20 February
President Madison announced that the Treaty of Peace and Amity
had been signed in Ghent on 24 December 1814.
The introduction of Monroe's plans brought heated debate
in both the Senate and the House chambers. For the most part,
the debate centered around the issues as articulated by Senators
Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts, David Daggett of Connecticut,
and Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire. All three senators seem to
capture the true feeling of the dissenting minority in the Senate,
Varnum noted that "this mode of draughting [sic] men from the
militia for two years, I must confess is a novel idea to me, and
8 3
I do believe it will be so to the nation." The bill utilizes
arbitrary principles "never before attempted to be imposed on
84the militia of this country." Senator Daggett was more precise
about the antithetical nature of conscription when he noted that
the provisions of the Constitution which called for raising and
supporting armies had to employ means consistent with the
great principles of civil liberty, known to the people of
this country, and adopted and' deemed sacred in all free
Governments. But it is utterly, inconsistent with those
principles to compel any man to become a soldier for life,
during a war, or for any fixed time."
8 3
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U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Daggett speaking on
the drafting of militiamen, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 November
1814, Annals 3: 72.
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Senator Mason voiced similar observations in noting that the
power to raise armies, unless confined to voluntary enlistment,
is without any guard or restrictions and thus the exercise of it
must depend wholly on arbitrary discretion. "In my opinion,
this system of military conscription ... is not only incon-
sistent with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution, but
8 6
also with all the principles of civil liberty." Possibly the
most articulate and philosophically grounded denouncement of the
proposed conscription legislation was made in the House of
Representatives by Daniel Webster. His speech manifested the
classical liberal complaint against conscription, because the
tenor of his address is for civil liberties and the concept of
individualism. Quotations from this speech are among the best
87
anti-conscription statements of all time.
What is there, Sir, that makes it the duty of this
people ... to surrender their most important rights to
its discretion?
The administration asserts the right to fill the ranks
of the regular Army by Compulsion. ... Is this, Sir,
consistent with the character of a Free Government? Is
this civil liberty? Is this the real character of our
Constitution? No, Sir, indeed it is not.
Who will show me any constitutional injunction, which
makes it the duty of the American people to surrender
everything valuable in life, and even life itself, not
when the safety of their country and its liberties may
demand the sacrifice, but whenever the purpose of an
ambitious and mischievous Government may require it? Sir,
I almost disdain to go to quotations and references to
U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Mason speaking on
the drafting of militiamen, 13th Cong., 3rd sess. , 16 November
1814, Annals 3: 83.
87Daniel Webster, The Letters of Daniel Webster , ed. C. H.




prove that such an abominable doctrine has no foundation
in the Constitution of the country.
. . . the power contended for is incompatible with
my notion of personal liberty.
In my opinion, Sir, the sentiments of the free popu-
lation of this country are greatly mistaken here. The
nation is not yet in a temper to submit to conscription.
The people have too fresh and strong a feeling of civil
liberty to be willing thus to surrender it.
If the Administration has found that it can not form
an army without conscription, it will find, if it ventures
on these experiments, that it can not enforce conscription
without an army. The Government was not constituted for
such purposes.
It is difficult to expand on Webster's argument, and few liberals
since have gone into the philosophical ramifications of the con-
scription system to the extent that Webster did. The one addi-
tional effort to bring group opposition to bear was voiced by
the Hartford Convention on 15 December 1814, where a joint state-
ment issued by its members condemned Monroe's plan on the basis
that conscription was not delegated to the Congress by the
Constitution.
The exercise of it [conscription] would be not less
dangerous to their liberties, than hostile to the
sovereignty of the state . . . the armies of the United
States have always been raised by contract, never by
conscription. . . ,&°
The failure of conscription to gain formal acceptance
in the War of 1812 was probably the result of many variables.
The anti-militarism basic to the Revolutionary War may have
strongly influenced those anti-conscription advocates who
remembered the war. The role given to the militia under the
88Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention
(New York: N. and J. White, 1833) , p. 359.
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Constitution and the possible infringement on state sovereignty
if a national conscripted militia were formed may have influenced
the policy makers. The fact that conscription would have been a
departure from the traditions of civil liberties and individ-
uality, as so aptly noted by Webster, must have been considered.
Even when these basic liberal variables were countered by the
vital need to fill the ranks of an army depleted of manpower or
by the recent burning of the city of Washington by the British,
the American people did not turn to conscription, even after
President Madison warned about the lack of other options, because
of its general antithetical nature to individualism and individ-
ual choice. Conscription was in fact anathema to the principles
of American liberalism as first battled for in the Revolutionary
War and then forged as part of the American political system in
the Bill of Rights. Even in the darkest days of the War of 1812,
the Americans still put their constitutional rights first.
When darker days were to beset the nation in the Civil
War, conscription was for the first time adopted in the United
States, first by the South in 1862, then by the North in 1863.
But as political history has revealed, adoption never really
grew into acceptance. The Civil War was important in the
history of national conscription in that it illustrated how
antithetical conscription was to the American ideal of liberalism
and the criterion of individual liberty. The war was fought
largely to uphold the central government, and in pursuit of this




8 9history. Both the North and the South had to suspend habeas
corpus proceedings in connection with the draft protestors , so
that the infringement of one's liberty, self-determination, led
directly to the removal of a legal right. Although this is the
result of conscription, such was not the case at the beginning
of the war.
The firing on Fort Sumter in April, 1861 brought forth
90
such a flood of volunteers in the North that on 3 April 1862,
the War Department ceased all recruiting. By June, this order
was rescinded because volunteering had declined to an all time
low. There is possibly no simple answer to this decline, but it
probably stemmed in part from the relatively poor performance by
the Union army caused in the main by a lack of leadership. This
triggered a slackening of enthusiasm in the people. Once the
initial volunteers had quit fighting for one reason or another,
the depleted ranks were filled by those to whom volunteering
meant a great personal sacrifice because of their families,
businesses, or farms. Compounding this recruitment problem was
the general rise in the wages and profit scales in the North,
which lured potential soldiers away from an army whose pay was
meager in comparison. To provide additional troops, the Congress
passed the Militia Act of 17 July 1862, which authorized
President Lincoln to call on the states for 300,000 militiamen
89
An analysis will be made only of the draft in the
Union and not in the Confederacy.
9
By the spring of 1862, it was estimated that over
600,000 had volunteered for military duty.
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to serve for a nine month term. One of the basic aspects of
this law was that it was an attempt by the Congress and the
President to use the Constitutional power of calling on the
states to furnish the nation with sufficient militiamen. It in
effect relied on the state's power of compulsion to furnish
........ 91
mxlitia troops.
From the beginning, the plan appeared doomed to failure.
There were requests for exemptions from such diverse groups as
professional engineers and railroad employees. For one reason
or another, delays were encountered in executing the call for
militiamen. One obvious result, as chronicled in the Official
Records of the War , was that it engendered in eligible militia-
men the desire to leave the country. In a letter from Governor
Richard Yates of Illinois to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on
7 August 1862 Yates noted,
since receiving the orders for drafting, large numbers of
citizens are leaving this city [ChicagoJ to escape the
draft, and it is strongly urged upon me to ask you for
authority to declare martial law again. 92
Stanton issued General Order Number 104 dated 8 August 18 62 in
hopes of stemming the flow of citizens out of the country.
By direction of the President of the United States,
it is ordered that until further order no citizen liable
to be drafted into the militia shall be allowed to go to
a foreign country. ^
3
91Militia Act , Statutes at Large 12, 597-600 (1862).
92
Secretary of War, The War of Rebellion: A Compilation
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armie3 ,
series III, 5 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office,






In a letter from Governor A. Bradford of Maryland to Stanton on
2 September 1962, he declared that "in several of the counties
of this State the enrolling officers are menaced with personal
94
violence and are applying to me for protection." By the
winter of 1862, it was obvious that the call for militiamen was
not going to provide sufficient manpower for the Union armies.
Of the 300,000 men requested, less than one-third, or approxi-
mately 88,000, were furnished by the states and even then an
undetermined number of these deserted. Resistance to involuntary
conscription was a prime reason, particularly where a militiaman
would be called upon to fight outside his immediate neighborhood
for a cause which did not seem to involve his own personal safety
or that of his family or property.
In order to prevent a breakdown in the war effort caused
by a manpower shortage, President Lincoln, in a speech before
Congress on 1 December 1862, urged Congress to take the necessary
action to correct the serious defects noted by Secretary of War
95
Stanton in the Militia Act of 1862. Congressional action was
not long in coming, and on 9 February 1863, Senator Henry Wilson
(R-Mass.) introduced a national conscription bill (S. 511).
9 6
Debate started on the bill in the Senate on 16 February 1863.




95James D. Richardson, A Compilation of Messages ,
7 (1897): 3332.
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U. S., Congress, Senate, Debate on the Conscription
Law, 37th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 February 1863, Congressional Globe ,
pt. 2, pp. 976-1002 passim.
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of who should be exempted from any draft and provisions that
would provide for a substitute or commutation option. The latter
issue was thought to be a key factor in determining whether or
not conscription would be passed or defeated. Senator Edgar
Cowan (D-Pa.) believed that men should be allowed to pay a fine
in lieu of serving because without it, the conscription measure
would in practice become a dead letter. Draft officials would
encounter widespread resistance in trying to enforce the law,
and in fact it night create such a furor that the draft might
have to be abandoned. Cowan noted that without Section Thirteen,
it would be an anomaly to compel a free citizen of a democratic
97
nation to serve in the army under any circumstances. The sec-
tion referred to by Cowan and which was eventually accepted as
part of the Conscription Act states,
. . . any person drafted and notified to appear as
aforesaid, may, on or before the day fixed for his
appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his
place in the draft, or he may pay to such person as the
Secretary of War may authorize to receive it such sum,
not exceeding $300, as the Secretary may determine, for
the procuration of such substitute. . . .9°
Unless this substitution and commutation clause were accepted,
Cowan warned that an army might be produced that would compel
service from any man in our system of government.
Our whole theory [recruitment] has gone upon a dif-
ferent hypothesis heretofore, and all our provisions of
law looked to the perfect freedom of the soldier in his












The Senate passed S. 511 on 16 February 1863 by a voice vote with
Section Thirteen intact, and sent the bill to the House, where on
21 February 1863 debate started. Here the anti-conscription
debate centered around the following issues: the bill did not
follow the traditional methods of raising troops; state sover-
eignty would be destroyed; unwarranted power would be given to
the President. Representative Charles Biddle (D-Pa.) objected
to the bill in that it turned the militia of the United States
into a regular army, it set up provost marshals as informers in
congressional districts, and it threw a vast network of military
authority over the whole of society. Biddle continued by noting,
I feel a personal interest, an interest as a citizen,
that things should not go on thus; for I believe it is at
the constant risk of lighting up the flame of social
revolution. . . .*
Representative Robert Malloy (D-Ky.) was even more succinct in
his assessment of the proposed legislation. "No people that
will patently submit to this system [conscription] can long
102
retain its freedom." The House passed the bill on 25 February
1863 by a vote of 115 to 48 and on 3 March the President signed
into law "An Act for Enrolling and Calling out the National
Forces." This act, was, so far as United States military
history is concerned, one of the most revolutionary steps ever
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authority to the national government and its military component,
the concept was abandoned that the battlefield and the homefront
could operate efficiently if every individual could freely chose
his own occupation. Section One of the Act describes the power
thus thrust upon the national government.
. . . all able-bodied male citizens . . . between
the ages of twenty and forty-five years . . . are hereby
declared to constitute the national forces, and shall
be liable to perform military duty in the service of the
United States when called out by the President for that
purpose. 104
Section Thirteen, as previously noted, remained intact in the
Conscription Act.
By the signing of the act, the battle over the rights of
the individual versus the concept of involuntary conscription was
not over but was taken up by dissenters in every state in the
Union. Possibly the most famous of the ensuing draft riots took
105
place in New York City in July, 1863. In a word, General James
Fry the Provost Marshal General of the Army, who had the
responsibility for administering the draft, declared in his
final report of 17 March 1866 that the draft was unpopular and
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105For an excellent description of this riot see
Lawrence Lader, "New York's Bloodiest Week," American Heritage
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Provost Marshal General noted that concerning conscription,
it was not easy to convince the public mind at once of
the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty,
contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation.
The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment of
privileges than to the fulfillment of duties under the
general government, and hence beheld the prospect of com-
pulsory service in the army with an unreasonable dread. 107
If General Fry had been candid about the entire matter, he would
have noted that the extension of government power over the
private lives of people was deeply resented. It must be
remembered that Americans are highly individualistic and were
essentially frontier and hard-working people, proud of their
freedom and suspicious of authority. They resented federal pro-
vost marshals, draft boards, and enrolling officers, who seemed
to pry into their personal affairs and make them do something
which they did not freely choose to do even when it may have
meant in this case the preservation of the Union. Americans
and their liberal traditions were not about to submit to the
overarching power of the government in giving up the basic tenet
of individualism. The precedent of national conscription was
an innovation that was hardly received with any great enthusiasm.
Even Section Thirteen of the Act, which provided certain
classes with an alternative to conscription and thus in an overt
fashion would seem to be in consonance with the liberal tradition
of choice, became the target of such slogans as "rich man's war
and poor man's fight." As one observer put it, the substitution






opposition to conscription than any other [clause] and consti-
10 8tuted most powerfully to incite the masses against the law."
Not only was the draft considered antithetical to individual
choice, it was considered by the poorer classes as unfair
,. . . ,. 109discrimination.
Shortly after the passage of the Conscription Act, of
the 292,441 names drawn for the draft, 9,880 were inducted,
26,002 found substitutes, and 52,288 paid the three hundred
dollar commutation fee. Thus a total of 35,882 were conscripted
in the national draft. By the end of the war, of the
2,213,365 individuals who served in the Union military, 51,516
were inducted as conscripts (approximately two percent) and
117,133 were substitutes (approximately five percent). Thus a
total of 168,649 (approximately seven percent) of the total
Union forces were secured through the conscription law. These
figures do not reflect the number of draft-inducted volunteers.
From the results of the Conscription Act, one could speculate
that even though the Union military manpower eventually over-
powered the Confederate forces, the draft by itself provided a
small segment of those who served. Furthermore, its invocation
Jack Franklin Leach, Conscription in the United States
Historical Background (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Publish-
ing Company, 1952), p. 310.
Even when selective service was institutionalized in
the post-World War II era, one of the continuing problems which
plagued the system was the question of fairness in selection of
draftees. This became particularly acute when the supply of
available manpower became greater than those needed to serve in
the armed forces; see pp. 17 2-7 5 below.
110Provost Marshal General, Final Report , p. 28.
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triggered riots and alienated a large segment of the population
because it was not accepted as part of the American political and
social system because of its antithetical nature to liberalism.
The Puritan ethic greatly influenced American negative reaction
to Civil War conscription.
The monumental failure of conscription in the Civil War
passed into history, and it was not until April, 1917 that the
halls of Congress again heard debate on whether or not to con-
script. Much had changed in the ensuing years in American poli-
tical history between Lee's surrender at Appomattox on 9 April
1865 and President Wilson's speech before Congress on 2 April
1917 calling for war with Germany. To Wilson, this "last" war
was a liberal crusade to make the world safe for democracy.
This crusade was legitimized to a large extent first, by
an act of Congress and second, by a decision of the Supreme
Court. Congress, though spending several months in debating the
complete reorganization of the military establishment in order to
make it more efficient, seemed to express the consensus of the
people in view of the war in Europe, by passing the National
Defense Act of 1916 by a strong majority vote. Although the
Senate's vote was by voice and thus not recorded on 17 May 1916,
the House on 20 May 1916 voted in favor of the measure by a vote
of 351 to 25 with 55 not voting. The act made every male adult,
111
in effect, a militiaman with a national obligation. A syn-
thesis of the congressional debate on the act can be found in
(1916)
.
National Defense Act , Statutes at Large 39, 166-217
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Representative Frank Greene's (R-Vt.) statement in the House on
17 March 1916. Here, as before, the arguments both for and
against a standing army in time of peace were articulated. Some
of the historical arguments, that were once again reiterated,
were as follows: to the protagonists, the Republic had to be
protected by a standing army, particularly in view of the war in
Europe, which seemed to involve the United States more and more;
there was a need to train the youth of the nation into a ready
force, and a need to develop a comprehensive plan for organizing
the state militia to react to a federal call-up when and if
needed. The anti-militarists again relied on the basic argument
that the principle of a standing army, particularly in time of
peace, was antithetical to the democratic and liberal policy of
112
the United States.
The second event was an adjudication by the Supreme
Court in 1918 upholding the constitutionality of the draft.
Chief Justice Edward White, in overrulling in the Selective
Service Draft Cases the contentions of the plaintiff's claim
that (1) the Constitution did not confer on the Congress the
power to compel military service by a selective draft, and (2)
even if so done, such a power was repugnant to the spirit of the
Bill of Rights, remarked that
the possession of authority to enact the statute [con-
scription law] must be found in the clauses of the Consti-
tution giving Congress power to 'declare wars', 'to raise
112
U. S., Congress, House, Representative Greene debating
the measure to improve the efficiency of the Military Establish-
ment, H.R. 12766, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 17 March 1916, Congres-
sional Record 53: 4330-39.
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and support armies', 'to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces', and to
'make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers '.lJ-3
Justice White thus upheld congressional power to conscript.
What may have been as important as this decision was the obiter
dictum rendered by White when he noted that the conception of a
just government and its duty to its citizens included the
"reciprocal obligation of the citizens to render military service
114in case of need and the right to compel it." Thus, in one
sense, the power to draft was settled in that Congress could call
upon citizens to serve in time of need. What could obviously
not be settled was whether the citizen would freely accept such
an obligation in time of war or peace, and even though the
legality of the draft was adjudicated, the philosophical
acceptance of it has met resistance from the early days of the
Republic.
The Supreme Court ruling pleased the conservative mili-
tary establishment, permitting as it did access to all male
citizens, and liberals, who were concerned by the crusading
nature of the war. In essence, it seemed that society was
beginning to accept conscription under very limited circum-
stances—a war of foreseeable length and specific purpose, i.e.,
the defeat of the enemy quickly in order to return to the real
problems of life. Thus though liberals failed in postwar





attempts to establish international security concepts, they were
beginning to realize that some of their beliefs entailed the
necessary periodic use of military force. Thus in World Wars I
and II the conscription system confronted relatively few problems
because in both instances there was a national commitment to the
short-term task of defeating a threatening enemy.
The World War I history of conscription is a study of
vast contrasts with Civil War conscription. The enemy and the
mission were certainly different. The Union had been saved and
the enemy now was a foreign power that threatened liberal America.
The "Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the
Military Establishment of the United States" (commonly called
the Conscription Act) of 18 May 1917 reflected the lessons
learned from Civil War experiences. Enrollment was done with
local draft boards, who had the authority to draft, and con-
sisted of civilian officials; deferments were for the most part
equitable; there were no provisions for either substitution or
commutation. Because of these changes, agitation against the
draft were minimized. Public opinion either had come to support
the war or possibly feared the threat of prosecution under the
Espionage Act of 15 June 1917 and its Amendments of 16 May
1918. Section Three of the Espionage Act provided for a
$10,000 fine or twenty years imprisonment, or both, to those who
Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily
the Military Establishment of the United States , Statutes at
Large 46, 7%-83 (1917).
116Espionage Act , Statutes at Large 40, 217-31 (1917);






shall willfully cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty,
in the military or naval forces of the United States, or
shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment
service of the United States. H?
The 1918 Amendments expanded the parameters of Section Three of
the Act of 1917 by further defining what shall be obstruction of
118
the recruitment and enlistment policies of the United States.
When Senator George Chamberlain (D-Ore.) introduced
S. 1871 on 18 April 1917, which authorized the President
temporarily to increase the military establishment of the United
States, he followed it with a speech which was to become the
basis of agreement for all but a few of the dissenting congress-
men.
It is manifest, I think, that when we are about to
wage war with what is probably the strongest military
force the world has yet seen, we can no longer rely in its
entirety or mainly on the volunteer system. Now that we
are engaged in war with one of the greatest powers in the
world, the adoption of the application of the principle of
universal service becomes all the more imperative . . .
this Nation can make no headway unless we adopt a system
in waging war which will enable us to utilize to the
fullest possible extent our entire resources in men and
material. . . .H
That was a speech that would appeal to both liberals (total
commitment to a crusade) and conservatives (commitment of a uni-
versal nature) alike. Most of the Senate and House debate







U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Chamberlain speaking
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the draft system; what would be the military pay; and what would
be the age limit on draftees and volunteers. Senator Charles
Thomas (D-Col.) voiced the belief of the minority of dissenters
as to the place of conscription within the American governmental
system.
But we are now told that compulsory military service
is democratic. . . . It is as repugnant to democracy as
any despotic principle which can be conceived. . . .
Democracy means liberty, and liberty is wholly at war with
the autocratic weapons of compulsory service. 120
On 28 April 1917, S. 1871 passed the Senate by a vote of 81 to 8
and the House by a vote of 397 to 24 with 10 not voting. Con-
ference committee procedures delayed the signing of the bill by
the President until 18 May 1917. Interestingly enough, two of
the eight Senators voting against the draft also voted against
declaring war. Likewise, fifteen of the twenty-four Representa-
tives who voted against the draft also voted against the war.
Eventually, twenty-four million men were registered under the
Conscription Act and of the 4.7 million men who saw service, 2.8
million were draftees, an increase indicative of the difference
in national attitude between the Civil War and World War I.
With the cessation of hostilities in November, 1918 came
a slowdown in but not a termination of conscription. It was at
this juncture that the army, although releasing draftees at a
rapid rate, believed that postwar conditions necessitated the
maintaining of the largest peacetime army in United States
U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Thomas speaking on
the bill to increase temporarily the Military Establishment,




history. In order to maintain this force, the army requested
that Congress sanction the army's continued use of postwar con-
scription. For the first time in the history of the United
States, conscription was maintained in operation after the ces-
sation of hostilities. It was not until Congress, expressing
the mood of the country, ordered the Secretary of War on
5 January 1921 by H. J. Resolution 440 to cease drafting men
121into the army of the United States. The Resolution passed
the House on 17 January by a vote of 285 to 4 with 141 not voting
and in the Senate by a voice vote on 22 January. The President's
veto of 5 February was overridden in the House on 5 February by
a 2 71 to 16 vote with 141 not voting and on 7 February by a 67
to 1 vote with 2 8 not voting in the Senate. Thus with approxi-
mately the same deliberate speed with which Congress instituted
the conscription system did it dismantle it after the war.
World War I thus for the first time in American history
institutionalized the draft, but it did so only under the threat
of total national emergency; and though liberals had to shift
their emphasis in the matter of recognizing the necessity of a
military establishment from a strict concern for the societal
imperative of liberalism to a concern of how to make liberalism
compatible with national security, liberals have never lost sight
of the historical fact that conscription per se is antithetical
to the individual's liberty. The continuing debate between the
liberal society and the conservative military establishment since
U. S., Congress, Senate, Introduction of Resolution to
direct the Secretary of War to cease enlisting men, H.J. Resolu-




World War I remains centered around the issue of how much military
force should exist effectively to protect American society with-
out destroying American liberalism. In the midst of the debate
and in less than a quarter of a century after the war had been
fought to save democracy, the United States, for the first time
in its history instituted conscription in peacetime by passing
"An Act to Provide for the Common Defense by Increasing the
Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Providing
for its training" (commonly called the Selective Training and
122Service Act) on 16 September 1940.
Although the American Institute of Public Opinion Poll
conducted from December, 1938 to August, 1940 showed a definite
increase in public sentiment for compulsory military service, the
debate over whether or not to institute peacetime conscription
was sometimes accentuated by anger. Table 1 indicates the tabu-
lation of the answers to the following question: Do you think
that every able-bodied man twenty years old should be made to
serve in the army, navy, or air force for one year?
122Act to Provide for the Common Defense by Increasing
the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Pro-
viding for its training , Statutes at Large 54, 885-97 (1940).

TABLE 1
COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE (Percentages)
168
Year Favoring Opposing
December, 1938 (after Munich)
October, 1939 (after war began)
2 June 1940 (after Battle of Flanders)









Source: V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American
Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 277.
Within this context of rising support, Senator Edward Burke
(D-Neb.) introduced S. 4164 "To Protect the integrity and insti-
tutions of the United States through a system of selective com-
pulsory military training and service" on 20 June 1940. After
more than two months of intense debate, covering more than 3,500
pages of the Congressional Record , the Senate passed the con-
ference committee report on 14 September by a vote of 47 to 2 5
with 2 3 not voting, and the House on the same day by a vote of
233 to 124 with 70 not voting sustained the desire of those
advocating the draft. On 16 September 1940, President Roosevelt
signed the Selective Training and Service Act which in Section




The Congress further declares that in a free society
the obligation and privileges of military training and
service should be shared generally in accordance with a
fair and just system of selective compulsory military
training and service. 123 (Italics mine.)
Furthermore, Section 3 (b) set the induction period at a maximum
124
of twelve months. In congruence with the acceptance of com-
pulsory service in a national emergency, congressional debate on
the act centered noticeably around such issues as the acceptable
induction ages and the number to be inducted under the act.
Debates still included the historical anti-conscription pleas,
but no longer was the issue one of how to preserve liberalism
but how to preserve the nation. As indicated by the congres-
sional debates and vote, the passage of the Selective Service Act
was not the result of the disappearance of anti-militarism and
the anti-conscription forces from the American scene. Its pas-
sage was bitterly fought. As John Graham noted, the 1940 Act
125
was only a temporary expedient. When comparing this situation
to the World War I era of conscription, there is no evidence to
indicate that Congress intended that the Conscription Act of
1917 be anything more than a wartime measure. The desire of the
army to continue conscription after the war was over in 1918
seems to have been an attempt by the army to expand while the
123
Ibid. , sec. 1 (b) , 885.
124
Ibid. , sec. 3 (b) , 886. The renewal of the Selective
Training and Service Act in 1941 extended the period for six
months. Further wartime extensions became automatic until the
debate over whether to continue it at all began in May, 1945.
125John Graham, The Universal Military Obligation (New
York: Fund for the Republic, 1958) , p. 4.
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machinery of conscription was still in effect. The tenuousness
of the peacetime acceptability of conscription in 1940 is made
even more evident when one realizes that Congress spent almost
three months debating whether or not to adopt conscription while
in the background both France and the Low Countries had fallen
victim to Hitler's onslaught, and the Battle for Britain was
imminent.
Toward the end of World War II, Congress in accepting
selective service as the means for maintaining the strength of
the army for the proposed invasion of Japan, extended the draft
law until 15 May 1946 or until the hostilities were declared
1 2 6
terminated by the President. Again in 1946, the draft was
extended, only this time as a measure to counter Soviet aggres-
127
sion. The date for termination was set for 31 March 1947,
and at this time the draft expired after being in operation for
almost seven consecutive years. At this juncture, Congress was
involved in the debate over whether to institute universal mili-
12 8
tary training. The action taken on this would affect any
future selective service legislation. What emerged was the
defeat of UMT and the passage of the Selective Service Act of
129
24 June 1948, which was renewed three years later and renamed
126Act to Extend the Provisions of the Act of July 11 ,
1941
,
Statutes" at Large 59, 168 (1945).
127Act to Extend the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940 , Statutes at Large 60, 341-43 (1946).
128 For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp.
125-30 above.




130the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951.
This latter act became the basis for selective service and was
renewed, with debate, every four years (1955, 1959, 1963, 1967).
It is interesting to note that the dates of renewal coincide
with non-election years. This kept selective service out of
election year debates and until its last renewal in 1967, the
major issue quadrennially debated was centered about the order
of induction and the number of persons involved in a draft call.
The existence of selective service was tacitly accepted by the
liberals as long as national resources were not being wholesalely
diverted for war efforts. The Korean War, which was a mili-
tary stalemate after 1951, discouraged liberals who believed
that wars of attrition are antithetical to the only true nature
of war— a crusade that utilizes total resources to a quick
victory. The settlement of the war in 1953 and the adoption by
President Eisenhower of a foreign policy that posited a "massive
retaliation" doctrine was in consonance with the liberal theory
that a nation should not waste its resources in wars of attrition,
The massive retaliation doctrine provided an answer to this
dilemma. Thus Eisenhower's "war or peace" policy brought into
historical perspective the dichotomy of liberal hopes of total
war or total peace. The security policy of the late 1950s and
1960s prior to the United States intervention in Vietnam in 1965
Universal Military Training and Service Act , Statutes
at Large 65, 75-89 (1951)
.
For a discussion of the national security policies of




manifested a switch to "optional responses" and the regeneration
132
of conventional forces. As a vital concomitant to this or
any national security policy, the selective service system
operated to support the military section of this policy. With
a nation determined to have a military "second to none" as dic-
tated by choice or cold war conditions, conscription continued
to support the functional imperative of national security.
Aided by the growing dissatisfaction of the Vietnam War,
the selective service system was drastically changed in November,
1969 by the introduction of a lottery system and was finally
replaced by the volunteer army concept in July, 1973. In the
last years of its operation, the system became the target of
criticism which was not aimed at the overall concept, but at how
it was administered. In most instances, the matter was one of
a system that had come to disregard the concept of equality, a
vital tenet of liberalism. More and more the system came under
fire for not being fair. Claims of favoritism (particularly
among students) and discrimination (among the poor and the
black) were common complaints. A Louis Harris and Associates
Poll completed in 1966 found support for drafting young men among
seventy-nine percent of those polled but only forty-nine percent
133
thought the way the system worked was fair. In December, 1966
132
For one author's explanation of this change see
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1960) .
June A. Willenz, ed. , Dialogue on the Draft: Report
of the National Conference on the Draft, 11-12 November 1966
(Washington: American Veterans Committee, 1967) , pp. 64-65.
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a Gallup Poll showed the percentage who thought it fair to be
134
only forty-three percent. Many of the claims of inequitable
treatment can be traced to the problem of what to do with all the
people who were entering the selective service system. The
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service noted in their
1967 report that of the nearly two million men now reaching draft
age each year, the armed forces are only likely to need one-half
to one-third of them and only a portion of these must be selected
for non-voluntary induction (recent years indicated a range of
135ten to forty percent) . Note in Table 2 the increase in the
number of men available.
TABLE 2
MEN REACHING AGE 18






Source: U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Hearings on the review of the Administration and
Operation of the Selective Service System . 89th Cong. , 2d
sess. , 1966, p. 10003.
134 Donald Jackson, "Evading the Draft: Who, How, and
Why," Life , 9 December 1966, p. 43.
National Advisory Commission, In Pursuit , p. 3.
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To the Commission, the problems now facing the selective service
system was "Who Serves when not All serve? It was an enduring
136problem, but floodlighted ... by the war in Vietnam."
Additional problems also confronted the system, in
addition to the continuing attempts to determine "who serves."
An increase in the realization of self (a paramount tenet of
liberalism) , manifested by the social revolution of the 1960s
basically runs counter to the concept of a coherent national
society, which was provided for in one way by the selective
137
service system. Additionally, it was charged that the system
of deferment and induction through the more than four thousand
local draft boards was based "on the assumption of a rural
138America long extinct." The demographic shift in population
from rural to urban (see Table 3 below) affected the localism
of the selective service system. Thus the selective service
system which might have been attuned to the American ethos in
the 1940s and 1950s was now finding itself in theoretical
opposition to the concept of "self" and the urbanization of the
American public. The uneasy alliance between the system and
civil society was torn asunder by the social revolution of the
1960s and the Vietnam War. Once the system became out of
136 Ibid.
For an incisive view of liberalism and the national
society see Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea,"
Public Interest 5 (Fall 1966): 70-83.
138James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little
Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System , Markam
Series in Public Policy Analysis (Chicago: Markam Publishing
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harmony with the political culture of liberalism, it was no
longer popularly supported, and at this point existing only
until a better solution for manpower recruitment could be
formulated.
Against this background, the opponents of the selective
service system began to articulate their arguments and did so
coincidentally with the rising unpopularity of the war. Con-
scription once again was said to be a serious invasion of individ-
ual liberty? it led to regimentation and militarism; the draft
had a deleterious effect on the individual's personality. The
debate appeared to rise to a high pitch on the eve of the
quadrennial review of the draft law in 1967. The Civilian
Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement in a report to
the House Armed Services Committee (February, 1967) , seemed to
have developed in the whole context of the report the assumption




adjustments to the selective service system were necessary.
By contrast, the National Advisory Commission's report made
recommendations that questioned some of the basic facets of the
selective service system. Two of its more important suggestions
were the possibility of instituting a lottery system and the
140
ending of many deferments. The outcome was a victory for
the congressional supporters of selective service. A Selective
Service Act to "Amend the Universal Military Training and
141Service Act of 1951" was passed, which had among its pro-
142
visions the prohibition of any lottery system.
As the Vietnam War grew more unpopular and initial
investigations were being made into the feasibility of a postwar
volunteer army, President Nixon in a message to Congress on
13 May 1969, appeared to sense the growing unrest with the pre-
sent system and in a reaction to this, proposed recruitment by
a lottery system.
Ultimately we should end the draft. I am hopeful that
we can soon restore the principle of no draft in peacetime .
But until we do so, let us be sure that the operation of
the Selective Service System is as equitable and as reason-
able as we can make it. By drafting the youngest first
... by randomizing the selection process . . .we can. do




Civilian Advisory Panel, Report , pp. 21-25.
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The House of Representatives, acting on this proposal, introduced
H.R. 14001 on 25 September 1969, which would allow modification
to the system of selecting armed forces personnel. Hearings were
144held by a special subcommittee on the draft, and the bill was
favorably reported to the House. Passage came on 30 October by
145
an overwhelming vote of 382 to 13 with 35 not voting. The
Senate Armed Services Committee disposed of the hearings on H.R.
14 001 in less than three hours on 14 November, and the bill
passed the Senate by a voice vote on 19 November. On 26 November
President Nixon signed the "Amendment to the Military Selective
146Service Act of 1967," which simply repealed Section 2,
section 5 (a) (2) of the 1967 Act to allow modification to the
system of selecting persons for induction into the armed forces.
In December, 1969, the first lottery was held, and with this the
unfairness that had plagued the selective service system in
later years, particularly when the excessive manpower produced
inequitable exemptions, for the most part disappeared. By July,
1973, the lottery system had performed its interim function, and
the President's goal stated in May, 1969, was realized. The
selective service system came to an end after almost thirty-three
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Military Selective Service System, Hearings before a Special
Subcommittee on the Draft on H.R. 14001 and H.R. 14015 . 9"Tst
Cong. , 1st sess. , 1969.
145
U. S., Congress, House, Vote on modifying the Selec-
tive Service System, H.R. 14001, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 30
October 1969, Congressional Record 115: 32468.
146Amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of
1967 , StatutesTat Large 83, 220 (1969).
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years of continuous operation, interrupted by only a fifteen
month lapse.
With the ending of the selective service system, an
equilibrium was re-established between the military establish-
ment and its liberal society very similar to the change from
the containment doctrine of President Truman to the massive
retaliation doctrine of President Eisenhower. Both situations
saw a reshaping of the imperative of the liberal doctrine of
total war or total peace. Morris Janowitz saw the end of con-
scription as the "clearest index of the end of the mass-army
147format of the first half of the twentieth century." It is
not within the realm of the impossible that with this change,
wars of attrition became unpopular with both the civil and mili-
tary leaders. The appearance of liberalism through international
detentes and the overt softening of cold war attitudes provides
the background within which liberal tenets can again be re-
asserted. The waning of the war atmosphere which has prevailed
in the United States for over three decades may be the environ-
ment within which the military establishment finds its eventual
accommodation with the liberal society. Predictions that either
objective civilian control, in which the military will again
assert maximum professionalism and possibly become the isolated
institution as witnessed in the 1920s and the 1930s, or subjec-
tive civilian control, in which the military establishment will
continue to "mirror" society, will chart the course of the
147Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. x.

179
future civil-military equation abound on both sides. In either
case, the historical antithetical nature of the values of the
military establishment vis-a-vis those of the liberal society
which eventually forced the selective service system first to
alter its concept (to the lottery system) and then to cease to
exist will continue to exert the determining factors which pro-
duce the final civil-military equilibrium. The "foot" differences
between the two societies are still antithetical to each other,
and the political history and nature of selective service in
liberal America has not changed the differences. With the
liberal side of the civil-military equation again in ascension
as manifested by the volunteer army concept, attention could now
be directed to the place of the modern volunteer army in a
liberal society.
Modern Volunteer Army
The United States has relied throughout its history on
a voluntary armed force except during major wars and since
1948. A return to an all-volunteer force will strengthen
our freedoms, remove an inequity now imposed on the expres-
sion of the patriotism that has never been lacking among
our youth, promote the efficiency of the armed forces, and
enhance their dignity. It is the system for maintaining
standing forces that minimizes government interference with
the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in
accord with his values . 148 (Italics mine. )
This quote taken from the 1970 report of the Presidential Com-
mission on an Al] -Volunteer Armed Force (commonly called the
Gates Commission) reveals in a succinct manner the main thrust
of the all-volunteer armed force concept. With the commission
President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed





stating its argument in such profound terms, the dichotomy
between the then existing conscription system and the proposed
voluntary system was made more evident in philosophical terms.
From 1940 to 1973, the American society was exposed" to con-
scription. It was considered by its proponents to be a part
of the American heritage generated mainly from the Jeffersonian
concept of the citizen-soldier. What these advocates neglected
to mention is that the United States had experienced grave diffi-
culties with its first conscription law enacted during the Civil
149War and had thereafter resorted to conscription only in time
of war, particularly where the war was of a crusading nature, as
was the case in World Wars I and II. History has revealed that
the attempt to return to an all-volunteer armed force after
150World War II as manifested in the long congressional debates
over universal military training and the continuation of selec-
tive service was unsuccessful mainly because the cold war pre-
cluded a return to the status quo ante bellum volunteer system.
Until near the end of the thirty-three year era of con-
scription which also corresponded closely with the end of the
Vietnam War and the defusing in many instances of international
confrontations, the United States seldom questioned the philo-
sophical basis for continuing the selective service system. If
the congressional debates and votes on the quadrennial extension
of the draft are any indication of the nation's attitudes and
149For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp.
156-60 above.




beliefs on selective service, one could be led to believe that
it had become part of the permanent ethos. In passing the
151Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951, the
House of Representatives spent four days on debate before passing
the bill by a vote of 372 to 44. The Senate debated for seven
days before voting 79 to 5 in favor of passage. In 1955 the
draft renewal was debated for one day each in both the House
and the Senate and was passed by a 394 to 4 vote in the House
and by a voice vote in the Senate. In 1959, 1963, and 1967 one
day each was spent in each congressional chamber on debate, and
the House voted for passage in each case by votes of 381-20,
388-3, and 362-9, respectively. The Senate voted in favor by
votes of 90-1, voice vote, and 70-2, respectively. In retro-
spect, it seems that the national crises of the 1950s and 1960s
(Korean War, Suez, Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
and Vietnam War) precluded any determined arguments against the
historical and antithetical nature of the draft vis-a-vis the
American liberal ethos. The threat to the American political
system and way of life made any other course than selective
service impossible to consider.
It was not until after the United States had become
deeply involved in the Vietnam War that the issue of a volunteer
armed force was again brought before the public as a social and
political issue. Even then, the return to the use of such a
force was based on its feasibility and not on its philosophical
151Universal Military Training and Service Act , Statutes
at Large 65, 75-89 (1951) .
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consonance with the liberal society. One of the first re-
examinations of the possible return to a volunteer system came
in 1967 as a result of the National Advisory Commission (com-
monly monly called the Marshall Commission) investigation into
the entire selective service system from the viewpoint of man-
152power procurement for the Vietnam War. That commission
reported that volunteers had constituted two-thirds of the mili-
tary forces since 1950 and with few exceptions the Navy, Marines,
153
and the Air Force had depended fully on volunteers. Despite
what may appear to be a favorable sign for pursuing the all-
volunteer concept, the commission recommended against the con-
cept because it basically allowed no flexibility in time of
crisis. Other than maintaining a "force-in-being," the military
would have no large reserve force from which to draw the neces-
154
sary forces in time of war. No other reasons were given for
its stand on the all-volunteer concept. The question of its
applicability to the American political tradition was not made
an issue.
In addition to the traumatic moral and social effects
which the Vietnam War had on American society, it spawned another
ancillary issue which was related to the continuation of selective
15 2
National Advisory Commission, In Pursuit . Neither
President Johnson nor Nixon resorted to implementing total
mobilization of reserve forces in the Vietnam War but resorted
instead to call up of selected reserve units. This could in a










service. The nearly two million men reaching draft age each
year produced a "pool" of personnel of which only one-third to
one-half would be needed. The Marshall Commission was very
specific about this point and made fundamental recommendations
to alleviate the unfair practices of the deferment system.
By the time of the Presidential election campaigns of 1968, the
Vietnam War had become such a public issue that both the candi-
dates, Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon, advocated review of the
whole selective service process. It appears paradoxical to think
that in the post-Tet era of the War, when the United States had
nearly one-half million troops committed to a war, that the
issue of a volunteer army should surface as a campaign issue.
Such an issue would have normally been more appropriately con-
sidered under peacetime conditions. Although it was an issue
well suited to political campaign rhetoric, it was also an issue
not being debated at this stage because of its feasibility but
because of its compatibility with the American tradition.
Though no one at this time could accurately predict that the cold
war would be reduced to a lower level of confrontation than
experienced in the 1950s, the candidates were capitalizing on an
issue which they hoped could eventually be an appropriate civil-
military accommodation.
The concept of a modern volunteer army (MVA) was sur-







time under the most adverse situation, but in the proper per-
spective it was a return to the historical civil-military rela-
tionship prevailing in American history. When the domestic and
international political conditions were favorable, an MVA would
be in the best interests of the nation in that it would recognize
the historical dichotomy between the conservative military
establishment and the liberal civilian society, the latter of
which recognized the rights of the individual to determine his
own destiny. Thus the consideration of feasibility which had
dominated the reasons for utilizing selective service for over
twenty years was being replaced by the consideration of the
historical civil-military equation that called for an army com-
posed of volunteers. It appears that instead of the selective
service system supplying in an efficient manner the personnel
needed to fight the war, both the war and the system were
mutually exacerbating the very continuation and existence of
selective service. Gary Wamsley theorized that the selective
service system from its inception in 1940 had sought to meet the
functional demands arising from the national defense needs with-
out violating values of American political culture, mainly having
government work at the lowest level possible, which is in keeping
with the Jeffersonian tradition of decentralized control. Thus
the function of the local draft boards was in consonance with
this theory. But, as Wamsley contends, because of changes within
American society generated by the unpopular war in Vietnam and
the social revolution of the 1960s, which clashed with the insti-
tutional rigidities of the selective service system, it had
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become difficult to maintain an equilibrium that satisfied both
157
society and the individual. During the period from inception
to adoption (1969-1973) , the complaints lodged against an all-
volunteer military were in fact only realizations that there are
"root" differences between the two societies that exist because
of the nature of the two societies. In essence, the frustration
which the American society witnessed with its military sector's
role in the War, whether warranted or not, resulted in a public
opinion that was searching for some alternative to the selective
service system. A universal military training system offered
many of the same generic qualities of the present system. It
seemed that an all-volunteer concept offered the best solution.
The genesis of the MVA program rests with the creation
of the Gates Commission by President Nixon on 27 March 1969.
Its task was to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating
conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force.
President Nixon's charge to the commission directed it
to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscrip-
tion and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force. The
Commission will study a broad range of possibilities for
viewing the supply of volunteers for service, including
increased pay, benefits, recruitment incentives and other
practicable measures to make military careers more attrac-
tive to young men. It will consider possible changes in
selection standards and in utilization policies which may
assist in eliminating the need for induction. It will
study the estimated costs and savings resulting from an
all-volunteer force, as well as the broader social and
economic implications of this program. 158
Gary L. Wamsley, Selective Service and a Changing
America: A Study of Organizational Environmental Relationships ,
Merrill Political Science Series (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E.
Merrill Publishing Company, 1969).




It was evident at its inception that the commission was basically
told to find ways to return to a volunteer concept. The issue of
its propriety within the American political system had been
settled, at least as indicated by the President, and the only
issue to be investigated was the feasibility of such a program.
In two additional messages on the all-volunteer armed force,
President Nixon reaffirmed his philosophy in terms which were in
consonance with American liberalism. In a message to the Senate
on 13 May 1969, the President noted that
it is my contention that the disruptive impact of the mili-
tary draft on individual lives should be minimized as much
as possible. . . . Ideally, of course, minimum interference
means no draft at all. I continue to believe that under
more stable world conditions and with an armed force that
is more attractive to volunteers, the ideal can be realized
in practice. l^ 9
After receiving the Gates report, the President was even more
lucid about his convictions and in turn the policy of his admin-
istration. On 23 April 1970 in a message to Congress, President
Nixon endorsed the Gates report for an all-volunteer force and
stated that
ultimately the preservation of the free society depends
upon . . . the willingness of government to guarantee the
freedom of the individual. With an end to the draft, we
will demonstrate to the world the responsiveness of
republican government—and our continuing commitment to
the maximum freedom for the individual, enshrined in our
earliest tradition and founding documents. By upholding
the cause of freedom without conscription we will have
demonstrated in one more area the superiority of a society
159




based upon the belief in the dignity of man over a
society based on the supremacy of the state. 160
The President's comments were a reflection of the unanimous
endorsement by the Gates Commission that the nation move toward
. . . an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective
stand-by draft . . . ; and that the first indispensable step
is to remove the present inequity of pay of men serving
their first term in the armed forces. 1^1
In essence, the volunteer concept places the selective service
system in a stand-by status for use during mobilization or
national emergency, whereas during peacetime the military services
were to rely on the procurement of manpower on a voluntary basis
in a "zero-draft" environment. The commission accepted the para-
meters of the investigation to exclude all but feasibility fac-
tors and thus conducted their investigation believing that "the
nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer
162
force, supported by an effective standby draft. ..."
Once the administration had pledged to re-establish the
all-volunteer system endorsed by both the President and the
Gates Commission as being in consonance with American liberal
tradition, the debate on the issue, heard in both the media and
in Congress, centered around factors of its feasibility in pre-
sent day society. Very seldom was the issue debated on the
question of whether the program was consistent with the liberal
U. S., Congress, Senate, President Nixon's message on
the draft, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 23 April 1970, Congressional
Record 116: 12661.







tenet of individualism and the autonomous individual making a
choice without the direct or indirect features of a conscription
system. This issue was for all intents and purposes settled by
both the historical and consistent pronouncements of the President
and the contemporary mood of the American public over its dis-
enchantment with the Vietnam War. Certainly a move to end the
war would please all political factions, and an adoption of an
all-volunteer armed force would, as far as liberals were con-
cerned, re-establish the proper civil-military equilibrium within
modern day America. It would once again recognize the dichotomy
that exists between the two societies.
Once the Gates report was endorsed by the President, the
political, economic, and social factors involved in instituting
a MVA became the center of the biggeBt congressional debate on
draft legislation since 1951. The congressional hearings on all
aspects of the draft, including the lottery system established
in 1969 and the new MVA proposal, were conducted at sporadic
intervals from 23 July 1970 163 until 13 March 1972. 16 During
the course of these hearings, all the attributes and detriments
of a volunteer system were discussed in terms of their political,
social, and economic effects on American society. Both
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Review of the Administration and Operation of the Draft Law ,
Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Armed Services . 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970.
164
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congressional Armed Service Committees heard both praise for and
complaints against the proposed system. In fact, the complaints
authenticated the "root" differences in American society and are
basically countered by a reaffirmation of the American liberal
ethos and its differences with the military establishment. In
addition to the complaints voiced in congressional debate, the
MVA became part of the continuing debate over the Vietnam War
which was carried on by most citizens.
Although the feasibility aspects of instituting a TWA
concept were the primary subject of discussion in both the con-
gressional hearings and debates, the more normative issues of
whether the system would change the American governmental system
were also addressed. Among its merits, the MVA was considered
as a basis for producing a greater consensus in a society divided
by a range of social and political issues. Those who would
voluntarily enlist would form a somewhat coherent group not
subjected to dissenters. The Gates Commission claimed that one
of the primary faults of conscription is that it "has weakened
the political fabric of our society and impaired the delicate web
of shared values that alone enables a free society to exist."
One of the reasons, which had popular support from all
political factions, for enacting the MVA concept is that it was
a return to the basic liberal tenet of individualism and individ-
i I
ual choice. This was possibly the one factor, particularly after
the President had spoken of it in his various messages endorsing




the MVA concept, that all proponents of the MVA continually
stressed. At the House Armed Service Committee hearings on
2 3 February 1971, the philosophical merits of a MVA centered
about the discussion of individualism. Representative Robert
Kastenmeier (D-Wis
.
) noted that the modern volunteer army would
not infringe on individual liberties as did the draft.
Representative Frederick Schwengel (R-Iowa) stated that
".
. . whatever protects the rights of the individuals, also
167protects the basic security of the Nation." In testimony
before the House on 30 May 1971, Representative Bella Abzug
(D-N.Y.) stated
. . . most of you [representatives] who are here
continue to support a practice [conscription] that vio-
lates the basic tradition of our country . . . everyone
of you would normally support the great American right
to be free, the right to be independent, the right to
human dignity--every right except the right to avoid




Milton Friedman, a nationally known economist who served on the
Gates Commission and advocated the all-volunteer force, has
remarked independently of the Gates report that the MVA would
preserve the freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve.
This free choice would lead to an elimination of arbitrary
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Extension of the Draft and Bills Related to the Voluntary Force
Con
Comm
cept and Authorization of Strength Levels, Hearings before~the
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discrimination among different groups and would also terminate
169
military interference with ones' life or career. The Gates
Commission unanimously endorsed the concept of individuality
which the MVA preserved. It concluded that conscription under-
mined respect for the government regardless of the individual's
170
own values. Peter Barnes, writing in the New Republic
,
argued
that the MVA would consist of those who voluntarily chose to
serve which would enhance the dignity and prestige of the
171
services. In an independent study conducted by Scott
Cunningham and based on 1,500 interviews conducted with enlisted
and officer personnel in 1971 and 1973 in both the United States
and Europe, he concluded that the MVA concept would be a success
if (1) the soldier were treated as a volunteer whose individ-
uality was respected and whose time were used in a productive
and interesting manner, and if (2) the army provided the soldier
with an environment which allowed maturity and an acquisition
172
of skills or education. In conclusion, Cunningham contended
that the caliber of those volunteering would be adequate for
most military assignments and thus their actual performance
would depend on how the army recognized the individuality of each
Milton Friedman, "The Case for a Voluntary Army,"
New Guard 7 (May 1967): 12-13.
President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report , p. 14,
Peter Barnes, "All-Volunteer Army?" New Republic ,
9 May 1970, p. 20.
17?
Scott M. Cunningham, The Volunteer Soldier: His
Needs, Attitudes and Expectations (Cambridge, Mass.: Cinecom
Corp.
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enlistee and utilized his skills accordingly. Thus individ-
uality would be protected in one sense by allowing a greater
degree of individual freedom through free choice of whether or
not to enlist in the military. Once the choice is made to enter
military service, the factor of individualism would be continued
to cover a new level and range of living and working conditions
that would include a fair and comparable standard which recog-
nized the worth of the individual.
One method which the Gates Commission thought would
improve both the quality and quantity of personnel entering mili-
tary service was through a pay increase. Conscription was in
essence a tax in that by drafting men to serve at levels of
compensation below what they would normally be paid, they were
being underpayed and thus being taxed unfairly. Increased pay
would eliminate this inequity while at the same time recognizing
174the worth of the individual. Conscription further produced a
"channeling" effect in that it caused the potential draftee to
distort his personal or career plans to the advantage of the
opportunity to postpone or avoid the draft. "Channeling young
men into colleges, occupations, marriage, or fatherhood is not
175in their best interests nor those of society as a whole."
Thus the case for recognizing the individual as a concomitant









argument. It was an argument in consonance with both the American
liberal tradition and the proponents of the MVA concept.
In contrast to the merits of the MVA system, certain
other issues, pertinent to the MVA concept, were debated. In
essence, these issues became complaints that manifested a reali-
zation of the "root" differences between the two societies.
One of the complaints made is that under the selective
service system, draftees guard against the growth of a separate
military ethos which could threaten democratic institutions.
The MVA would lessen civilian concern about the use of military
17 6forces, which would come under less public scrutiny. Repre-
sentative William Steiger (R-Wis.) remarked at the congressional
hearings that he was concerned whether the all-volunteer force
would lead to the "development of a military establishment with
177
values and goals different from the rest of society." One can
say that by its very nature, the MVA concept would lead to the
alienation of the military establishment from the rest of
society. The military would not have its broad base for recruit-
ment, as it did under selective service, and its members might
not be in as frequent contact with society as were members con-
scripted under selective service. Adam Yarmolinsky notes that
whereas the draftee might not complain, volunteers might never
178
complain if they had a long term career to protect. Peter
Ibid.
, pp. 14 , 17
.
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U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Extension of the Draft , 1971, p. 256.
178Yarmolinsky, Military Establishment , pp. 399-400.
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Barnes claimed that the MVA would allow the attention of the
public, press, and Congress to drift from the aspects of mili-
179tary life. Complaints of a "gulf" growing between the
civilian and the military became common. In the study con-
ducted by Cunningham, he described the modus vivendi of the
normal volunteer as one of a self-selective process in which the
perspective volunteer selected the military because of certain
characteristics--a traditional value system that is of a non-
counter culture nature, an interest in personal security needs,
a seeking of peer group acceptance and active group participation,
and a highly structured arrangement similar to the life he left
18
to enlist in the military. Thus, the self selective process
by itself might produce a separate society that has conservative
characteristics similar to those from which the enlistee left.
A more self-contained and isolated military society,
produced by adopting MVA, say the critics of the MVA, would be
unacceptable. In fact, without an understanding of the histori-
cal dichotomy between the civilian and the military societies,
one might not be aware of the ramifications of this isolation.
Many critics hold the false concept that by having eighteen and
nineteen year olds enlist in the armed services, the entire mili-
tary establishment per se is going to be isolated from society.
This is in fact not true based on several observations. The
enlistee under the MVA system will be accorded the same official
179Barnes, "All-Volunteer Army?" p. 23.
18 Cunningham, Volunteer Soldier , pp. 3-5.
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channels for articulating complaints as were accorded his draftee
predecessor. These are normally through the chain of command
and in specific instances through congressional correspondence.
In addition to this, the past insensitiveness of the armed
forces to many enlisted complaints and requests has for the most
part been corrected by both policy and administrative changes.
The enlistee's rights are protected by written procedures, and
arbitrary actions taken against him have for the most part been
eliminated. This protection against isolating the enlistee is
further aided by the interdependence between the military and
civilian societies in matters of technology and educational
resources. Years of civilian control are not going to end with
the ending of the draft and the inception of the MVA. A further
inhibiter of an isolation ethic is that a MVA would have to be
aware of the opinion of its potential enlistees, who if they
disapproved of the nation's military policy or practices would
not volunteer. If enough refused to volunteer and enlisted
quotas were always unfulfilled, then military policies that were
so antithetical to an enlistee's perceptions would have to be
changed.
The Gates Commission in one of its conclusions noted
that
the officer corps exercises the dominant influence on
military values. Elimination of the draft will not
significantly alter its composition. Officers will con-
tinue to be recruited from all over the nation and from
a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. Further, the
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change to an all-volunteer force will have no effect on
top leadership, since these men have always been
professionals. 1°^
The injection of true volunteers at the lower officer and
enlisted levels makes the threat of isolation seem even more
remote. The commission furthered countered the isolation charge
by projecting that the turnover of voluntary force personnel will
only be three-fourths as large as if conscription were retained.
With a projected force level of 2.5 million, the MVA needs to
attract 325,000 new enlistees per year as compared to the 440,000
needed under conscription each year. Futther , the men who join
the MVA will not all become long service professionals. As esti-
mated 215,000 men will leave after a single tour (three years).
As a result, about one-half of the personnel in the MVA will
182be in their first tour of duty. William Rae in an independent
study noted that an overall first-term re-enlistment rate after
the November, 1971 pay raise and the completion of plans to
inject both professionalism and an improved life style into the
army may be as high as thirty-eight percent. However, these fac-
tors do not entirely determine re-enlistment rates since other
factors such as withdrawal from Vietnam and civilian job employ-
18 3
ment produce variable influences on re-enlistment. The Gates
Commission added that evidence shows that military service does
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not necessarily alter one's opinions because the pre-enlistment
factors of region, education, age, family, and community are
significant in shaping a person's way of thinking.
Much of this evidence tends to disprove the threat of a
military totally isolated from the civilian society and thus
immune and insensitive to the needs of society. But, by the same
token, the MVA concept presupposes a military force that will be
isolated to some extent because of the nature of its tasks and
the values it holds vis-a-vis civilian society. Few predict
that the military will be forced to retreat within itself to the
extent that it did after every war until 1940. What the mood of
the present era indicates is that the trend toward subjective
civilian control exhibited in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s will
subside, and in the institutionalization of the MVA a move will
be made toward a model of objective civilian control where the
military, while separated from society, is a "tool" of society.
Objective control is the sine qua non of the MVA concept, and
while the MVA will be isolated from the civilian society in
recognition of the "root" differences, the isolation will only
be a manifestation of the neo-professionalism of the military.
The threat posed to civilian society in the nature of an isolated
military is at most philosophically minimal.
Another complaint often voiced against the MVA concept
is that an all-volunteer armed force will appeal especially to
certain groups. Those groups normally mentioned are the poorly
educated, the poor, and the blacks, who by enlisting heavily
will thence come to dominate the military ranks. Thus to the
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MVA critics the appeal of a conscription system is that it injects
a cross-section of the American population into the military
without any one group becoming dominant or subservient. Such a
complaint was voiced by Representative Steiger in his testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee in February, 1971
when he raised the issue "that an end to the draft would create
184
an Army of the poor and the black." The extreme of this
complaint leads one to speculate and project the possibility of
having the poor and the black fight a white man's war or take
over the state!
Statistics and surveys made for the armed forces tend to
confirm the belief that a shift to a concept of true volunteerism
tends to attract enlistees who are poor and black. In an exten-
sive survey made in 1971 by the Rand Corporation for the United
States Air Force, it was shown that
1. Recruits who have entered the military service without
draft pressure (true volunteers) are on the average of
lower mental quality, have lower levels of educational
attainment, and have lower preservice earnings.
2. True volunteers have higher re-enlistment intentions
and a higher proportion of re-enlistment than the draft-
induced recruit population. 185
In a study conducted by John Drexler on the comparative profiles
of true volunteers in 1973, he concluded that true volunteers,
on the whole, have lower levels of education than did the draft
1 04
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Extension of the Draft , 1971, p. 255.
1 Q C
G. L. Brunner, The Importance of Volunteer Status ;
An Analysis and Reliability~Test of Survey Data (Santa Monica,
Cal. : Rand Corp.
,




motivated respondents. The 1967 Marshall report stated that
the conscription system enlistment rates for both blacks and
whites were about the same, but that re-enlistments for blacks
187
was almost double that of the whites. The Gates report
refutes the claim that blacks will dominate the services by pro-
jecting that a black MVA percentage will be around fifteen per-
cent or about two to four percentage points above the national
18 8black population percentage. Figures released by the Depart-
ment of Defense in February, 1974, indicate that since the last
draft call in December, 1972 and with the advent of the MVA in
July, 1973, there are 308,245 blacks in an armed forces of
2,201,750, or approximately fourteen percent of the total.
Although the statistics are an indication of trends,
they do not provide any rational reasons for refuting the con-
tinuation of a MVA system. While admitting on one hand that
socio-economic conditions may channel the less well-educated,
the poor, and the black into a volunteer army, such conditions
may channel most people into any occupation. To select the
armed forces as the sole repository of a channeling effect is
erroneous. The total black percentage of federal workers
(excluding the military) according to 1972 statistics was 11.9
I Of
John A. Drezler, Jr., Comparative Profiles of True
Volunteers and Draft-Motivated Navy Men (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
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189percent or 278,000 out of 2,335,000 workers. This percentage
is close to the eleven percent total black population recorded
190in the 1970 census. This percentage by itself is within five
percentage points of the number of blacks in the armed forces.
Additional census figures indicate that of the total 109,943
federal employees working in the District of Columbia, 76,453 or
191
seventy percent are black. Written or voiced concern about
the black dominating the federal government is seldom recorded.
One of the obvious causes of this channeling effect is that the
federal government in both the civilian and military sectors
provides in general a realistic and workable non-discriminatory
policy for employment. Thus to complain that the military ranks
will be manned by the poor and the black may in fact happen, but
is at this juncture as realistic an appraisal of the situation
as saying that the blacks will dominate the federal government.
In either case, any results produced by these statistics are
purely speculative and in the case of the military almost incon-
sequential. In fact, they indicate a lack of racial discrimi-
nation and a payment of wages that are attractive to blacks and
the poor. The higher percentage of black and poor white
189
U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1973 , 94th ed.
190
U. S.j Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
United States Census of Population: 1970 , vol. 1, Character-
istics of the Population
,
pt. 1, United States Summary. Out of
a total population of 203.2 million, 22.6 million were black.
U. S. , Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
United States Census of Population: 1970 , Subject Reports :
Government Workers
,
pp. 1, 7, 270-71.
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re-enlistments may indicate that these particular servicemen
have found a life in the armed forces which is distinctively pre-
ferable to available civilian alternatives. In either case of
initial enlistment or re-enlistment, individual choice is
accorded the soldier as much as it is accorded to the worker in
the civilian society. In specific refutation to the fear of an
all-black army, James Miller notes that the complainant is saying
that
since we [public] have failed to open all the doors of
society at large to the Negro, we should close the door
of opportunity in the military sector also. . . . Why
shouldn't the Negro be allowed to enter the armed forces
voluntarily if it represents a chance to better himself
and to serve his nation more productively . I" 2
In another vein, the making of military policy is still
entrusted to civilian and military officers, both of whom are as
representative now of a cross-section of American life as they
were in the era of conscription. Self-selection into such
employment is as much a factor in present times as it was in past
193
eras. Thus the fact that the military is now composed of
fourteen percent black or could become ninety percent black is
irrelevant to the military posture of the United States as long
as the leadership of the forces and the forces themselves con-
tinue to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and
adhere to the tenets of conservatism, which includes and demands
James C. Miller, III, ed. , Why the Draft? The Case
for a Volunteer Army , with an Introduction by Senator Edward W.
Brooke (Baltimore, Md. : Penguin Books, Inc., 1968), p. 158.
1 9 3 ...
The concept of self-selection and socialization is
discussed in some detail in Chapters IV and V.
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adherence to such traits as group solidarity, obedience,
patriotism, and duty. There is no indication that the MVA will
subvert any of the historical characteristics of the military
sector of society and thus a return to an all-volunteer concept
after a thirty-three year period of conscription will not be the
cataclysmic venture feared by the critics of the MVA but will in
fact be a restoration of the historical civil-military equation
which will be in the nature of objective civilian control.
The third of the major complaints voiced against the MVA
is that it will undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional
belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his
country. Such a complaint has been voiced by, among others, the
Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement and by
Representative John Dellenback (R-Ore.). The panel contended
that MVA would abandon the unifying influence of the nation
placing its faith in its own citizenry to rally to its defense
194
when national security was threatened. Representative
Dellenback, in testifying before the House Special Subcommittee
on the Draft in 1970, stated that by having a volunteer profes-
sional military defend the country, it would "eliminate the
democratizing effect created by the infusion of a large number of
volunteers from varying backgrounds and for short periods of
,,195time
.
19 4Civilian Advisory Panel, Report , p. 18.
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The underlying concept of this complaint lies in the
pronouncements of persons such as Thomas Jefferson, who advocated
the citizen-soldier concept as the most fair and effective means
for recruiting manpower to wage wars. Jefferson's concept has
been interpreted by those protagonists of the draft to mean that
conscription is part of the American tradition and citizen obli-
gation. Critics of this viewpoint, which includes liberals, allow
for a citizen army only when the national security or ideology
is threatened, as in World Wars I and II. At all other times,
conscription is antithetical to the historical evolution of
American civil-military relations. A more definitive liberal
answer to the criticism voiced by Representative Dellenback,
who noted the non-democratizing effect of the MVA, is that it is
better than conscription, which undermines respect for government
because it coerces people to serve involuntarily in the armed
forces. The draft in effect is not totally democratic in that
it arbitrarily selects some and defers others because of such
factors as health and intelligence. The Gates study issued con-
currently with the Gates report noted that the exclusion and
deferment policies which became part of the selective service
system deterred any real democratic or "melting pot" theory from
taking effect. What must be understood is that the re-estab-
lishment of the volunteer system did not eliminate the selective
service system, because in keeping with the liberal tenet of
President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed




total war or total peace? the President can re-establish induc-
tion in case of an emergency.
If one is of the belief that the military must be
reflective of the larger society and thus is a proponent of sub-
jective civilian control and of the Janowitz school of civil-
military relations, then a move to MVA would appear to be anti-
thetical to such democratization. But such a view can be
nullified by the fact that as previously noted about fifty per-
cent of the MVA would be first term volunteers and thus repre-
sentative of the larger society. Also as in the draft, the MVA
would represent beyond first term enlistment the character of
American society particularly associated with elements that con-
tinue to be carriers of the traditional military ethos. This is
in essence a self-selective process that lends itself under con-
ditions of both the draft and MVA to a professional military
force that is a tool of society.
The position that the military has to be democratized
and reflect the larger civilian society ignores certain basic
philosophical facts. The draft does in fact do little to demo-
cratize the services when it is considered that the enlistee has
little philosophical input into the services. Even with the
establishment of the MVA and its continued demand for new
recruits, the impact which the enlistee will have in changing
service policy will be similar to that which he had under the
draft system. Such a claim also ignores the fact that, histori-
cally, civilian control has been continuously and successfully
exercised over the military establishment. Any such relationship
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affords some degree of democratization even if it is in a
"watch-dog" status. The critics assume that the MVA will be
fully career military when in fact it will have a high turnover
197
rate as did the selective service system. They also under-
estimate the importance of having a professional military, which
historically has been the case but which has recently been seen
as a threat to American society. Such a military force is
assured of civilian control and thus can better utilize its man-
power for a more productive and efficient national security
policy. Finally, the whole concept of being representative is
questioned from the viewpoint of whether this representation
means more than having a representation of a cross-section of
people in the National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
or in the state and local police units. These organizations
also have the means to incite a coup d'etat, the prevention of
which is assumed to be one of the reasons for being so fanatical
about having civilian control- over the federal military forces.
The drafting or volunteering of men for the lower
echelons of the armed forces is little affected by any great con-
cern for democratization. The armed forces by their very nature
are humane but not democratic. Where democratization is meant
to mean having the larger society carry out the burden of
national defense, liberals would endorse this only in time of
general crisis or war, and historical precedent would refute it
as being antithetical to American civil-military relations.
197 See p. 196 for the statistics supporting this fact,
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Where democratization means an input by draftees from the larger
society, this is in fact negligible because of the basic auto-
cratic nature of the military society. In conclusion, the MVA
critics' position that military service can be justified solely
on the ground that it is a universal and democratic responsibility
is unfounded from both a philosophical and pragmatic viewpoint.
Democratization and representation will continue under the MVA
concept to the extent that both concepts are products of the
realization that "root" differences have always existed between
the two societies.
One final complaint voiced by the critics of the MVA is
that by appealing to the lower class and black population, the
armed forces will be manned by mercenaries. Representative James
Burke (D-Mass.) in speaking on H.R. 6531 (Amendments to the
19 8
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 ) noted that
despite all the claims to the contrary ... I still am
not entirely convinced . . . that we have to replace the
draft, with all its inequities, with a system which will
see rich man's wars fought by poor men--poor men who are
attracted to battle and risk their lives simply because
1 Q9
of an attractive pay.-1^
The Gates Commission anticipated this complaint and in its
studies noted that American history offers no proof that volunteer
armies are a danger to democratic policies. As it noted, volun-
teers like draftees, would never be "in a policy-making position
198Amendments to the Military Selective Service Act of
1967 , Statutes" at Large 85, 348-62 (1971).
199
U. S., Congress, House, Representative Burke speaking
on Amending the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, H.R.




in the armed forces" because of the short-term of his enlistment.
Even the inference that by sheer weight of numbers they would
have something to say about military policy cannot be maintained,
the commission thought, and its conclusion is equally applicable
to volunteers. There thus seems to be little credence to the
claim of the MVA becoming a band of mercenaries. The civilian
control exercised over the military since the founding of the
Republic shows little sign of accommodating mercenaries. While
the pros and cons of the MVA system were being discussed in all
sectors of society, President Nixon's pledge of directing the
nation toward a MVA, which started in the 1968 Presidential elec-
tion campaign, moved closer to becoming a national policy through
congressional action in 1971.
On 1 April 1971 the House passed H.R. 6531 by a vote of
293 to 99 which expressed the largest negative vote on draft
legislation since 1951. On 24 June 1971 the Senate also passed
the bill by a vote of 72 to 16. Many of the negative votes were
cast in symbolic disagreement with the war and with the draft
system. The President signed the legislation into law on
28 September 1971. H.R. 6531 extended the draft for two years
to expire on 1 July 1973, which was acceptable to the anti-MVA
critics, and substantial pay raises were granted first-term
draftees, which was the first recommended step toward an MVA and
acceptable to MVA proponents. Representative F. Edward Hebert
(D-La.), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, seemed




to express the feeling of Congress and the Administration by
stating that the merit of H.R. 6531 was that basically the
bill gives the President the tools to do the job by
increasing substantially the basic pay for men with
less than two years service. If an all-volunteer force
is feasible, the bill does all that we can do legis-
latively to move, over a reasonable period of time,
toward that objective. 201
With the passage of the draft extension, the army issued its
master plan for a MVA with the stated objective "to expedite the
development of a capably led, highly competent fighting force
202
which attracts motivated, qualified volunteers." At the heart
of the program was the effort to strengthen the army as an insti-
tution in two ways: (1) strengthen professionalism, and (2)
improve army life. The first is a definite manifestation of a
return to objective civilian control where the military becomes
a professional instrument of national security policy. It is a
realization that the voluntary armed forces will bring the civil-
military equation again into its proper equilibrium. The second
effort is a humanizing effort that will help to maintain an armed
force relevant to society but still separate in its mission. In
accordance with Section 211 of the draft extension law, Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird issued a one-time report to Congress and
the President in August, 1972 on the progress toward an MVA. He
U. S., Congress, House, Representative Hebert speaking
for the Amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
H.R. 6531, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 30 March 1971, Congressional
Record 117: 8634.
202
U. S., Department of the Army, The Army's Master
Program for the Modern Volunteer Army: A Program for Profes -
sionals (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971) , p. 1.
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was more than optimistic about the success of a MVA mainly
because in a peacetime environment, the armed forces will func-
tion best when they can compete with other institutions for man-
power. He coupled this attitude with the fact that volunteers
tend to be more efficient than ones that are forced into the
203
military. The Secretary was depending on philosophical atti-
tudes as the main factors in MVA's success. Concurrent with
the hopeful development of a successful MVA was the rapid turn
of events in the Vietnam War in late 1972. With the signing
of the Paris accords on 27 January 1973, which brought an
announced cease fire policy in Vietnam, Secretary Laird announced
the ending of the draft and the exclusive dependence of the
armed forces on volunteers for its manpower.
Whether the MVA will be successful is the subject of
discussion within all levels in the armed forces. Published
statistics indicate that enlistment quotas are being met at the
rate of ninety-two percent. What is more important is that the
historical dichotomy between the two societies was re-established
by a Congress and President that obviously believed that con-
scription had outlived its intended purpose and that a voluntary
method was more in keeping with American tradition. It is in
accordance with both traditions in that it satisfies the liberal
U. S., Department of Defense, Report to the President
and the Chairman of the Armed Service Committees of the Senate
and the House of Representatives. Progress in Ending the Draft
and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1972), p. 7.
204New York Times, 28 January 1973, p. 1.
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tradition of individuality and individual choice while at the
same time satisfying the military establishment by giving it
more stability in manpower requirements that allows it to become
more professional.
Now that the recruitment of the enlisted ranks has been
brought under an all-volunteer concept, it is of importance to
investigate the effect officer recruitment has on the "root"
differences between the civilian and military societies.
Chapter IV is thus devoted to an investigation of this effect
as it pertains to officer recruitment through the military






This chapter is devoted to an investigation of the effect
which officer recruitment has on the "root" differences between
the civilian and military societies. Although the recruitment
process is carried on in a liberal environment and is directed
toward the procurement of potential career officers, who are a
product of this environment, the recruited officer has not had
the liberalizing effect on the military establishment that one
would commonly expect. Although recruitment is the only factor
discussed in this chapter, it is not the only factor which is
related to determining the political ethos of the military estab-
lishment via the officer ranks. Once the officer is recruited
into the military, professional socialization then becomes an
important factor in deciding the career motivation of the
officer. This factor will be discussed in Chapter V.
Within the recruitment process, the three major sources
of officer recruitment and thus training—the military academies,
Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) /Of ficer Training Schools (OTS)
,
and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) —will be investi-




juxtaposes the liberal ethic of American society against the
conservative ethic of the military establishment. The pattern
to be investigated is one in which the main source of career
military officers is the product of the most conservative insti-
tutions (military academies) , while the fewest career officers
are the product of the most liberal institutions, i.e., OCS/OTS
candidates selected from colleges and universities. Between the
two extremes is the officer procurement source which many military
planners claim combines the best of the military and the civilian
ethic—the ROTC program. The retention rate of officers whose
commissioning source is ROTC is higher than OCS but lower than
the military academies. Thus the most conservative institutions
produce the most career officers while the most liberal institu-
tions (colleges) , which graduate ROTC students and is normally
the source for OCS/OTS candidates, produce the fewest career
officers. Such a pattern may not be surprising, but as the
investigation will reveal, the cause of such a pattern has not
been the result of chance alone.
The officer who is a voluntary and not draft-induced
product of the recruitment process is one who more likely than
not has an affinity for military life. Thus the belief that
the military is liberalized by the officers recruited into the
ROTC and OCS/OTS programs is suspect. If this is true, then the
detractors of the product produced by the military academies,
Draft-induced, as used in the context of this investi-
gation, is used to refer to one who joins a military program as
a result of the direct pressure of conscription.
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who are at the same time protagonists of the citizen-soldier
supposedly produced by non-academy sources, may be better under-
2
stood. Liberalizing the "root" differences between the mili-
tary establishment and its civilian society by recruiting
officers from a liberal environment may prove to be an illusion
even to its most ardent supporters.
Military Academy
The concept in the United States of having a nation whose
militia or military are trained in an academy or other educational
institutions is basically an old notion dating back to the estab-
lishment of the government under the Constitution. In a speech
before Congress in December, 1796, President George Washington
recommended the establishment of two separate institutions as
being vital to the conduct of good government. First, a national
university should be established to provide for a common, liberal
education of American youth in the service of government. A
second institution, a military academy, should likewise be estab-
lished because it would not only provide a place where students
could study the art of war but could serve as a central reposi-
3
tory for the knowledge and techniques of war. Even if other
Peter Karsten and others are examples of writers who
conclude that those who want to drive ROTC units from the liberal
arts campuses should have some second thoughts, because there is
a real need for these liberalized officers to serve in the armed
forces; see "ROTC, MYLAI and the Volunteer Army," Foreign Policy
2 (Spring 1971) : 155.
3George Washington, The Writings of George Washington ,
ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1931-44), 35 (1940): 314-17.
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factors than Washington's recommendation were instrumental in
the founding of America's first military academy at West Point
in 1802, his concept of such an institution as providing a place
for the study of war was, in fact, basically ignored. Instead
the Military Academy, established under the aegis of President
Thomas Jefferson, was founded as a technical school, designed,
as Samuel Huntington notes, "to serve the entire nation as a
practical scientific school, not a professional academy for the
4
military vocation." Jefferson's interest in scientific matters
rather than military matters was obviously present in the action.
The establishment of a military institution which stressed
technology has influenced the entire history of the educational
programs not only at West Point, but at the Naval Academy at
Annapolis, which was established in 1845. The establishment
of the Air Force Academy in 1954 broke tradition when the policy
makers and administrators placed great emphasis on the study of
the humanities and social sciences, to the detriment, so thought
5
some, of the technological aspects of the military profession.
Thomas Jefferson's grand design was to formulate a
program that produced engineers who would work in both the public
and private sectors to help expand and develop the United States.
Thus he recognized the public nature of the institutions as well
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 198.
The curriculum issue brought a liberal reaction from
both West Point and Annapolis and helped spawn the Hebert investi-
gation of 1967-68; for a more complete discussion of this matter
see pp. 221-23 below.
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as the public service of its graduates. Though the stress on
scientific matters has declined somewhat over the years, the
public nature of the first academy was made manifest in the mis-
sion assigned all the academies as they developed in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. The common mission, basically
identical for all three academies, was thus publicly oriented.
Each academy provides academic instruction and military training
which seeks to develop the motivation and ideals of duty, honor,
and country which are essential to the development of a career
military officer. More specifically, as stated in the catalogues
for each academy, the missions are as follows:
Military Academy- "To instruct and train the Corps of Cadets
so that each graduate will have the quali-
ties and attitudes essential to his pro-
gressive and continued development
throughout his career as an officer in
the Regular Army."
Naval Academy- "To prepare young men morally, mentally, and
physically to be professional officers in the
naval service."
Air Force Academy-"To educate and train career officers for
the United States Air Force."
Thus as we view the academies in contemporary terms, their mission
is stated in unequivocal terms—to produce career officers for
the military services. To carry out this mission, the academies
have under instruction a yearly total of approximately 13,500
students, evenly distributed among the three institutions, who
are taught a four-year course combining academic and military
education along with a vigorous physical education program and
summer training exercises. All academy graduates receive a
Bachelor of Science degree. As a general principle and without

216
analyzing the sociological profile of a prospective academy
student, the selective process at one particular academy, West
Point, is based on a "whole man" concept score, which places
sixty percent of the emphasis on academic matters, thirty per-
cent on leadership potential, and the remaining ten percent on
. . 7physical proficiency. This concept corresponds favorably with
the other academies' admission standards.
Injected into the academy educational process are such
factors as leadership potential, physical proficiency, and career
officer motivation, all of which have no equivalent value in the
civilian academic world. In addition to these factors and
peculiar to the military ethic is the idea of training vis-a-vis
educating to carry out the mission of the academies. Education
is the broader term commonly used to describe the general learn-
ing process in a liberal environment. Contrariwise, training
is a concept that is basically job oriented. In the liberal arts
environment, training and education are understood to be com-
pletely separate functions, but the "education programs of the
armed services are conceptually and administratively part of the
For two introductory works that more than adequately
analyze the sociological implications of military academy
students see Morris Janowitz , The Professional Soldier: A Social
and Political Portrait (New York! Free Press, 1971) and Laurence
Y. Radway , "Recent Trends at American Service Academies , " in
Public Opinion and the Military Establishment , ed. Charles C.
Moskos , Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and
Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971).
Leo J. Kotula and Helen R. Haggerty, Research on the
Selection of Officer Candidates and Cadets (Washington: U. S.
Array Personnel Research Office, [1966] ) , pp. 10-11.
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gtraining function." The academies' mission may best be carried
out in an environment that stresses a positive training process
that is goal oriented to the commissioning of career military
officers.
Prior to World War II (1920-1940) , the execution of the
academies' mission was made easier by the presence of many fac-
tors: the small size of the student body (less than 2,000 at
each of the academies) ; the stiff competition for appointments
to the academies; the expense of colleges vis-a-vis economic
factors of the era; and the respect accorded those who pursued
a career as a military officer. This era also witnessed the
isolation from society of the military establishment because it
was not only antithetical to liberal tradition, but was a burden
on a society that had no real world security commitment that
could not be literally handled by landing a detachment of marines
on foreign shores. The mission and function of the academies
was in consonance with the historical philosophical dichotomy
between the military and civilian societies. The military ethos
was isolated from the mainstream of American thought, and a sort
of benign neglect was characteristic of the relationship between
society and its military establishment because of the latter'
s
small size and small budgetary requirements. The concept of the
"militarization of the military," as defined by Samuel
Huntington's theory of objective civilian control, was the
John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and
Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton:




Just as World War II changed the structure of most of the
world's institutions, it also brought the military establishment
into a new position of power within the American political and
social system. One of the first indications of how the postwar
military academies would continue to carry out the function for
which they were established was contained in a Report of the
Board to Study the Methods of Educating Naval Officers of July,
1944. The Navy committee responsible for the report rejected a
proposal to combine both academies. A separate Naval Academy
was essential, the committee noted, because while any one of
many technical schools and colleges could provide a proper
education, "none . . . can provide the equivalent training,
9discipline, and indoctrination and character building." The
Department of the Army staff arrived at basically the same con-
clusion. In testimony before a House of Representatives sub-
committee on appropriations on 27 May 194 6, General Maxwell
Taylor, then Superintendent of the Military Academy, testifying
in reference to a proposal to make West Point a two year
graduate institution, stated that ". . .we must have these young
men in their formative years if we are to implant the principles
in them which we try to implant." A historical summary of
U. S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary
of the Navy, Report of the Board to Study the Methods of Educat-




U. S. , Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1947, Hearings
before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations .
79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, p. 620.
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postwar academy policies, in fact, confirms that academies did
return to a full four year program from a war time imposed two-
three year program and did return to basically training students
to become future military officers. Education in non-military
subjects continued to be relegated to a secondary position of
importance. This educational policy was short lived in that the
civil-military relations of the era rapidly changed.
Because of post-World War II cold war considerations,
the historical military policy of objective control was changed,
and the military sector gradually emerged as co-partners with
the civilian in policy making. The policy of subjective control
became the dominant civil-military relationship in that the
military became more of a "mirror" of society and an extension
of civilian policy rather than a "tool" of society. Such
historical changes brought the military into the closest contact,
outside wartime conditions, it had ever had with the civilian
sector and produced a new interest in civilian matters which
generated the era of political-military policy making. This
new-found coordination and response of the military to the
civilian ethic in turn spawned an awakening in the academies
of the need to re-evaluate their curricula. With the establish-
ment of the Air Force Academy in 1954 and its relative freedom
from tradition, an innovative educational experience was
generated which placed more emphasis on the humanities and social
sciences than had heretofore been experienced at the two other
academies. Both these academies followed shortly (early 1960s)
with their own academic revolutions, with the Naval Academy being
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more innovative than the Military Academy.
Such a liberal revolution would have been more than
welcome at most liberal arts colleges, but its applicability to
the academies' unchanged mission of producing career military
officers produced inherent conflict. Because the military
academy graduate provides the most institutionalized profes-
sional input into the military establishment, any reduction in
the professional standards of academy graduates could possibly
lower and even compromise overall service standards, which
included such military characteristics as the conservative traits
of loyalty, group integrity, courage, and obedience. These
qualities are not necessarily acquired by long study or reasoned
argument but by discipline, symbols, and personal example. What
was happening was that the military academies were attempting
to liberalize their image, procedures, and curricula while at
the same time attempting to continue to instill into their
students the conservative traits of the "heroic" military
officer. The Vietnam War, aided by the social revolution of the
1960s, spawned an anti-military bias that produced an added
impetus, at least at the Naval Academy, to become, as a Superin-
tendent once remarked, "a Harvard on the Severn River." The
result of this trend toward a more liberal academy brought forth
a one-time review, which up to this point was unique among the
academies, of the entire military and academic program at the
Comment made by Admiral Draper Kauffman, Superintendent
of the Naval Academy, to the faculty forum at the Naval Academy
on 18 November 1967.
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Academy. On 2 November 1967, an ad hoc Professional Training
and Education committee submitted its final report on the pro-
fessional training and education of midshipmen at the Naval
Academy in which they unanimously concluded that the present pro-
fessional (military) training and education program at the
Academy did not satisfy the mission of the Academy, which is to
train and educate career officers of the Navy. Their conclusion
was based on the premise that the Academy had shifted both teach-
ing and credited course emphasis to academic courses to the
12detriment of professional training.
This report, coupled with the numerous complaints about
the quality of academy graduates in general, generated a Con-
gressional investigation (1967-68) by a subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee and chaired by Representative F. Edward
Hebert (D-La.) with the purpose of making a thorough
inquiry into the operation of the United States Military
Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United
States Air Force Academy to . . . assure a professional
military force truly representative of a cross-section
of the American people. 13
Thus ensued an independent investigation into whether within the
new liberal environment the service academies had lost sight of
the fact that their mission was to train future career officers.
The message that they exist only for this purpose was made
1 2
The Report of the U. S. Naval Academy Professional and
Education ad hoc committee is included as an appendix to U. S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Administration of
the Service Academies, Report and Hearings of the Special Sub -








quite clear in a session which officials at the Naval Academy
had with subcommittee chairman Hebert, in which he acknowledged
both his pleasure with how the Military Academy was performing
its function of "training" officers and his displeasure with
the Air Forces' seemingly cavalier attitude toward the same
goal. As Hebert noted,
what would you think of a school [referring to the Air
Force Academy] that had 70 percent of its students on
some type of dean's list? It must have a lot of intelli-
gent students or it must be academically ineffective.
I am inclined to believe it is the latter. **
Hebert believed that the methods used to carry out the Naval
Academy's mission were not as good as the Military Academy's but
better than the Air Force Academy's. His belief about the Air
Force ' s performance of its mission was later confirmed in the
hearings.
The reason this committee sits is because of informa-
tion that has come to us which indicated particularly in
the area of the Air Force it was concentrating on academics
and subordinating military training. 15
Admiral Draper Kauffman, then Superintendent of the Naval
Academy, noted in his testimony that the top specific task of
the Naval Academy is first and foremost moral and character
development, and second to conduct military training with the
initial emphasis on discipline, willingness, and ability to fol-
low orders. The fourth priority of six was an academic education.
As Kauffman related to the subcommittee, "as you know our
Interview with Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La.),






ngress, House, Administration of the Service
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graduate has a 5-year obligated service, but we never talk about
that here at the Academy because we are in the business of pro-
1 r
ducing 30- or 40-year men, not 5 year men." Similar testimony
and statements of their respective academy's mission were heard
from General Thomas Moorman, Superintendent of the Air Force
Academy at the time, and General Donald Bennett, then Super-
17intendent of the Military Academy. One of the conclusions
made by the Hebert subcommittee directly reflected the commit-
tee's concern with the mission of the academies. As Hebert put
it, the review of academy operations and administration enabled
members of all academies to "fully appreciate the determination
of the Congress to insure that our future career officers will,
in truth, understand and wholeheartedly accept the precept of
18
'duty, honor, country 1 ."
Little doubt thus remains that the historic mission of
the military academies remains as conceived by the Hebert investi-
gation and particularly accentuated in its overall conclusions.
The historical dichotomy between education and training manifested
in the difference between college/universities and military
academies restricts how liberal a military academy can become and
still train its students to fight a war. The conservative ele-
ment of the military establishment remains dominant in setting










Once the institution defines its parameters and thus by-
its very nature the extent of any liberalization, then any
external liberalization is subjected to the type of student who
seeks and is admitted to a military academy. This process will
be referred to as the self-selection process. Just as the func-
tion of the academy limits, for all practical purposes, the
extent of any effective civilianization and liberalization, so
does the professional ideology and self-selection of the mili-
tary officer serve as a powerful counterforce to liberalization.
In fact, they assist in reinforcing the limits of an academy's
liberalization efforts. What may differentiate the military from
other bureaucratic institutions is that as managers of violence,
the notion of combat, either preparation for or actual battle,
remains a central value unique to the military profession.
Another unique characteristic that typifies military self-
selection is noted by Mayer Zald and William Simon.
Historically, military career choices in American
society have not competed in the marketplace of occupa-
tional opportunities. On the one hand, to a greater
extent than is true of most occupations, military career
choices have been nourished in family and regional tradi-
tions. . . . Furthermore, whereas entrance into most
occupations of middle-class status is usually relatively
voluntary, entrance into the officer corps is in some
cases one step from coercion, representing avoidance of
conscription or of enlisted-man status rather than a
positive choice.^"
Such an observation, while partly appropriate to describing
academy recruitment, is directed more toward ROTC and OCS
1 Q
Mayer N. Zald and William Simon, "Career Opportunities
and Commitments Among Officers," in The New Military: Changing
Patterns of Organization , ed. Morris Janowitz (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 270.
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students when conscription is in effect.
A more accurate assessment of the recruitment function
as it pertains to the self-selection of academy students is one
that realizes that the military attracts people whose motives,
habits, values, and images of life have the greatest chance of
fulfillment within the military establishment. In this sense a
military career, as any other career, can be considered as a set
of choices. In either case, if the civilian or military occupa-
tion allows a certain gratification of values relative to other
possible choices, the person is likely to remain in the profes-
sion. Thus in the case of the military, its conservative ethos
would appeal to those of similar social and political traits.
Laurence Radway believes that self-selection into the academies
is a more important determinant of future attitudes and values
than the kinds of experiences that the students undergo through
20the in-service socialization process. John Lovell in his
extensive study of the impact of West Point training on officer
attitudes concluded that "socialization at West Point produces
only slight impact upon professional orientations and strategic
21perspectives of the cadet." Adam Yarmolinsky believes that
self-selection into the officer corps is more important in deter-
mining attitudes than the impact of life in the military
22
academies. Morris Janowitz calculates that since 1945 more and
20 Radway, "Recent Trends," p. 4.
John P. Lovell, "The Professional Socialization of the
West Point Cadet," in Janowitz, The New Military , p. 145.
Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its
Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1971) , p. 223.
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more cadets entering the academies are doing so through a self-
selection process. By the 1960s more than one-fourth of entering
23
cadets came from career military families, the implication of
such a statistic being that such families influence self-
selection. More recent statistics indicate that entering students
at the academies are becoming more self-selectively oriented.
The Class of 1972 at West Point, for example, was comprised of
13.4 percent officer's sons and 46.4 percent enlisted men sons.
Only 14.7 percent of the fathers did not serve in the military
in some capacity. Statistics for the Classes of 1973 and 1974
at West Point show a similar emphasis on self-recruitment,
25particularly of sons of enlisted men. Thus is established a
possible causal relationship within the family whereby the
father's occupation influences to a great degree the occupation
of the son. This may be particularly evident in the military
which provides upward mobility, particularly for the sons of
enlisted men.
Recent research has shown that interest in the military
profession was the most frequently reported reason given by those
who selected the Military Academy, and that the most important
23Janowitz, Professional Soldier , p. xxv.
Office of Institutional Research, United States Mili -
tary Academy: Characteristics of the Class bf 1972 (West Point,
N . Y . : Office of Research, [1968] ) , p. 9.
2 5
Office of Institutional Research, United States Mili-
tary Academy: Characteristics of the Class of 1973 (West Point,
N . Y . : Office of Research, [1969]); Office of Institutional
Research, United States Military Academy: Characteristics of
the Class of 1974 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [T9P0])
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intrinsic factors that influenced selection of West Point were
2 6parents and contact with the military. In research conducted
in the autumn of 1968 on the Military Academy Classes of 1969,
1970, 1971, and 1972, cadets were requested to report the
extrinsic/intrinsic factors that influenced their decision to
attend the Military Academy. Fifty-one percent gave as the most
important reason for seeking an appointment the desire for a
military career. Likewise, the major reasons given for declin-
ing the appointment were as follows: lack of desired curriculum
at the Academy, acceptance by the college of their first choice,
27
and length of mandatory service obligation. Although similar
statistics were not available at either the Naval Academy or the
Air Force Academy, there is no reason to believe that the same
observations would not be generally true at these schools. This
is based on the fact that the admission standards, missions, and
overall ethos of the three academies would attract similar
applicants and similar responses.
Another indicator of the self-selection process is
illustrated by the announced political attitudes of freshmen
entering the academies as compared to freshmen entering four-
year private universities that could generally be considered the
most liberal of higher educational institutions. It is not sur-
prising that the entering academy freshmen in 1970 tended to
Gerald W. McLaughlin, Jr., A Multidimensional View of
Cadets' Decision to Seek a USMA Nomination (West Point, N.Y.:






perceive of themselves as being more conservative in their poli-
tical preferences than the national norms. In fact, the academy
students' political identification compared favorably with that
of the nation's technical institutions, which have tended to
have the most conservative orientation. The following data is
collated to indicate the differences between the current political
beliefs of freshmen entering the three academies and seventy-two
private, four-year colleges and universities. Table 4 indicates
a line comparison and Figure 3 indicates the differences in a
more graphic manner.
TABLE 4

















Source: American Council on Education, National Norms
for Entering College Freshmen--Fall 1970 (Washington: American
Council on Education, Office of Research, [1970]), p. 25;
Charles L. Cochran, "Midshipmen and Cadet Profiles and National
Norms: A Comparison," Naval War College Review 24 (May 1972):
43; Gerald W. Medsger, A Comparison of New Cadets at United
States Military Academy~with Entering Freshmen at Other Colleges
,
Class of 1974 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Institutional




GRAPHIC COMPARISON OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES
Academies
Middle Far
Far Left Liberal Road Conservative Right
One can conclude that the academies through both their functional
restrictions and self-selection process attract significantly
fewer liberal and more conservative students than would possibly
be expected due to chance.
One additional result of this pattern of self-selection
works to the detriment of recruitment. Historically speaking,
Andrew Jackson was instrumental in having the base for recruitment
into the military academy changed in 1843 to a more representative
system based on congressional appointments. This system is basi-
cally the one in use today at all the academies. The point is
that regardless of the broadening of the base in social recruit-
ment, it seems that the officers recruited into the academies
have political attitudes that remain in consonance with the con-
servative military establishment. More succinctly, broadening
the social base in officer recruitment has not been accompanied
by a concomitant process of democratization in the officer's
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political beliefs. The political orientation of the officer
corps seems more contingent upon organizational expectations and
less on the pattern of recruitment.
With the end of conscription in 1973 and the introduction
of the all-volunteer concept, combined with the social develop-
ments of the 1960s, a new factor has been introduced into the
possible liberalization of the service academies. This is the
growing unpopularity of things military among American youth, in
part spawned by the Vietnam War and the social revolution which
generated an awareness and ethos of an anti-military "self" ethic
in the 1960s. This could well mean that the historical concept
of having the military academies attended by students who are
representative of the country-at-large may have changed. With
the advent of the modern volunteer army, it is likely that a
narrower range of individuals is likely to apply for admission
to and opt for a service academy education. Increasingly it
would seem that such a person would be predominantly the highly
motivated, self-selected individual from a distinctly conser-
vative background who was willing and able to ignore peer-group
pressure and choose a military career. In this sense, the anti-
military bias of the youth culture may in fact ironically pro-
duce a more militaristic military by the very fact that only
those individuals whose values closely resemble the conservative
military establishment will enter the military profession of the
future. How extensive this polarization will become is unknown
at this juncture, but in any case the continuing trend toward a
more conservative student body at the service academies may run
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counter to the overt attempts at liberalization by its faculty
and administration. Such a trend certainly confirms the inherent
conservative nature of both the institution and the students who
attend.
One of the best indicators of how self-selection deter-
mines to a large extent the composition of the officer corps is
the factor of retention on active military duty of officers who
graduate from the academies vis-a-vis those who graduate from
other recruitment sources. Relying on the observations made by
John Lovell in his investigation of the Military Academy cadets,
in which he concluded that the Military Academy does not have the
comprehensive impact of implanting the traditional values on its
29
student body one might believe, and noting that self-selection
does, in fact, play a major role in determining whether one
attends an academy or not, academy graduates tend to be more com-
mitted than graduates of other procurement sources at least as
far as retention statistics indicate. The percentages noted in
Table 5 are representative of one particular year group and are
submitted only to indicate representative retention rates rela-
tive to commission source. Variables such as the modern volunteer
army, war, and domestic social and economic conditions will alter
Conclusions are based on the author's observations made
at the Naval Academy, September, 1966 through May 1968, August
1973, and at the Military Academy, January 1973.
Lovell, "Professional Socialization," p. 120. Lovell 's
observations may be modified by the observations made by Masland
and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars
,
p. 170 in which they note that
the academies are the "repositories of service ethos. It is at
the academies that the services define the ideals to which they




SERVICE RETENTION vs. SOURCE OF COMMISSION
(Year Group 1963—Percentages)
5 Years (1968) 7 Years (1970) 9 Years (1972)
Service MA ROTC OCS MA ROTC OCS MA ROTC OCS
Army 96.4 77.9 13.5 83.0 60.4 12.0 75.0 56.0 10.4
Navy 78.4 59.6 16.1 50.0 24.6 12.3 46.8 22.6 12.0
Air Force 78.5 51.8 28.9 58.0 37.0 18.0 54.0 36.7 15.0
Source: U. S., Department of Defense (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) , 1 July 1973.
Note: Intervals were picked to correspond with "mile-
stones" in ones career: 5 year—initial obligation over for all
commissioning sources; 7 year— seventy to eighty percent of all
officers who leave the service do so within two years after
their initial military obligation expires; 9 year
—
promotion to
Major (Army and Air Force) and Lieutenant Commander (Navy) is
close to the midway point in a twenty-year career.
percentages within each particular commissioning source over a
span of years, but such conditions will not greatly affect the
relationship among the three sources. The statistics indicate
rather conclusively that more academy graduates devote their
career to a military profession while most non-military academy
officers do not. The figures also verify Representative Hebert's
praise for the career officer produced at West Point.
The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed
Force reported in 1970 that although the military academies
For a further discussion of this matter see pp. 221-22
above. West Point has consistently retained more of its
graduates on active duty than the other two academies.
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produced only three percent of all newly commissioned officers
in the selected fiscal year 1968, these academy graduates have
in the past and will continue in the future to set the standards
for the services and are far more likely to be career officers.
They eventually hold the predominant share of responsibility and
31power within the military service.
In conclusion, the attempt to liberalize the academies
is to a large extent thwarted by the very nature of the institu-
tions, of the mission they are to carry out, and of the students
who opt to attend an academy. Although the ROTC, OCS, and OTS
programs furnish from ninety to ninety-five percent of the
annual officer input into the military services and with it the
hopes for liberalization of the military establishment, low self-
selection rates, a high resignation rate, and the nature of the
conservative institution vis-a-vis the political beliefs of
their students diminish to a large extent any thrust toward
liberalization of the military establishment that might result
therefrom. The post-Vietnam ethos of anti-militarism manifested
somewhat in the establishment of the all-volunteer military con-
cept will likely tend to further amplify the self-selective pro-
cess. Since liberalization of the military establishment through
the recruitment of individuals from a liberal environment into
the military academies has proven to be more of an illusion than
fact, an examination of the remaining major sources of officer
procurement (OCS/OTS and ROTC) will be made to determine whether
President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed




or not they provide an infusion of liberalism into the military
establishment.
Officer Candidate School
Officer Candidate School, conducted by all three
services and mainly open to college graduates and some enlisted
men, and Officer Training School, conducted by the Air Force
for college graduates only, are officer procurement programs
designed basically to train, not educate, within a short period
of time, usually three to four months, reserve officers to fill
particular billets that are vacant because of a shortage of
32
active duty regular officers. Under wartime conditions, the
OCS programs expand to become the largest source of officer pro-
curement. For example, in 1967 and 1968 at the height of the
Vietnam War, while West Point produced 558 and 667 graduates and
Army ROTC produced 10,727 and 14,176 graduates, Army OCS produced
19,226 and 18,355 officers, respectively. By 1973 and with the
military withdrawal from the Vietnam War nearing completion, Army
OCS was annually training, 1,000 or less officers, which was a
sufficient number needed to maintain a much lower officer manning
level. Although the Air Force and Navy manpower needs in the
war were of a lesser magnitude than the Army's and thus their
requirements for OCS graduates not nearly so high as the Army's,
all three services, as they had done in the past, utilized the
program as a method to expand the officer corps manning level
The OTS program is considered for purposes of this




rapidly. From all outward appearances, the OCS program would
appear to be the best source and method for liberalizing the
military establishment because most personnel accepted into the
program have completed college or finished some college work.
When demand levels for officers are high, the quality and quantity
of education requirements decrease and vice versa.
Despite the appearances of potential liberal input,
particular when the demand level is high, philosophical "root"
differences between the two societies precludes any great
liberalization for several reasons. The high resignation rate
shown in Table 5 of OCS students indicates to a large extent the
desire of students to fulfill an involuntary or draft-induced
military obligation in the fashion best suited to their needs.
Avoidance of serving as an enlisted man is another factor. The
relatively short obligation (two to three years) period serves
as another influence in having young men join the military
through OCS. Thus OCS students who remain on active duty beyond
their initial obligation, particularly as noted in Table 5, are
then viewed as objects of initial self-selection and subsequent
professional socialization. In the "draft free" environment
under the all-volunteer concept, and particularly in peacetime,
officer entry into the military establishment via the OCS
program will be minimal.
Thus the program which provided the majority of military
manpower for World War II and in the interim years until the
Quotas in the program vary from month to month depend-
ing on the need for officers on active duty.
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establishment of the modern volunteer army on 1 July 197 3 sup-
plied the largest initial input into the officer corps, will be
almost ineffective from the viewpoint of providing a steady input
of liberally educated officers into the military establishment
for what has been statistically speaking mainly one obligated tour
of duty. Thus while any liberal input would be minimum from
officers of lower rank, those officers graduated through the OCS
program who reach upper or general/flag ranks are a small minority
of the total officer manning level. With the operation of the
modern volunteer army and the drastic reduction in OCS officer
procurement, future liberal input will be further restricted.
The pragmatic reasons for having an OCS program (training
quantities of students in the shortest period of time to fill an
immediate need) seems to outweigh the philosophical nature of the
input of the program on the military establishment. Once again
retention statistics confirm that any OCS input is considered
temporary and transient.
>
Reserve Officer Training Corps
The other major recruitment source of officers is the
ROTC program which is organized to bring college students into
the program who are then concurrently trained in military sub-
jects and educated in the arts and sciences. To many, such a
program combines the qualities that Thomas Jefferson spoke of as
the citizen-soldier. To others, ROTC remains more attached to
the principles of the military academies than the other extreme
of OCS. Whereas the OCS program is in many ways a "stop-gap"
measure designed to supply officers when demand exceeds
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institutional supply either through the academy or ROTC program,
the ROTC program has been institutionalized as a regular source
of officer procurement since the passage of the National Defense
Act of 1916. This Act created the organized reserve force for
which officers would be mainly trained in and procured from the
ROTC program conducted in civilian colleges and universities.
The act authorized a reserve commission to be awarded to those
who successfully completed a four-year curriculum at civilian
34
educational institutions.
The history of the American experience with ROTC may
have philosophically begun with the Militia Act of 1792, which
35
affirmed the concept of the citizen army, and with Thomas
3 6
Jefferson's later hopes for a citizen army. In fact, the actual
manifestation of such a concept began with the founding of the
American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy (now called
Norwich University in Vermont) in 1819. Its mission was
partially to provide officers for the national defense who would
be identified with the interests of the community. To accomplish
this mission, the academy provided courses in professional mili-
tary training. The next civilian military colleges to be estab-
lished were Virginia Military Institute in 1839 and The Citadel
in 1842. The lack of trained and experienced officers in the
Civil War was in part responsible for the inclusion of military
National Defense Act, Statutes at Large 39, sec. 49,
193 (1916).
For a further discussion of this matter see p. 35
above.




instruction in the curricula of colleges and universities under
the terms of the Morrill Act of 1862. 37
Justin Morrill (Whig-Vt.) noted in Congress that he did
not consider the expansion of West Point to be an operational
solution to the problem of providing adequately prepared
officers, because a centrally-controlled standing army was a
danger to a free society. By his reasoning, having military
training in a civilian educational institution was a means by
which a democratic people could gain a competent officer corps
38
without endangering their basic liberties. In brief, the
Morrill Act offered to each state tracts of federally owned
public lands or script in lieu thereof. The funds derived from
the land sale (or the holding of script) were to be devoted to
the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one
college where the leading object shall be, without exclud-
ing the scientific and classical studies, and including
military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as
are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts. 39
Between 1862 and 1916, neither the Congress nor the War
Department made any serious attempts to define exactly how mili-
tary instruction was to be carried out at the Land-Grant Colleges.
There was no machinery established to administer the program nor
was there much enthusiasm for such military training. It was
3 7
Act Donating Public Lands to the Several States and
Territories which may provide Colleges for the Benefit of Agri -
culture and the Mechanic Arts , Statutes at Large 12, 503-05
(1862) .
3 R
U. S., Congress, House, Representative Morrill speaking
on the donation of land to states and territories to provide
colleges, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 6 June 1862, Congressional Globe
4 (Appendix E) : 256.
39Act Donating Public Lands , p. 504.
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really not clear in the early years of the act whether the mili-
tary training was to be a compulsory or optional course of study.
Although several supplemental acts were later amended to the
original act and specifically detailed military officers to land-
grant campuses, very few arrived because of the Army's basic
indifference to the program. Colleges and universities were
left to decide for themselves what role military training was to
play in the life of students. Some made military instruction a
four year requirement, others for three years, others for two,
and still others did not require it at all. By 1898, there were
organized military departments in forty-two institutions. It was
not until the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the
organized reserve corps for which officers would be largely
trained in a Reserve Officer Training Corps, that the teaching
of military subjects at Land-Grant Colleges experienced a vast
expansion, and equally important, it became institutionalized.
Following the stated need for reserve officers in the
National Defense Act of 1916, the ROTC program continued to
expand on campuses until by 1972 there were a total of 517 Army,
Navy, and Air Force ROTC units at the colleges and universities
in the United States and Puerto Rico, with an enrollment of
approximately 109,000 cadets and midshipmen. Although there have
been numerous and continuing policy and administrative changes
made to the original ROTC concept to make it more responsive to
the needs of the student and the military, the philosophy under
which the program was founded has not changed, except for the
fact that more emphasis is now placed on producing regular and
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career oriented officers rather than on commissioning reserve
officers, if only because of the expense of the time and money
spent in attracting and training students in the program.
Through the years the mission of the ROTC has been to
train selected college students for reserve commissions, and
then since World War II, for long-term career purposes. More
specifically, it is to bring together the military and the
academic world so that there is a better understanding between
them. But more important, it is a process wherein the military
is provided with an input that reflects a side of the military
other than that found at the military academies. Thus what we
have been witnessing has been the historic evolution of the
Jeffersonian concept of the citizen-soldier. Before examining
more closely the validity of the citizen-soldier concept, other
questions depict the larger philosophical dilemma that confronts
the ROTC program. Such rhetorical questions can be thus stated:
Can the military expect the ROTC program to produce a liberal
citizen-soldier? Does the ROTC program in fact attract potential
officers that will eventually liberalize the military establish-
ment? These questions are very different and are considered
equally important to the commonly asked questions as to whether
or not ROTC, a military institution, is compatible with the pur-
pose of a university, or whether the ROTC institution is
academically acceptable or even belongs on a college campus.
These questions are addressed in Chapter V. Instead, as noted,
this inquiry into the recruitment function is directed to an
investigation of whether the combination of a liberal college or
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university and a ROTC student produces a liberalized officer.
Once the quality of the student produced by the program is deter-
mined, then the parameters of its policy are established on what
it can and can not accomplish on a college campus. From this,
the proper relationship of the program with the academic com-
munity can be established. If the program is found to be
ineffective in producing a liberalized ROTC student, then its
removal from prestigious liberal campuses and subsequent estab-
lishment on campuses more willing to accept the military should
be considered. The geographical shift of ROTC units in the
1970s, as discussed in the latter part of the chapter, is an
obvious manifestation of this observation.
There are many protagonists of the ROTC program who con-
tend that educating military officers on civilian campuses
strengthens the civilian control and influence over the military.
These same advocates believe that ROTC is a link between higher
education and the federal government and thus there is a bridge
established between the two that tends to add legitimacy to the
education carried on at campuses. The university is perceived
as an institution that transmits knowledge and values, and there-
fore training of ROTC students in a liberal atmosphere can be
viewed as an extension of that educational process. In this
particular situation, the military is possibly lured into believ-
ing that the factors of linkage and legitimacy will produce an
officer who is a combination of a career officer and liberalized
student. Other outcomes are also expected of the amalgamation
of the college student with the prospective military officer.
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The leadership of the nation should come from the
brightest, best educated, and most motivated of the nation's
young men. One of the reasons for the ROTC is that there is
always the chance that military academies will contribute to
undue service parochialism and thus another, more liberal,
source is needed to balance the officer corps. Over-reliance on
academy graduates can create an inbred military elite. Thus by
having the continued presence of a substantial number of military
officers from a wide variety of civilian educational institutions
and backgrounds is a guarantee against the establishment of a
military caste system in the United States. Such a position was
expressed by the Special Committee of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on ROTC in its report
to the Secretary of Defense in September, 1969, wherein the com-
mittee called for the continuance of ROTC based on its com-
patibility with the primary function of institutions of higher
40learning. A more meaningful observation was made by the
advisory panel on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense in their com-
ments on the special committee's report. The panel believed
that the main purpose of the ROTC program was officer education,
which is a form of professional education, to be conducted at
41
the highest level. The ROTC is thus pictured to be a proper
amalgamation between citizen and soldier which is the raison
d'etre for ROTC. But does this supposed relationship in fact
40 Special Committee on ROTC, Report to the Secretary of








There are basically three main characteristics that
distinguish the ROTC program from regular on-campus educational
activities. First, the absolutist vision of the military
distinguishes it from other professions in that as Harold
Lasswell noted, military people deal in the "management of
violence." This has prompted some military men to question the
need for a general liberal education to develop these unique
characteristics. Second, the development of the characteristics
(leadership, loyalty, obedience to name a few) to enhance the
above is not exactly the function of civilian institutions.
Students do not feel as bound to these "core" values and the
obedience to certain standards of conduct and performance that
are strictly military in nature. Third, as long as ROTC remains
on civilian campuses, it will, as Gene Lyons and John Masland
note, mean that the "ROTC will continue to be regulated and
operated by the separate services as essentially a training and
42
recruitment device rather than as an educational program. " To
carry this third characteristic to a logical conclusion, training
is concerned with the specifics of a military system, which is
related to roles and missions, all of which is related to strategy
and tactics. The overall educational process of colleges and
universities does not perceive of its function in exactly the
light of training for roles and missions, strategy and tactics.
Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and
Military Leadership: A Study of the ROTC . with a Forward





Despite the arguments for and against the institution of
ROTC, much of the debate is focused on the image of whether the
program has in fact produced the citizen-soldier. As William
Lucas has succinctly stated,
if the products of the ROTC are significantly different
from members of American society in general, or more
specifically different from comparable college students,
then the citizen-soldier does not operate as it was
intended. *•*
If one accepts Lucas 1 observation as a factually true picture of
a citizen-soldier, then the basic process of self-selection into
the ROTC program and peer-group pressure make the citizen-
soldier model hopelessly impractical. In the case of self-
selection, like attitudes (military and ROTC student) attract
and then reinforce each other. Peer-group pressure reinforces
the pledge to serve with others who hold the same pre-disposi-
44tions. In addition to Lucas' observations, it is likely that
Jefferson believed that if the methods of entering the military
and training the military force were democraticized, then the
force per se would represent society and be democratic as well.
What Jefferson may have neglected to consider was that the
elimination of the differential access to the military, basically
through a competitive and not an ascriptive system, does not
remove the self-selective desire to enter the military. The data
compiled below should help to clarify the citizen-soldier/self-
William Ashley Lucas, II, "The American Lieutenant:
An Empirical Investigation of Normative Theories of Civil-
Military Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North








selection syndrome by comparing father-son occupations.
The data in Table 6 was gathered from three separate
sources—a 1959 survey of the occupations of high ranking (elite)
officer's fathers, a 1964 National Opinion Research Center survey
of all army officers vis-a-vis their father's occupations, and
the 1960 and 1970 characteristics of the United States popula-
tion. Same year data was not available.
TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONS OF THE OFFICERS' FATHERS AND THE
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Summary,
One obvious conclusion regarding the social origins of officers
is that when compared with the white and blue collar populations
of the United States, fathers with white collar jobs are clearly
overrepresented in the officer corps while fathers with blue
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collar jobs are underrepresented. Thus the sons are in fact not
that representative of the characteristics of the male population,
Self-selection appears to result in patterns of ROTC
attitudes that are significantly more characteristic of the pro-
fessional soldier than the citizen-soldier. Robert Gage, in
conducting a series of tests with 14 5 midshipmen at the Naval
ROTC unit at Northwestern University to determine the effect of
military training on discipline, arrived at the conclusion that
students who joined the Naval ROTC program accepted military
discipline more fully before they joined the program than did
45the college students who did not join. Further tests revealed
that those who preferred association with the military in col-
lege (basically cadets and midshipmen who more readily accepted
military discipline) also exhibited greater patriotic senti-
46
ment. To confirm further that self-selection is also partly
established in family relationships, James Montgomery conducted
a survey of all ROTC students at Ohio State University in 1971
by asking where the students had received their information on
ROTC. By far the most common response, from 3 3 percent of the
students, was from a member of the family. The next common
reply, 19.1 percent, was from college friends and peer-groups
enrolled in ROTC. The latter is in essence similar to the
Robert Gage, "Patriotism and Military Discipline as a
Function of Degree of Military Training," Journal of Social




James Montgomery, "Lost Opportunity: Army ROTC"
(Course paper, U. S., Army War College, 1972), p. 15.
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findings of William Lucas in his survey at the University of
48North Carolina at Chapel Hill. All the above observations,
when viewed separately, obviously are not conclusive. But when
viewed in a total context, they tend to confirm the presence of
a self-selection process in the recruitment of students into
ROTC, a situation that was previously noted as being evident
in the recruitment process into the military academies. Like-
wise, the self-selection process, if it does not refute the idea
of the citizen-soldier, tends to place the historic Jeffersonian
concept in a new context. The citizen-soldier may be in fact
more a rhetorical symbol than an active participant in the mili-
tary service.
While the nation depended upon conscription as the main
method for providing military manpower between 1940 and 1973,
the self-selection process, which by the observations made so
far, limited the amount of liberalization one could expect to be
transferred from the liberal society to the military establish-
ment through the student. Students who during this era entered
the ROTC program did so for reasons in addition to a voluntary
self-selection process.
Nona Malbin, in analyzing the ROTC on college campuses,
concludes that surveys of college students clearly support the
conclusion that the draft was a major reason for student enroll-






service. Robert Nichols concluded in a study published in 1971
that the threat of the draft was then "the strongest motivating
force currently influencing college youth to volunteer for
50
officer training programs." Mayer Zald and William Simon
claim that in 1964 more than fifty percent of the officer corps
consisted of officers who had not made a positive career choice
but instead joined to fulfill a military obligation (ROTC) or
joined after serving as an enlisted man through the OCS
program. In a study published by Glenn Griffin in 1972 for
the United States Air Force of a survey conducted of 579 Air
Force ROTC cadets, the following results are significant:
forty-two percent responded that the draft was the most signifi-
cant reason for enrollment in ROTC; forty-five percent responded
that the draft was the second most important reason for ROTC
enrollment; sixty-one percent said that the draft influenced
52
their friends to enroll in ROTC. Nancy Guinn in a study for
the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory on the impact of the
all-volunteer force on Air Force officer personnel, had 3,201
advanced Air Force cadets from non-compulsory ROTC detachments
complete a questionnaire. Cadets were classified as being either
49Nona Glazer Malbin, "The ROTC: Military Service on
the College Campus," in Moskos, Public Opinion , p. 86.
50 Robert L. Nichols et al., "The Officer Corps in an
All-Volunteer Force: Will College Men Serve?" Naval War College
Review 23 (January 1971): 45.
Zald and Simon, "Career Opportunities," p. 283.
52Glenn R. Griffin, A Comparison of Attitudes of Black
and White Cadets in AFROTC (Washington: Department of the Air
Force, [1972] ) , pp. 48-51.
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draft-motivated (those cadets who indicated that they would not
have entered an ROTC program in the absence of a draft) and
self-selected cadets (those true volunteers who would have joined
despite the draft). The results are tabulated in Table 7.
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF SELF-MOTIVATED AND DRAFT-MOTIVATED
AIR FORCE ROTC CADETS (Percentages)
Self-Motivated Draft-Motivated
(N = 556) (N = 442)
Desire to become a
pilot or navigator 49 11
Patriotism or desire
to serve country . 11 2




More desirable 27 2
Equally desirable 46 24
Less desirable 12 54
No opinion 15 2
Expressed career intent:
Definitely yes 10
Probably yes 28 5
Undecided 50 44
Probably no 10 36
Definitely no 2 15
Source: Nancy Guinn, William E. Alley, and Byron C.
Farmer, Impact of an All-Volunteer Force on Air Force ROTC
Officer Procurement (Brooks Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force
Human Resources Laboratory, [1971]), p. 4.
I
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Conclusions to be drawn from the Guinn study are as follows:
First, the enrollment in Air Force ROTC does not reveal per se
that the liberal environment of the college or university will
affect in any great way the attitude of Air Force ROTC cadets.
The draft-motivated cadet obviously joins ROTC for different rea-
sons than the self-motivated cadet, and at least fifty-four per-
cent of the former believed that the military career was less
desirable than a civilian career. Compare this percentage to
those self-selected cadets who not only believe a military career
is more or equally desirable (seventy-three percent) but who
intend, either definitely or probably, to make the service a
career (thirty-eight percent) . One can see a pattern that con-
firms the trend of self-selecting cadets having traits, of which
patriotism is the most evident, that are easily identified with
military tenets. These percentages suggest that a majority of
potential volunteer Air Force ROTC cadets enter the Air Force
with a positive outlook toward a military career. One would
expect a higher retention rate to be the result of such a
favorable attitude. Second, with the self-motivated officer
entering the military with such "positive" military conceptions,
socialization will add to and reinforce these tenets as the
officer assumes more responsible positions and becomes involved
in policy making. Contrariwise, any liberal influence expected
from the draft-motivated cadet will be minimal because of his
initial attitude and his probable one-tour service in the Air
Force, during which his liberal input affects basically a low
level af the decision-making process if it affects it at all.
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With conscription being terminated in the United States
on 1 July 1973, copious analyses of how the modern volunteer
army concept will affect officer recruitment programs have been
made. Most of this literature is obviously biased by those who
either support or criticize the various programs. Despite the
varying viewpoints, the abolition of the draft and the establish-
ment of the modern volunteer army will affect all officer pro-
curement programs, the ROTC and OCS programs possibly more than
others.
With the need for a more professionalized officer in
view of the lesser numbers of officers being commissioned by all
the services, and with the need for a force-in-being as a neces-
sary adjunct of the modern volunteer army, the ROTC and OCS, to
a lesser extent, may be looked upon more and more to provide
career officers rather than reserve officers, and the military
service will become more of an initially chosen career field.
Concomitant to this may be a more vigorous self-selective process
than heretofore experienced. Making the goal of these programs
to produce career officers will in essence disrupt and further
dilute the basic philosophical premise for which ROTC exists
—
to produce liberally educated officers trained in the rudiments
of military science. This in turn lessens liberal input into
the military services. More military dedicated individuals will
be attracted into the officer procurement programs. Much of the
literature on the effects of the modern volunteer army on pro-
curement programs addresses the issue from the viewpoint of
numbers of officers produced. Little is said about its affect
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on the liberalization of the services, other than the prediction
that the modern volunteer army will isolate the military from
civilian society, which will spawn a growth of military pro-
fessionalism.
In the special committee report on ROTC in September,
1969, the committee realized that if the active forces^were
reduced in size to any great extent and were to be basically
volunteer in nature, there would be tremendous implications for
the ROTC program. "Indeed its very existence might be called
53into question." The President's Commission on the All-
Volunteer Armed Force addressed the question of the effect of the
modern volunteer army on the officer corps in the context of
quantity and not quality of officers produced from the ranks of
college graduates. The commission asserted that about ninety
percent of the officers entering the service each year will be
college graduates. Service academies will normally provide less
than five percent of the yearly officer requirements. With a
projected number, by 1980, of male college graduates of 490,000
annually, with a projected armed force manning level of 2.5
million, and with an annual requirement for new officers pro-
jected at 30,000, only seven percent of the yearly graduating
54
males need to be recruited for military service. This low per-
centage reinforces the assertion that a more self-selective pro-
cess will occur within the ROTC program, which will in effect
69-70.
5 3Special Committee on ROTC, Report , p. 7.
5 President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report , pp.
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further undermine the liberalizing effect which the program is
claimed to inject into the armed services.
In addition to the decline in ROTC enrollment (from a
total of 212,417 in 1969 to 109,598 in 1971), the geographical
shift in location of active ROTC units further narrows the
recruitment base and the liberalizing influence. Morris
Janowitz observes that the geographical distribution of ROTC
units has altered significantly the number of units at prestigious
liberal colleges and universities, with a subsequent increase in
units at southern and southwestern colleges of lesser known
academic qualities. This trend would seem to reinforce the
55
selectivity of officer recruitment. Reasons for the dis-
establishment of many ROTC units at well-known colleges and
universities in the 1970-74 era includes student dissatisfaction
with the Vietnam War, questioned academic quality of ROTC
courses, and compatibility of units with the college environment.
Reasons for the establishment of units since 1970 include the
acceptability of ROTC on certain campuses, and the need to extend
ROTC to predominantly black or Mexican-American campuses. Table
8 is a compilation of the colleges and universities where ROTC
units have been established and disestablished since 1970 and
includes schools where ROTC programs will be disestablished by
1975.
The defenders of ROTC continue to claim that the erosion
of ROTC will lead to the enrollment of more officers from the
J






Weber State, Utah (A)
Wisconsin State (A)
Missouri Western (A)
U. of Tampa, Fla. (A)
Campbell College, N.C. (A)
Alabama A&M (A)
Southwestern State, Okla. (A)
East Central State, Okla. (A)
Austin-Peay, Tenn. (A)
Alcorn A&M, Miss. (A)
U. of Wisconsin, Plattville (A)
U. of Wisconsin, LaCrosse (A)
Columbus College, Ga. (A)
Carson-Newman, Tenn. (A)
Fort Valley State, Ga. (A)
St. Augustine, N.C. (A)
Bishop College, Texas (A)
Indiana Institute of Technology (A)
N.W. State College, Okla. (A)
Southern State College, Ark. (A)
Prarie View A&M, Texas (N)
Virginia Military Institute (N)
SUNY (Bronx) , N.Y. (N)
Maine Maritime (N)
Florida A&M (N)
U. of Western Florida (N)
North Carolina Central (N)
Texas A&M (N)
U. of Florida (N)
Southern A&M, La. (N)
Savannah State, Ga. (N)
University of Jacksonville, Fla. (N)C (N)












U. of Arkansas (Monticello)
Embry-Riddle, Fla. (AF)
Florida Tech. (AF)
Valdosta State, Ga. (AF)










Boston College, Mass. (A)
New York U. (A,AF)
CCNY (A)






SUNY (Buffalo), N.Y. (AF)
Lawrence, Wis. (AF)
Ball State, Ind. (AF)














Parks College, 111. (AF)
Grambling, La. (AF)
U. of Southern Mississippi (AF)
Missouri Valley State (AF)
S. E. Missouri State U. (AF)
U. of Missouri (Rollo) (AF)
College of Sante Fe, N.M. (AF)
Fayetteville State, N.C. (AF)
Wilkes College, Pa. (AF)
U. of Puerto Rico (AF)




Angelo State, Texas (AF)
Sul-Ross State, Texas (AF)
S. Utah State (AF)
Norwich, Conn. (AF)
Source: U. S., Department of Defense (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs), 1 June 1974.
Note: A-Army; N-Navy; AF-Air Force.
enlisted ranks and from the military academies, the implication
being that each of these sources has a low degree of liberal
ethic and a high degree of authoritarian attitude. Peter Karsten
believes that the ROTC produces a possible "leavening" effect as
a possible counterbalance to the more aggressive academy and
enlisted ranks. The question can be asked--How flexible are
ROTC students vis-a-vis non-ROTC students and academy students?
A random survey of 90 Naval Academy students, 177 Air Force, Army,
and Navy ROTC students, and 117 non-ROTC college undergraduates
was made and the results are reported in Tables 9 through 11.




MEASURE OF AGGRESSIVENESS (Percentages)
Offer physical Prefer admin-
response to
offer verbal istrative orinsult to girl response or Prefer technical







16.1 (29) 66.7 (60)
57.6 (102) 32.0 (57)
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REASONS IMPORTANT IN DECISION TO SEEK COMMISSION
(Percentages)
Desire to Belief in Desire training Prefer to be
make military military for future officer than
a career traditions civilian life enlisted man
Annapolis 48.0 (43) 26.0 (23) 36.5 (31) 56.0 (49)
ROTC 17.0 (29) 19.2 (34) 47.5 (84) 73.0 (130)
Source: Peter Karsten et al. , "ROTC, MYLAI and the
Volunteer Army," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): 147.
The data is valuable in that it makes a vital comparison between
the Naval Academy, which for all intent and purpose may be repre-
sentative of the other military academies, and the ROTC. The
statistics tend to reaffirm that the aggressive nature of the
Annapolis midshipmen is in consonance with the aggressive ethos
of the profession that he has chosen (Table 9) . Table 10 tends
to confirm the concept that like values between person and chosen
career attract. In this case the inevitability of war due to
man's nature, a tenet of conservatism and the reason for the very
existence of the military institution, attracts a high Academy
response (seventy-seven percent) . Table 11 indicates that the
desire to join the military depends largely on a self-selective
process. This is further confirmed by the relatively low per-
centage of non-ROTC students who showed tendencies of aggres-
siveness (Tables 10 and 11) . One final observation which may
verify what has been contended in the overall tenor of this
investigation is that when comparing ROTC students with non-ROTC
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students a greater percentage of ROTC students make an aggressive,
military response. Thus one could conclude that whereas ROTC
may not militarize the campus environment, there is evidence to
indicate that the liberal environment of academe does not neces-
sarily liberalize the ROTC student.
In conclusion, this broad investigation of officer
recruitment programs has revealed in a general manner that the
major sources of officer procurement—military academies, OCS,
and ROTC— are basically influenced and subscribed to by rising
college students (college graduates in the case of OCS) , who
for the most part pre-select the program which is most in con-
sonance with their own pre-conceptions and values. Thus the
liberalization process that could be transferred from the liberal
society to the military establishment is diluted in a direct
manner. The most self-selective group chooses the most conser-
vative institution (the academies) , which historically has pro-
duced the elite group of officers, while the most liberal group
(college students) chooses the most liberal program (OCS) which
has produced the fewest career officers. While this syndrome
operated within a draft environment, the product of officer
recruitment may in retrospect be now considered liberal when one
speculates what may be the officer produced in a non-conscription,
all-volunteer society.
If the philosophical reasoning and the empirical evidence
are any indication of the past results which witnessed the
questionable transfer of liberalization into the military estab-




future "draft free" environment may reveal the following: the
recruitment of officers within this environment will lead to a
widening of the gap between the military and civilian society.
Furthermore, it will lead to a more professional and objectively
controlled military, i.e., one that is a "tool" of the govern-
ment, and a further reaffirmation of the historical "root"




The professional socialization of the military officer is
a process by which the officer incorporates into his value system
those values and perceptions essential for a military occupation.
Within this general definition, this chapter will investigate,
(1) several factors that affect the socialization process and (2)
the ramifications of formal education conducted in the non-
technical and professional areas at the military academies, the
Reserve Officer Training Corps, the service colleges, and civilian
colleges and its relevance to the socialization of the officer.
It is through formal academic education conducted at the
military academies and the ROTC that the prospective officer is
initially exposed to the philosophical tenets of the military
establishment that, as previously noted throughout this investi-
gation, are in conflict with the liberal tenets of civilian
society. Having once been exposed to the initial formal academic
socialization process, the officer at various times during his
career is normally sent for advanced education to either the
service colleges or graduate education at civilian colleges and




open-ended and more exposed to liberal influences than are the
academies. Furthermore, the educational socialization carried
on in a liberal environment must by its very nature influence to
some degree the relationship of the civilian society to the mili-
tray establishment and affect the "root" differences between the
two.
The process of training and intra-service socialization
is not part of this investigation because it is not expected to
give the officer the in-depth theoretical capability which is
the hallmark of formal academic education. Also, because Officer
Candidate Schools are basically training and not academic insti-
tutions, they will not be considered in this investigation as
part of the socialization process. Likewise, technical education
such as that experienced in the physical sciences and in the
legal, religious, business, and medical areas is not considered
here because the education in these areas at the primary and
advanced levels is normally directed toward the technical and
not the liberal aspects of education.
To a great extent, the determinants of formal academic
instruction are the various factors that influence to a great
degree the substantive material taught at the above noted insti-
tutions. Thus an understanding of these factors will better
delineate the direction to be taken by officer educational
socialization. The very fact that the military operates and
staffs three military academies and eight professional service
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colleges, and by General Accounting Office statistics, spent
seventy million dollars on 4,200 officers enrolled in full-time
2graduate education programs during fiscal year 1969 points out
the importance of investigating the academic socialization process
of the military officer.
Factors Affecting Socialization
Among the various factors that affect any socialization
process, three vital ones are applicable to the process as it
applies to the military officer— fusion, conflict, and attitude.
Fusion
The historical evolution of the fusion of political and
military matters as it applies to United States foreign policy
was the subject of an extensive investigation earlier in this
3
study. Also as was earlier noted, the exigencies of the cold
war, supplemented by the reorganization of the defense establish-
ment after World War II, made the making and execution of foreign
policy a matter of interest to both the civilian and military
sectors of society. While Chapter II discussed in some detail
the ramifications of this post-World War II fusionist policy in
The colleges are as follows: National War College;
Armed Forces Staff College; Army, Navy, Air Force War Colleges;
Army, Navy, Air Force Command and Staff Colleges. The Industrial
College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is not considered in this
study because of its singular emphasis on the management aspects
of national resources.
2
U. S., Controller General, Report to the Congress on
Improvements Needed in Determining Graduate Education Require -
ments for Military Officer Positions, 28 August 1970, p. 1.:y \




terms of its effect on the overall civil-military equation, it
is the intent of this section to discuss the effect of this
fusionist policy on the socialization process of the military
officer to show the problem experienced when the professional
military officer is trained and educated in both military and
non-military subjects.
Concurrent with the isolation of the military establish-
ment from civilian society in the era preceding World War II was
a military educational policy that defined the parameters and
extent of military education in terms which were oriented toward
4
strictly military matters. The military academies utilized a
core curriculum that emphasized, along with professional subjects,
scientific and engineering courses that were oriented to the prag-
matics of the military profession. With the possible exception
of having a choice as to which foreign language to study, all
students at each academy, for the most part, were required to
take the same four-year professional course. Likewise, because
the objective control model dominated civil-military relation-
ships in this era, the service colleges taught an almost com-
pletely military-oriented curriculum. When ROTC courses were
offered at state universities, they were at times made a man-
datory course requirement because of the provisions of the
Morrill Act of 1862 and given full academic credit by the host
institution. The professional subjects were generally confined
John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and
Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton;
Princeton University Press, 1957) , p. 96.
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to the teaching of military "nuts and bolts" subjects, and
ROTC graduates were offered reserve commissions and assigned to
inactive military reserve components. Military officers utiliz-
ing civilian institutions for graduate education studied
exclusively in the engineering, science, and business areas.
Thus the unidirectional policy of pre-World War II complemented
the prevailing civil-military policy of objective control wherein
the military was a highly trained professional "tool" of the
civilian sector.
The total amalgamation of the civilian and military
efforts in World War II brought realization of the fact, whether
the military liked it or not, that the military officer needed
additional preparation outside the purview of military subjects
in order to consider matters beyond conventional military affairs.
Furthermore, as John Masland and Laurence Radway posited, there
was then a need for the development of an educational program
that stressed the problems resulting from the unification of
the armed forces. In addition to the unification factor was
the problem of institutionalizing the cooperative efforts
between the military and civilian sectors.
Out of the post-World War II cold war situation developed
a fusionist policy that manifested itself in a civil-military
model of subjective control. This fusionist policy was anti-
thetical to the historical liberal concept of a separate military






the context of participating in total war. Despite this
historical fact, the military establishment began to become more
and more involved in making foreign policy and national security
policy that had heretofore been the province of civilian states-
men. Concurrently, the objective control model became weakened
as the military became more involved in technological matters and
cold war policy making. Military policy became a vital input
to national security policy. The civilian sector, in addition
to always having controlled the military, became more involved
in the everyday policy making and operations of the military
establishment, both of which produced further tension between
the two societies. For example, whereas the military sector
might be guided and influenced in a situation by the conservative
tenet of relying on past experience and past history, the liberal
society under the same circumstances might perceive of the
situation as being unique and not amenable to past solution or
experience. Under these circumstances, the civilian, who has
now possibly become an amateur military strategist, can offer any
number of novel and possibly unproved solutions with the idea
that doing something is better than doing nothing.
In an attempt to bridge the expertise gap which the mili-
tary experienced as a result of the fusionist policy, the military
used the educational process as a mechanism for imbuing the mili-
tary officer with civilian-oriented expertise. In this process,
As discussed in Chapter II, this policy exacerbated the
historical dichotomy between the liberal civilian society and
its conservative military establishment.
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that has spanned the era since World War II, the military has
provided in its educational institutions numerous academic sub-
jects that are relevant to both the general area of political-
military relations and the specific area of national security
policy. For the most part, the emphasis on such subject matter
is stressed least in ROTC courses, more in the primary education
received at the academies, and most at the service colleges,
where the development of an officer's career is believed to
require an in-depth knowledge of political-military matters.
Within each institution, the emphasis is subject to such vari-
ables as funding, conditions of war or peace, external social
conditions, current civil-military relations, and current need
for such expertise. Thus the educating of the officer in pro-
fessional, political-military, civil-military, and other relevant
courses has taken on varied emphases over time. For the most
part, the issue of military education has been resolved into the
question of what subject matter should be emphasized within any
military-sponsored education. Such an investigation will be
made in the section of this chapter on Education and Sociali-
zation. One indication of the magnitude of this problem is
found in the aforementioned House Subcommittee investigation of
7
the military academies in 1967-68.
In addition to the general instruction in political-
military matters at military educational institutions, the
services have attempted to bridge the fusionist gap by forming
•7




their own coterie of intellectuals educated in the general area
of political-military affairs who not only attempt to balance
the civilian expertise but who provide a somewhat unique military-
civilian input into military planning. Any complete return to
a pre-World War II situation where professional education was
normally restricted to military subjects in a military environ-
ment, which some believe will again occur because of the modern
volunteer army concept, is highly unlikely if for only the rea-
son that because the military function is so deeply intermingled
with the political function, any non-specialized education con-
ducted under military auspices must by the very nature of current
civil-military relations include matter that is not of an exclu-
sive military nature. Also, the society of today is relatively
speaking more open-ended than it was in the pre-World War II era
and thus subject to more of a liberal influence.
Despite the obvious potential conflict in policies that
attempt to "civilianize" the military establishment through
either bureaucratic structures or educational policies, the con-
cept of an a-political military is still seen as a viable pos-
sibility in a civil-military association. Samuel Huntington
believes that politics deal with the goals of state policy and
thus is beyond the scope of military competence. Military
Q
officers should remain politically neutral. If this is accept-
able as a fundamental tenet of American civil-military relations,
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967) , p. 71.
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it is difficult to adhere to it in view of post-World War II
fusionist policy for several reasons. First, the military in
essence participates in policy making as advocates of particular
policies and as executors of final military decisions. A
clearer view of the political involvement of the military estab-
lishment is manifested when one sees Congress asking it for
military advice and when choices arise between military and non-
military programs and military programs are chosen at the expense
of needed social programs. Second, with the entry of the mili-
tary into the educational areas of political-military matters,
it is naive to believe that the educational process will per-
petuate a-political officers. If this were the case, they would
be educated in but exempted and restricted from questioning or
making value judgments on political decisions.
Thus the fusionist policy has produced a dilemma in the
civil-military equation as far as it concerns military educational
policy. It has certainly produced policy statements, the
rhetoric of which clouds the issue of military education. Amos
Jordon, Chairman of the Political Science department at West
Point, noted that today's and tomorrow's military education system
should be devoted to developing "the management and application
of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping, and combat
roles in the context of rapid technological, social, and political
change." 9 Jordon and co-author William Taylor, a military officer
Amos A. Jordon, Jr., "Officer Education," in Handbook
of Military Institutions , ed, Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills,
Cal.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 212.
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teaching social science at West Point, more recently stated that
the modern military man must not only develop the traditional
competence of training, deploying, and fighting but must develop
a competence in the political-military dimension and/or the
scientific/technical dimension and/or advising foreign military
establishments
.
The conflict becomes more obvious when we note that if
we train officers in political-military subjects and at the same
time ignore teaching professional subjects, then a certain amount
of expertise is lost, and the officer could become unsympathetic
to the military point of view as well. The military officer
must certainly be able to communicate with his superiors and
subordinates, both military and civilian, but placing the mili-
tary man in competition with the civilian trained man should be
avoided. Likewise, there is danger in making the military pro-
fessional a part-time statesman in that he may be deterred from
his main mission of protecting society. Edward Katzenbach
believes that it was understandable to assume that at the end of
World War II the military would become involved in requirements
of policy making. There was then a need of the military to
understand the civilian point of view. But by the 1960s, the
civilian group still controlled the military curriculum-making,
which Katzenbach notes should have been turned back to the mili-
tary for teaching professional subjects. There is enough
Amos A. Jordon, Jr. and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The
Military Man in Academia," in Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 406 (March 1973) : 130.
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military literature, he thought, to be understood to preclude
introducing extraneous subject matter that had no bearing what-
soever on military professionalism.
The entire evolution of fusionist policy has thus pro-
duced first, basic rhetorical normative questions that must be
acknowledged— is the intellectual process of educating the mili-
tary officer in fact a bona fide attempt to liberalize the mili-
tary society? do the processes of socialization intend to main-
tain a military apart from its society?; second, basic conflicts
between the military and civilian societies, the content of
which is the next subject of investigation.
Conflict
With the evolution of the fusionist policy, the
amalgamation of civilian and military oriented educational
policies revealed and magnified the inherent conflict between
education in a civilian environment and that conducted at service
institutions. Once this educational process had become institu-
tionalized, new conflicts were created basically because of the
new role now cast on the military by the civilian society. Both
the inherent and resultant conflicts were exacerbated by problems
in determining whether or not to stress the teaching of non-
I




Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Demotion of Profes-
sionalism at the War Colleges," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings 91 (March 1965) : 34-36.
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Possibly the inherent conflict is a legacy which might
have generally been the product of the historical evolution of
the conservative military establishment within the liberal
society. More specifically, Samuel Huntington notes that after
the Civil War, there was a trend in military education institu-
tions, particularly at the service academies, away from technical
knowledge to the professional aspects of the military but that
the relationship between liberal and professional elements of the
curricula were left unresolved, particularly in the primary
12 ...
eucational system. The conflict in educational socialization
still for the most part remains basically unresolved for the
simple reason that no successful bridge has been developed to
rationalize the purpose of a liberally educated military officer
in the military establishment.
One of the first inherent conflicts is that in the
United States, higher education is usually likely to lead to
liberal rather than to conservative tendencies if for no other
reason than education exposes one to a basic liberal tradition.
This educational process can run counter to and present problems
for the military establishment, whose entire ethos is basically
conservative in nature. The entry of liberal factors into the
officer educational process may not only dilute his professional
beliefs but may be antithetical to the basic mission of the mili-
tary, which rests on the requirement of combat. If the invest-
ment in officer education is designed to produce career officers,
1
2
Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 239.
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then the liberalization of the officer may generate internal con-
flicts which may in extreme cases of ideological conflict cause
him to voluntarily leave the military service. Samuel Huntington
submits that in general the better educated an officer is, the
less likely he is to be motivated toward a professional military
13
career. It is difficult for men of intellect and liberal
views to reconcile the spirit of authority and discipline in the
military with the concept and spirit of inquiry which is essen-
tial to a liberal education. As Gene Lyons and John Masland note,
"it is this very reconciliation that is a key to the survival of
14democracy today.
"
In_ addition to this apparent dichotomy, there are mixed
opinions on whether or not higher civilian education is either
necessary or desirable for military officers. Is there danger
of the military becoming too overeducated? One answer noted by
Amos Jordon is that it is hard to consider this question
seriously because military men are skeptical of the intellectual
and anti-military community; they are also aware of the differ-
15
ences between the thinkers and the doers. Thus by one man's
observation, the military seem to partake of education but never
to become serious intellectual scholars. Amos Jordon and
1 1 Samuel P. Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the
Military Profession," Daedalus 92 (Fall 1963): 789.
Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and
Military Leadership: A Study of the ROTC , with a Forward by
John Sloan Dickey (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1959)
, p. 63.
15Jordon, "Officer Education," pp. 239-40.
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William Taylor make this same argument by noting that it is hard
to visualize an officer resigning over a clash of values because
in the final judgment the tenets of the profession outweigh any
position he may have taken on values. Such a view again affirms
the inherent dichotomy of values between the military and
civilian societies. Herbert McClosky in believing that education
fosters liberal traditions notes that education demands of people
precision in speech and thought, open-mindedness and tolerance,
17
and intellectual flexibility. In a general sense, these traits
are not normally those thought to be indigenous to the military
ethic. Morris Janowitz notes that although higher education is
associated with liberal attitudes, such higher education within
18
the military does not weaken the conservative military tenets.
By making the military establishment open-ended to the liberal
influence of society, the military may suffer more internal con-
flict by the very fact that it is influenced by the socialization
efforts of a liberal society and opened to public scrutiny of
its values and beliefs.
Another inherent conflict is that the mission of the
military requires, in addition to management and leadership
qualities, a heroic trait which is distinctive of the military
establishment. Even with the extensive civilianization effort
16Jordon and Taylor, "Military Man in Academia," pp.
142-43.
Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality,"
American Political Science Review 52 (March 1958) : 41.
18Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social
and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 238.
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of the post-World War II era, Janowitz contends that
the narrowing distinction between military and non-
military bureaucracies has not resulted in an elimination
of fundamental differences
. . . the need for heroic
fighters persists. The pervasive requirements of combat
set the limits to civilianization tendencies.
^
Bernard Brodie believes that the whole training of the military
is vindicated in battle and training and that the "skills
developed in the soldier are those of a fighter, and not of a
20
reflective thinker on ultimate purposes." The distinctive pur-
pose of the military establishment is to conduct combat operations,
and the most important function of the officer corps is to train
and direct combat forces. To socialize the officer in non-
military subjects may "rob" him of the chance to develop profes-
sional expertise and heroic qualities which could eventually deny
the military its very reason for being.
Within the inherent conflicts are certain limits of
socialization established because of the very nature of the pro-
fession and the theoretical precepts of the civil-military equa-
tion. The military officer usually follows a career pattern
that stresses military competence at the junior officer level and
then a move away from this in his later career to the analysis
of matters in the political-military context. By the time the
officer becomes a flag/general rank officer, his valuea^are far
removed from his technical ability and are seated in his under-




20Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1973), p. 492
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During this same period of time, the socialization process must
also change from instilling within him the concept of command
and obedience to instilling the desirability of cooperation and
manipulation. Along with this may occur a demand that military
policies and procedures be a product of reasoned analysis and
not dogmatic conclusions. This might produce a tendency to
weaken traditional authority based on obedience and ritual.
The growth of a rational or reasoned approach within the mili-
tary establishment could mean the growth of a critical attitude,
which if left uncontrolled could undermine the very existence of
the military establishment. This rationality could weaken the
very support upon which the military depends, for example, in
the matters of ceremonies, rituals, honors, and obedience.
Obviously, education may create a rationality that would be anath-
ema to the core values of the military establishment. The mili-
tary like other professions has a specialized body of knowledge
that is acquired by training and experience. It has a defined
set of standards and a group identity, and like other bureau-
cratic institutions, it is highly structured. How it differs
is that it is a uniquely public institution whose members are
committed to unlimited service which involves the risk of life.
The very nature of the military profession has limited
the accommodation with the academic profession. The military
has not been made into a learned profession as in the case of law
and medicine. Military science has not been accepted with the
same respect on the university campus because as Christopher
Jencks and David Riesman note the art of exercising authority so
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vital in the military is not effectively taught in an academic
21
atmosphere. Another reason for its non-acceptance is the
questionable academic caliber of military science courses
vis-a-vis other academic courses. The historical mission of
the military, which is to provide for national defense, deter-
mines to a large extent the pragmatic limits of professional
educational socialization. The nature of the profession, in
effect, determines the parameters within which the educational
function is executed. Education outside these limits may have
a divisive effect on the system and detract from the degree of
professionalization attained by the military officer. Thus when
the military claims that its "new" and more liberal educational
program is directed toward the training of a "new" military pro-
fessional, there is a paradox created. The reference to a new
military is inaccurate unless the entire ethos and values of the
military have been changed, which is factually not true. Thus
by knowing what product the socialization process should produce,
a better determination can be made of what should be the sub-
stantive material taught in military academic institutions. One
of the major limits of military education as noted by John Mas-
land and Laurence Radway is that the preparation for war is not
22
conducive to the relaxed atmosphere of a liberal education.
In addition, the training for combat which is so much a part of
any military education is basically antithetical to a liberal
2 1 Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic
Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1968) , p. 220.
2 2
Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 236.
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education which exposes one to numerous humanistic aspects of
life. P. H. Pattridge, an Australian social scientist, believes
that the vital normative issue can be condensed to the question
—
how does the quality of education on the humanistic and social
science side affect the morale and ideas inculcated on the pro-
23fessional side? As Lyons and Masland state the issue, it is
a question of how to achieve a balance between learning to become
an officer and equipping the same person with a general education
24
which will allow him to grow intellectually. "Education for
a profession can be sensibly discussed only in terms of its
function in preparing those being educated for roles in that
* - ,.25profession.
Along with the inherent conflicts are the factual differ-
ences between civilian and military education. Some of the more
obvious characteristics of military education are as follows:
there is a tendency toward conformity in teaching and subject
matter because standardization allows an interchange of person-
nel between duty assignments and also makes job description more
uniform; there is a general tendency to identify and associate
education with training, and with this there is more often than
not greater stress placed on teaching technique than on sub-
stantive material; there is a further tendency to emphasize
2 "?
P. H. Partridge, Educating for the Profession of Arms :
Comments on Current Thinking and Practice in Britain and the
United States , Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, no. 5




Lyons and Masland, Education and Military Leadership ,
pp. 204-05.
25Jordon, "Officer Education," p. 211.
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"need to know" material rather than "nice to know" material.
One of the major consequences of this educational process is
that it does not cultivate the creative and imaginative mind.
While these conflicts exist in a general pattern through-
out military schools, possibly the best comparison of military
vis-a-vis civilian education can be viewed through the institu-
tion of the ROTC. Possibly the major criticism leveled against
ROTC is that it violates the principles of academic freedom in
that the federal government imposes part of a curriculum and a
group of instructors upon a university. Also objected to is
that the methods normally used to develop traits that are con-
sistent with the military code may amount to indoctrination. In
its method and purpose, indoctrination is alien to the best
ideals and objectives in American higher education. It raises a
basic conflict over the compatibility of having a military
institution on a college campus. Thus, as Joseph Scott notes,
the military establishment and most educational institutions
are separated by vast differences in values, structure, style,
and function. "Anathema to the university, with its long
standing tradition of humanism, are the trappings of the mili-
7 ft
tary life. ..." In an attitude survey conducted by Peter
Karsten of 117 male college students at the University of
Pittsburgh and Ohio State University in 1970 and reported in
Tables 12 and 13 below, the observations of Scott are basically
confirmed.
Joseph W. Scott, "ROTC Retreat," in The American
Military , ed. Martin Oppenheimer (n.p.: Aldine Publishing
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Source: Peter Karsten, "Professional and Citizen
Officers: A Comparison of Service Academy and ROTC Officer
Candidates," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment ,
ed. Charles C. Moskos , Sage Research Progress Series on War,
Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal. : Sage Pub-
lications, 1971), p. 58.
In fact, by the statistics gathered by Karsten, if one wants to
inject liberalism into the military establishment through the
institution of ROTC, the humanities major should be most
encouraged to become military officers. It is not surprising
to find that by his surveys less than five percent of the ROTC
students were, in fact, humanities majors. Thus in essence the
humanities majors were generally least willing to do what the
stereotyped military man would customarily do.
Finally to be considered as part of the analysis of con-




COLLEGE MALE RESPONSE TO FOUR BASIC SITUATIONS
(Percentages)
Willing to Military
Willing to respond phy- Willing takeover
obey morally sically to to use might be
Academic repugnant insult to nuclear justified
majors orders girl weapons some day
Humanities (29) 14 14 37 14
Social
Sciences (100) 30 33 65 23
Natural
Sciences (102) 37 40 75 26
Engineering (117) 42.5 30.5 76 22
Source: Peter Karsten, "Professional and Civilian
Officers: A Comparison of Service Academy and ROTC Officer
Candidates," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment
,
ed. Charles C. Moskos , Sage Research Progress Series on War,
Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal. : Sage
Publications, 1971), p. 58.
for the military because of this conflict. In the case of the
ROTC, as it has evolved toward an increasingly "demilitarized"
curriculum, the officer produced by the system is possibly less
prepared for military occupational specialities than his academy
counterpart. Dilution of his training on campus has necessi-
tated further training after commissioning. To counteract the
aforementioned closing of ROTC units at more liberal colleges
and universities, there will have to be a further liberalization
of the ROTC curriculum as a result of the demands of the
2 7







for one reason or another reject the ROTC program, the result
could well be that the academic profession will have less and
less influence on military policy matters. As, then Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird said in May, 1970, with reference to
the future of ROTC on college campuses,
I have been continually mystified by those who on the
one hand oppose the so-called militarization of our
society and on the other hand seem determined to dry up
an important source of civilian-trained officers of our
armed forces. 2 8
This opposition to military things may be happening at a time
when the military profession is intellectually best prepared to
work closely with the academic community. Otherwise, the mili-
tary may turn more and more to its own "think tanks" and officers
for conceptual thinking.
The conflict factor thus determines to a large extent
the limit and extent of any socialization effort connected with
military education. The practical limits of socialization are
determined by their effect on the viability of the military estab-
lishment. The final and possibly most unique factor affecting
socialization is the element of attitude as it pertains to the
socialization process.
Attitude
The content of the substantive material contained in the
curricula of military educational institutions depends in a large
measure on what values and attitudes are expected by the society-




at-large from the military officer in order for him to carry out
his mission of national defense. One of the vital pillars,
notes Amos Jordon and William Taylor, upon which the military
must justify its needs for civilian schooling programs, and I
would hasten to add programs at the military academies, ROTC
units, and service colleges as well, is an assessment of the
values and attitudes which the nation wants its military officers
to have. "This is an important issue which needs broader airing
29in American society." Whether the education conducted at the
primary and advanced levels in military educational institutions
produces -an officer better qualified for command and overall
professional service than one who has not had the benefits of
this educational experience is a question difficult if not
impossible to answer. In any case, unless a certain attitude,
which in the military lexicon can be referred to as the "military
way," is instilled by design into the officer at military edu-
cational institutions, then the extensive education carried on
at these establishments could possibly be better accomplished
at civilian colleges. It is the instilling of this military
attitude that defines to a great extent the mission of military
academic institutions.
The military way, which is essentially a method of
action characteristic of the military society, has in a histori-
cal sense been referred to as producing the military mind, a
term that has been characterized pejoratively as a monolithic
29Jordon and Taylor, "Military Man in Academia," p. 14 3.
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mind impervious to change. Although it is important to establish
a proper military attitude in the educational process, it is
equally important to understand that the military mind must be
viewed in the context of its attitudes and characteristics and
not as to its quality, which would concern itself with intelli-
gence levels. In this context, a military mind would be viewed
as one would view a medical or legal mind. The military mind is
conditioned as in other professions by the functional imperative
of its profession. The outside observer must be cognizant that
because the military has operated in a detached and antithetical
nature to its parent society, it has been the target of many
novels which portray in general the military establishment and
more specifically the military mind in anti-liberal and even
anti-humane terms. Hopefully, it is not the nature of any
institution to instill into any officer or prospective officer
such a military mind, but likewise it is imperative that a mili-
tary attitude and its corollary military way are made a vital
part of the military curriculum. It would seem that one of the
possible explanations for the broadening of the parameters of
military education is in fact an effort by the military to
There have been many American novels written either
about garrison or war experiences that normally portrays the
main character of the novel as one who possesses military char-
acteristics. To the layman, such characters lack humane instincts,
Of the numerous novels on the military life, the following seem
to best portray the military mind syndrome: James Joner, , From
Here to Eternity (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951)
;
Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, 1948) ; William Styron, The Long March (New York:
Random House, Modern Library Paperback, 1952); Herman Wouk,





eliminate the civilian contempt for the military mind. If such
an effort continues without either direction or analysis, the
military may someday find it has an institution of scholars but
not an establishment composed of professional military officers.
As in the socialization factor of conflict, the attitude
factor is largely determined by the historical and theoretical
difference of attitudes between the civilian and military socie-
ties. The recognition of the heritage of the American military
establishment takes note of the fact that historically the mili-
tary has been performing a function that was almost destined to
develop, over a period of time in the American liberal environ-
ment, distinct and persistent characteristics that were in many
ways the product of the historical anti-military bias of American
society. The military establishment was founded for the specific
purpose of applying controlled violence while in the process of
effectuating national defense. Thus the resort to the appli-
cation of power through a national and controlled source has
reduced the operation of the system to one of order, discipline,
and generally fixed routine. Such characteristics produce an
institution that is dedicated to the proper conduct of war whose
execution has placed a high premium on the following attitudes:
decisiveness, patriotism, courage, certainty, punctuality,
standardization, and obedience. The socialization process in
the military is realistically appraised for its ability to create
these attitudinal characteristics in order for it to aarry out
effectively the mission of national defense. Thus the tradi-
tional concept of military professionalism is dependent upon a
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set of values that is different from those of society. What has
evolved is a service ideology which is used as part of the
indoctrination program of those entering the military profession.
The task of the military is to develop and instill an attitude
within its officer corps not with the purpose of competing with
the civilian society but of complementing the civilian ethic.
The military educational institutions which carry out this func-
tion are the military academies, the ROTC units, and the service
colleges.
Obviously at the military academies, the "whole-man"
concept encourages the creation and proliferation of a military
attitude in order to produce career military officers. Here, as
in no other program that involves military education, ideals are
not only proffered as the roots of the total military ethic, but
they are institutionalized and perpetuated. Also, it is here
that any divisive efforts which could dilute the overall mission
of professional preparation of career officers would keenly
affect the entire ethos of the military. The academies are
repositories of service traditions and values. As Morris
Janowitz notes,
the academies set the standards of behavior for the whole
military profession. They are the source of the pervasive
likemindedness about military honor and for the sense of
fraternity which prevails among military men . . . the
purpose of an academy education is to transform him into
a member of a professional fraternity. 31
As John Masland and Laurence Radway note, service academies may
be better compared to medical and theological schools which are
31Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 127.
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attempting to "prepare young men for a lifetime career of dedi-
32
cated service." *" Correlli Barnett claims that at the military
academies it is a conditioning in the myths, habits, and atti-
tudes that together with drill and discipline turn civilians into
soldiers. In actual terms of creating a military elite it is
the indoctrinal factor--i.e. attitudinal change—that is of
greater importance than the changing emphasis on academic curri-
33
culum. The academies are the institutions that convey an
attitude considered appropriate for members of the profession.
Cadets and midshipmen acquire attitudes by sharing a common
experience, institutional history, and cultural values. As Carl
Guelzo has observed, there is a place for the intellectual in the
military profession, but it is not at the academy level because
of the recognized need for indoctrination in the early years of
a professional career. In this light, the proliferation of sub-
jects in the liberal arts at academies will not insure expanded
34intellectual horizons. C. Wright Mills believes that pro-
cedures and rites at the academies tend to isolate the person
from civilian life while they lead him to conform and accept
35
the military society.
32Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars , p. 231.
Correlli Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites,"
Journal of Contemporary History 2 (July 1967): 22-23.
Carl M. Guelzo, "The Long, Hard Climb to Profes-
sionalism," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 93
(February 196TT~i 87-91.
35
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, Galaxy Books , 1956) , p. 193.
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To those who believe that the academies have a primary
role to produce students with high scholarly achievement, there
is disappointment in the student produced at the academies. In
three separate articles written on his impression of the
academies, David Boroff found the intellectual quality of the
institutions lacking. At West Point, he found more stress placed
on precision than on critical ability. The cadets were so
immersed in routine and unquestioned obedience that they had no
time to devote to intellectual pursuits. The atmosphere at the
Naval Academy was termed "puerile" ; there was a need to reduce
naval training aspects. Similar observations were made at the
3 6
Air Force Academy. To the outside observer, there is a common
"thread" that seems to be prevalent in all three academies, a
stress on the "completed mission," wherein the student appraises
the situation and works out a complete answer with no "loose
ends." To maintain a lengthy doubt is foreign to the military
personality. The indecisiveness of a Hamlet would be an
intolerable situation to be placed in. The academies tend to
make the student think in terms of individual mission rather
than in a never-ending continuum. To the liberal educator, the
academies might seem to be "second-rate" institutions, but the
mission of preparing future career officers is best identified
with the creation of an attitude.
David Boroff, "West Point: A New Breed," Harpers ,
December 1962, pp. 51-59; "Annapolis: Teaching Young Sea Dogs
Old Tricks," Harpers , January 1963, pp. 46-52; "Air Force




While discontent may be expressed about the product pro-
duced by the academies , there are also critics who express dis-
content with the professional military aspects of the academy
education. In addition to the critical report made by the Naval
Academy's Professional Training and Education committee in 1967,
which concluded that the professional training program at the
37Academy did not adequately train career officers for the Navy,
the Congressional investigation conducted by a subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee and chaired by Representative
F. Edward Hebert (D-La.) in 1967-68 was generally concerned
whether the service academies were being responsive to their
parochial mission of
producing a commissioned officer with a properly balanced
background of both academic and professional military
training, an officer who as a cadet or midshipman has been
provided with an environment which enables him to develop
morally, physically, and mentally, an officer equipped in
both mind and character to assume the highest responsi-
bilities of command, citizenship, and government . ^8
Note that two of the three attributes to be developed—the moral
and physical—are not really applicable to the role of a civilian
college. The subcommittee was more specific on this matter when
it cited that the academies were to "develop the motivation which
is essential to the young man's subsequent progress as a career
•37
For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp.
220-21 above.
38
U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Administration of the Service Academies, Report and Hearings of
the Special Subcommittee on Service Academies . 90th Cong. , 1st
and 2d sess., 1967-68, pp. 10226-27. For a detailed discussion
of the Hebert subcommittee investigation as it relates to




officer and as a future leader in one of the military services."
(Italics mine.) Representative Hebert was concerned that the
academies were not only getting away from the "whole-man" con-
cept and developing individuals, but that because of the expense
40involved, it owed an obligation to the public to see that the
professional aspects of the academy were not being compromised.
41Otherwise, why not tram all officers at ROTC units? Repre-
sentative Charles Grubser (R-Cal.) concluded that the academies
are to produce military officers and not academic, civilian-type
students who are given an option of participating in military
42
matters.
Thus the demands for attaining both academic and profes-
sional excellence places the academies in the position of attempt-
ing to do both simultaneously, but as the critics note, to the
possible diminishing of each effort. Having investigated the
norms of socialization, which included critical comments from
both sides on what attitudes are created, it may well serve the
investigation to view how many students are affected by the
socialization process. If we accept the fact that the student,
43
for the most part, pre-selects himself into the academies, then
39 Ibid.
, p. 10229.
It costs on the average approximately $45,000 to edu-
cate a cadet/midshipman in contrast to a cost of $7,500 to edu-
cate an ROTC student.
41
U. S., Congress, House, Administration of the Service
Academies




43Somewhat confirmed by the higher retention rate vis-A-
vis ROTC and OCS as tabulated in Table 5. See p. 2 32 above.
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an indication of how academy students and graduates feel about
the academy may be indicative of the socialization process.
Carl Lauterbach and David Vielhaber in a study of the educational
climate at West Point compared West Point to thirty-two under-
graduate institutions. In the results, West Point, more than
other colleges, encouraged obedience, academic organization,
student supervision, order, propriety, planning for the future,
achievement, and persistent striving. The survey found less
encouragement of reflective contemplation, change, and intellec-
tual freedom on the one hand and less interest in natural
44
science and the arts-humanities-social science on the whole.
The socialization process is even more evident when the seniors
were compared with freshmen. Seniors reflected concern for
organization, dominance, energy output, and athletics. Freshmen
were more aesthetic, more attention seeking, and encouraged to
45
a lesser extent than seniors an attitude of affiliation. The
subtle shift from the freshman to the senior year to the tenets
of a military attitude are rather evident. Further research
conducted by Walter Hecox on the West Point Class of 1973
pointed to such indicators as their lesser inclination than
similar civilian college students to abolish capital punishment,
liberalize divorce, legalize marijuana, and their smaller inter-
est in federal protection for the consumer—all traits which are
Carl G. Lauterbach and David P. Vielhaber, The Educa-
tional Climate at West Point as Reported by First and Fourth
Class Cadets (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Institutional






46deemed basically liberal. Data collected for the Class of
471974 indicated similar results.
In a questionnaire answered by 59 81 male graduates of
seventy-five colleges and universities including West Point in
1950, the statistics tabulated and shown in Tables 14 and 15 con-
firm the fact that the officer graduate of West Point has both a
higher sense of loyalty and satisfaction with his college choice
than graduates of other colleges and universities.
TABLE 14
LOYALTY TOWARD UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE (Percentages)
Pleasantly
Strong attach- nostalgic but
Colleges and Universities ment to it no strong feeling
West Point (active duty) (135) 75 23
West Point (inactive duty) (39) 72 18
West Point (total) (139) 69 23
Engineering and Science (1060) 32 45
National Norm (5651) 29 49
Source: Office of Institutional Research, U. S. Military
Academy: Comparison of USMA Graduates from the Class of 1950
with Graduates From Other Colleges on Selected Variables (West
Point, N.Y. : Office of Research, [19711) , p. 38.
Walter E. Hecox, A Comparison of New Cadets at USMA
with Entering Freshmen at Other Colleges, Class of 1973 (West
Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1970] ) , pp. 24, 27.
47Gerald W. Medsger, A Comparison of New Cadets at USMA
with Entering Freshmen at Other Colleges, Class of 1974 (West





SATISFACTION WITH COLLEGE CHOICE (Percentages)
Colleges and Universities Yes, definitely Probably no
West Point (active duty) (133) 59 11
West Point (inactive duty) (38) 42 13
West Point (total) (326) 56 13
Engineering and Science (1060) 37 16
National Norm (5651) 30 21
Source: Office of Institutional Research, U. S. Military
Academy: Comparison of USMA Graduates from the Class of 1950
with Graduates From Other Colleges on Selected Variables (West
Point, N.Y. : Office of Research, [1971] ) , p. 39.
The percentages noted in Tables 14 and 15 possibly indicate the
culmination of the initial self-selection (recruitment) process
and the inculcation of the military attitude substantiated by
the relative high percentage of those who remain on active duty.
From this group eventually emerges the elite corps of army
leaders. As the officer output decreases in ROTC and OCS, the
influence within the services of academy officers can be expected
to increase. Thus if the military services are to depend on the
academies for their leaders , they must remain the repositories
of service tradition.
While the military attitude created in ROTC programs is
nowhere near as intensive as that created at the academies because
of the basic part-time nature of the ROTC student, who is addi-
tionally immersed within college surroundings, the attempt to

293
instill an attitude sets the program off from normal academic
endeavors. Because the participation of the ROTC student in the
program is usually comparable to the time spent on other academic
subjects, the ROTC must utilize the little time it has with the
student to concentrate on instilling an attitude and a desire for
48
a military career into the cadet or midshipman. Because the
ROTC program is being more and more utilized for training career
and not reserve officers, it, like the academies, must be
particularly concerned with motivating students toward a military
profession. But career motivation within the ROTC program is
made difficult by the very fact that it is set within and
affiliated^ with colleges and universities whose concepts are
not in consonance with the military ideals. One isolated investi-
gation conducted by William Lucas at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1966 and reported here in Table 16
shows the relationship between the socialization of a random
sample of college students and ROTC students over a four-year
period. Many variables are obviously present in any such survey,
including the initial recruitment factor of self-selection and
the liberalization influence of the college vis-a-vis the con-
servative influence of the ROTC program. In any case, the
statistics indicate that the etudent who joins ROTC becomes more
conservative during his college career than one who does not
join the program, thus lending credence to the belief of the
establishment of a military attitude within the student during
his college career.










Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior
(39) (23) (16) (19)
Conservative 17.9
A little on the conservative
side
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A little on the conservative side
A little on the liberal side
Liberal
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: William Ashley Lucas, II, "The American
Lieutenant: An Empirical Investigation of Normative Theories
of Civil-Military Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
North Carolina, 1966), pp. 75-76.
The remaining institution which has an attitudinal input
into the officer's career is the service college. Several
authors are of the opinion that the war colleges tend to imple-
49
merit and develop a service point of view. Bernard Brodie notes
that as far as changing attitudes are concerned, the service col-
lege education comes too late in one's career and is too brief
50
and too casual to be effective. More will be noted on the
performance of the service college in the section on Education
and Socialization, but suffice it to say here there should be no
great expectations for the creation of a liberal attitude in the
Janowitz , Professional Soldier , p. 142; Masland and
Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, pp. 479-80.
50Brodie, War and Politics, p. 486
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service colleges. What is more surprising is that they have not
produced any great theorists or strategists since the days of
Alfred T. Mahan.
The final attitudinal element as presented might appear
as a refutation of the logic of an indoctrinated service point
of view. Despite the obvious need for the socialization of an
attitude at the military educational institutions, there is an
argument for the value of a liberal education within the military
framework because as Samuel Huntington notes, the officer is
required in his profession to have a deeper understanding of
human attitudes, motivations, and behavior, all of which can be
better understood by having a liberal education. The officer
can neither be isolated from the needs of his subordinates nor
can he likewise lose contact with the needs of the nation he
serves. To Russell Kirk, the leaders of a society require a
liberal education which allows them to have better judgment
"against the ephemeral and vulgarizing solicitations of the
52hour." John Masland and Laurence Radway claim that something
was lost when the courses in moral philosophy fell into disrepute
at the academies. James Stockdale, who was a prisoner of war
for over seven years in North Vietnam, when asked what education
best prepared men for capture, replied that it was a broad
Huntington, Soldier and the State , p. 14.
52Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to
Eliot , 3rd rev. ed. , Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1960), p. 497.
53Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars , p. 2 39.
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liberal education that gave man enough of a historical perspec-
54tive properly to analyze the various aspects of life.
Thus the experiences and personal relationships of life
evaluated in the rubric of a liberal education seem to clash
with the military attitude which is necessary for the survival
of the military establishment. How can humanism be adjusted to
and rationalized in the same arena with such elements as obedi-
ence, command, and group? The fact is they can never be fully
reconciled, and herein lies the eternal problem that faces the
military as it operates within the civilian society. The com-
mand and obedience structure which might on any given day recog-
nize the worth of the individual can the very next day order that
same individual into battle and possible death as part of a
total group effort.
The difficulty in this basic reconciliation of liberal
views and a conservative military establishment has been examined
in terms of the three factors that, have affected military social-
ization, mainly, fusion, conflict, and attitude. In the section
that follows, an investigation will be made of the relationship
between education as it is carried out in the military academic
institutions and the socialization of the military officer.
Education and Socialization
Because of the total institutional nature of the military
academies and service colleges, one could be led to believe that
54James B. Stockdale, "Experiences as a POW in Vietnam,"
Naval War College Review 26 (January-February 1974): 3-4.
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there is an effective indoctrinational process that assures the
military establishment a certain and effective hegemony over the
content and magnitude of the education of its members. But to
at least two noted political scientists, Adam Yarmolinsky and
Laurence Radway, the loosening of this hegemony is very evident
at the institutions of primary socialization—the military
academies. Yarmolinsky notes that as late as 1971 the military
academies were becoming more and not less like civilian schools
basically because of the high incidence of non-professional
courses being taught. Radway also noted in 1971 that included
among the recent trends at the service academies has been the
continuing change to being more civilian oriented. Neither
author would predict the impact of this on the future of military
leaders. What has obviously been created is a dilemma being
experienced primarily at the academies, but also at the service
colleges, where the historical mission in both cases has remained
the "preparation" of the military officer for military duties,
but the method of carrying out this duty has become the product
of, as previously noted, the post-World War II fusionist policy.
Both institutions in an apparent attempt to prepare the officer
in both military and civilian areas have at times divided their
efforts to the extent of not only confusing the officer as to
Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its
Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Pub-
lishers, 1971)
, p. 73.
56Laurence I. Radway, "Recent Trends at American Service
Academies," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment , ed.
Charles C. Moskos, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolu-
tion, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications,
1971)
, pp. 26, 28.
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what he should be prepared for but also confusing the mission of
the military establishment. Testimony taken at and the conclu-
sions of the Hebert subcommittee in its investigation of the
military academies lends credence to this dilemma. The creation
of this dilemma is not without cause, of which several of the
more apparent are noted.
Because of the fusionist policy that has waxed and waned
in its intensity since World War II, coupled with the social
revolution of the 1960s and the divisiveness produced by the
Vietnam War, the academies had an "academic" revolution which
started with the establishment of the Air Force Academy in 1954
57
and continued on into the early 1960s. The revolution was an
obvious and basic attempt to update and upgrade instruction at
the academies with a major emphasis being placed on the academic
subjects. The ostensible reason given was that this was neces-
sary to keep the academies within the mainstream of American life
and that such changes would produce a "new" breed of military
officer. Not so often heard was the assertion that in order for
the academies to compete with civilian colleges and universities
for students, they had to make their curricula more attractive
and thus civilian oriented. In addition to having always
basically emphasized a science-engineering curriculum which made
academy graduates competitive with many contemporary engineering
schools, the academies began to offer an undergraduate curriculum
that permitted students to concentrate their studies in the




humanities and social sciences, at the same time allowing them
to compete favorably with civilian college graduates. This was
manifested by the introduction of the academic majors program
into the academies' curricula, the policy of which was that in
addition to completion of the required professional courses, a
student also had an academic major and many times a minor. This
policy continues to be the overall academic policy at the
academies today. Results of this policy change have produced
academy graduates who have been competitive in the humanities
and social sciences with graduates of other liberal arts colleges
and universities as evidenced by selected statistics. The Air
Force Academy graduates from 1959-62 had comparable Graduate
Record Examination scores with 230 college-level institutions.
The West Point Class of 1963 had a mean in the eighty-first
percentile in the Educational Testing Service examination on
foreign affairs. The Naval Academy Class of 1964 had a higher
58
Graduate Record Examination composite than the national norm.
During the era of academic change at the academies, the
service colleges were experiencing a similar shift from the pre-
World War II curriculum of basically teaching strategy and tac-
tics to a postwar emphasis on national security policy and
political-military issues. The overall subjective control model
which governed the postwar civil-military equation brought about
a great civilianization of the service college curricula. Such
William E. Simons, Liberal Education in the Service
Academies (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University for
the Institute of Higher Education, 1965), p. 198.
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a change, although tempered by a re-emphasis on professional
subjects in recent years, has not been without its critics.
Edward Katzenbach represents the critics' point of view. In
decrying the demotion of professionalism at the war colleges,
Katzenbach recommends that the curriculum should be oriented to
allow for the discussion of military problems as central to the
course, with national and international problems peripheral to
59this. From John Masland and Laurence Radway comes the sug-
gestion that the services could possibly close the war colleges
and
yet succeed in producing more effective national security
administrators than these colleges can ever hope to
graduate. ... It could make better use of the natural
skills and practical experience of officers without
special schooling. fi
The authors were referring to the "on the job" training, which
all officers acquire, as being an invaluable education within
itself when attempting to cope with the problems of national
security. The authors also claim that the American military
schools, particularly the service colleges, are not pushing out
the frontiers of knowledge in their professional fields and that
there is a lack of notable contributions to advanced study and
research. Where, they ask, are the contemporary Luces, Mahans,
and Uptons? Robert Ginsburgh suggests that the professional
military be withdrawn from all save professional military
Katzenbach, "Demotion of Professionalism," pp. 40-41.
60






subjects. The obverse of these arguments is argued by Samuel
Huntington, who urges the general recognition of the fact that
there are no purely military aspects of a problem and that the
6 3
military man must be a citizen first and an officer second.
Before investigating the curricula of the service educa-
tional institutions, several of the general issues concerning
the nature of education at these institutions should be examined.
Because of the elaborate curriculum changes made particularly at
the academies and the service colleges, the question is asked
as to what should be the military investment in the teaching of
the humanities and the social sciences? What is really the pur-
pose of providing such studies to people who are being trained
to spend the rest of their productive years in the military
service? P. H. Partridge brings the question into focus by
noting that such education may very well be a functionless edu-
cational extravagance because it is questionable whether the
different dimensions of education at the service academies
(professional versus intellectual) can lie comfortably side by
side. The Army War College in drawing up its Long Range and
Development Plan in 1972 admitted that the persistent problem is
that of finding an optimum mix of military and non-military
62Robert N. Ginsburgh , "The Challenge to Military Pro-
fessionalism," Foreign Affairs 42 (January 1964): 266.
63Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of
Military Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. of
the Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 1962), p. 237.
64Partridge, Educating for the Profession , pp. 13, 16.
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courses. In two separate reviews of the Army officer educa-
tional system, conducted in 1966 and again in 1971, the Depart-
ment of the Army concluded that the education program of the
Army should be composed primarily of a core of professional
military subjects. To verify the magnitude of these questions,
the most recent (1974) cost-effectiveness study conducted by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense asks whether the one
billion dollars currently being spent on military education is
producing the educated military man best suited for the defense
of the country. Obviously a major thrust of any such investi-
gation will be directed toward answering what should be the edu-
cational process for the "generalized" officer. Is it to be
directed toward a more liberal base, a more theoretical approach,
more emphasis on the humanities and social sciences, more
emphasis in the professional military area, or a combination of
all of these?
Since the service schools impart to the students the
functional imperative required for national defense, the empiri-
cal investigation of the socialization process will include an
analysis of the curricula used at the military academies, ROTC,
and the service colleges for the general purpose of determining
where the academic emphasis is placed. Cooperative civilian
6
U. S., Department of the Army, Army War College, Long
Range Development Plan (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War
College, [1972]).
66
U. S., Department of the Army, Report of the Depart-
ment of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools , 4 vols.
(Washington: Department of the Army, [1966] ) , 1: 1. U. S.
Department of the Army, Report of Army Officer Educational
System
,





education conducted with several of the service colleges is not
analyzed because the programs are considered as an "extra-
academic" matter and not part of the service college mission of
curriculum. Service utilization of civilian schools will be
discussed separately. In each institution, the curriculum will
be divided into the following general areas: professional
courses—courses that are specifically military-oriented and not
normally taught in a civilian college outside of ROTC (example
— strategy and tactics) ; political-military courses—those
courses that emphasize the role of the military in implementing
political decisions (example--courses in international relations
that stress national security matters and military policy
making) ; civil-military courses—those courses that emphasize
the role of the armed forces in civilian society (example--
courses oriented toward civil-military compatibility and not
policy implementation) ; American government/political theory
courses—courses considered essential to the understanding of the
American governmental system; non-professional/non-academic
courses--physical activities conducted outside the classroom
which carry no academic credit (example—physical education,
military drill and training) . The specific reasons for analyzing
the curriculum in a general manner is that it is important to
posit the present academic and professional emphasis of these
institutions vis-a-vis the philosophical and historical dichotomy
between the civilian society and the military establishment.
In all four institutions, the general mission is basi-
cally to prepare the officer better for future military duties.
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While preparation can mean exposure to a totally military-pro-
fessional oriented curriculum, it can not mean exposure to a
totally civilian oriented curriculum, which would not be effec-
tive in carrying out the basic mission of these institutions.
Thus within these extremes is a curriculum area that has been
the result of the fusionist policy of post-World War II, i.e.,
the political-military area which stresses such subject areas as
international relations, military decision-making, and area
studies. Figure 4 illustrates the concept of preparation vis-a-
vis the four education institutions.
FIGURE 4














Possibly the socialization effort of the three types of
institutions—military academies, ROTC, and service -colleges
—
should remain oriented to the left portion of the spectrum in
order that a more professional military can develop within the
environment determined by the historical and philosophical nature
of civil-military relations. Obviously a curriculum oriented
more to the right of the spectrum might prove to be increasingly
distractive or even antithetical to the professional socialization
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of the military officer. In this area, the academic work done
by military officers at civilian colleges may prove highly detri-
mental to professional socialization when one analyzes the course
work relative to the overall military socialization objective of
instilling values and perceptions essential for a military
profession.
Because the curricula over the years at the three types
of institutions have for the most part been designed with the idea
of attempting to balance the teaching of professional subjects
with civilian subjects, there is no gain to be made in the pre-
sent investigation by comparing old curricula with new curricula
because this will not produce normative values. For this reason,
only the recent curricula will be investigated with the purpose
of analyzing them in the context of the inherent nature of the
institution and the applicability of the curriculum to both
historical and philosophical civil-military relations.
Any analysis of the curricula at the military academies
must consider the environment within which the subject matter is
taught. Normally in a civilian college, courses are taught in
an environment where there is no hierarchical structure and a
great dependence is placed on student participation and input.
Unlike this environment, courses are taught at the academies
under very different conditions. There is always present a
hierarchical relationship between the officer-instructor and
the student. The style of teaching often borders on a briefing-
lecture method structured to cover certain quantities of material
at any given classroom session. While the instructor's teaching
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knowledge and ability may be on a par with his contemporary
civilian counterpart, it is the general anti-liberal atmosphere
that precludes an in-depth liberalization process. John Masland
and Laurence Radway note that in a military institution, open
controversy is rarely valued because it might jeopardize team-
fi 7
work. If the liberal environment were not such an important
factor in producing liberal-minded students, then one could read
books, never set foot on a college campus, or participate in
class, and get a liberal education.
While the academies may produce quality graduates, the
very nature of the academies' mission limits any extensive
liberalization process. The liberal university requires its
graduates to have general education requirements which normally
require major and minor areas. At the academies, in addition to
this requirement, the student has to take professional military
courses and participate in non-academic matters such as physical
education and drill. Thus his interests are automatically
channelled into several directions. Add to this a "dawn-to-dusk"
mandatory schedule with little time left for necessary rumi-
nation, and further detraction from any liberalization effect is
evident.
Possibly the most realistic appraisal of academy educa-
tion was made by the often-noted Hebert subcommittee, which
realized that the academies were in the business of producing
career officers; thus its investigation was to determine "whether
67Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars , p. 244
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or not the curriculum provides a background for the professional
officer commensurate with the technological advances in the
68
weapons of war and military and naval techniques." Personal
affiliation with the Naval Academy as an instructor has led me
to believe that the inclusion of the liberal arts at all
academies may not have an especially heavy impact on the student,
i.e., he very seldom has time to do in-depth research simply be-
cause he normally finds the immediate demands of his profession
are more closely attuned to the scientific, engineering, and
military studies than to the humanities and social sciences.
Thus with these factors basically determining the context of any
academy liberalization policy, the present curricula are dis-
cussed in an effort to illustrate the emphasis between profes-
sional subjects, political-military subjects, civil-military sub-
jects, and American government/theory subjects, the latter two
of which provide the normative basis for determining the realistic
extent of any liberalization in any military educational
institution.
If one turns first to the service academies, it is
immediately evident in Table 17 that a required definitive course
in civil-military relations is absent, though it can be con-
sidered vital to an initial understanding of the milieu in which
the graduate will move for at least five years. Equally as
evident is the nominal emphasis placed on courses in American
government and American political theory, an understanding of
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Source: U. S., Department of the Army, U. S. Military
Academy, Catalog, 1973-74 (West Point, N.Y. : U. S. Military
Academy, 1973); U. S., Department of the Navy, U. S. Naval
Academy, Catalog, 1973-74 (Annapolis, Md. : U. S. Naval Academy,
1973); U. S., Department of the Air Force, U. S. Air Force
Academy, 1973-74 Catalog (Colorado Springs, Col.: U. S. Air
Force Academy, 1973)
.
Note: Because the curricula at the academies are divided
between required and elective courses, they were analyzed in
terms of courses required in the sub-curriculum areas over a
four year period. Elective courses are indicated in parentheses.
Course offerings outside the sub-areas are not included.
which provides one with the normative background which again can
be considered vital to an understanding of the American political
process. Likewise, one should not be surprised with the stress
placed on professional subjects and non-professional, non-
academic matters, such as physical education and drill. The fact
that the academies allow academic majors and minors in areas out-
side of the professional area is evidence of the fusionist policy
which overtook military professionalism and thence military
curricula after World War II. There has not been a great
increase in subjects that would provide the normative bases for
what could be considered any real liberalization in civil-military
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relations, the one area that touches on the role of the military
within society.
In its unique position in military education, the general
ROTC curriculum indicated in Table 18 represents a rather small




Professional Pol-Mil. Civ-Mil. Theory Prof.
Army 6 10 3
Navy 8 10 4
Air Force 6 1 1
Note: Courses noted are those required for a military
commission and are representative of general ROTC requirements.
The larger requirement for the Navy ROTC in both the professional
and non-professional course areas is the product of the full
scholarship program, which requires more emphasis on professional
subjects and which is now only becoming more available in the
Army and Air Force ROTC programs because of the need for a
greater percentage of regular career officers from the ROTC pro-
gram. Even though there is this change in emphasis toward
(TO
Most military, naval, and air science courses carry
reduced credit or no credit vis-a-vis regular academic courses.
For example, in a college which has an academic course require-
ment of thirty-two courses for the baccalaureate level, the ROTC
is normally granted credit for between two and four courses.
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training more career than reserve officers, the ROTC program can-
not be considered comparable to the service academy programs.
Even so, here, as in the academies' programs, there is a lack of
both civil-military and American government/theory courses to
familiarize the graduate with the rudiments of these important
areas. Again, as at the academies, the perspective officer is
not provided with the normative basis for understanding his pro-
fessional relationship with society. For those who resign after
their initial tour of duty, which is true of more graduates of
the ROTC programs than the military academies, this requirement
may seem peripheral. But for those who remain in the military
and never possibly attend any military or civilian college there-
after, ignorance of these normative factors may prove somewhat
of a professional liability. For those who attend one of the
service junior command and staff courses (after service of be-
tween eleven and fifteen years) and one of the three service
senior courses (after service of between sixteen and twenty-two
years) , length of service and professional socialization may
render worthless any attempt to teach the basic conceptual idea
of civil-military relations and American government/theory.
Without this basis, the mental analytical process does not
analyze the selected life occupation in normative terms. The
pragmatics of the occupation seem to dominate the ethos of the
profession. The last level of formal military education is
received by the officer at the military service colleges, of
which there are basically eight. Generally an officer must
attend one of the command and staff schools before he attends
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one of the war college courses. Inter-service schooling at both
levels is quite common.
The service colleges do provide a definite upward mobility
for future military leaders of the United States, and because
approximately twelve percent of the total officer time in the
military service is devoted to education and training, with much
70
of this time spent at the junior and senior service colleges,
the colleges should be the culmination of a professional offi-
cer's academic education. In one sense, selection to flag or
general rank may be helped by attendance at the war colleges;
in some cases attendance at one may seem to be more advantageous
than attendance at another. Table 19 represents such selection
opportunity of senior service college graduates of the Classes
1951-60, inclusive. The years selected were the most represen-
tative because the Vietnam War years (1964-73) were years when
war college attendance was given a different emphasis in terms
of promotion.
As at the academies, the service colleges have had con-
tinually to evaluate their curriculum in order to appraise which
type of education is best provided at the service college level.
John Masland and Laurence Radway are of the belief that the
service colleges should display a greater concern for intellectual
vigor and search for critical analysis. The school should be
education and not training oriented and thus better equipped to
develop basic principles and habits of thought. There is a
70Huntington, "Power, Expertise," p. 789.


















Source: Edward R. Day, "Impact of Senior Service College
Education on Naval Officer Promotion," Naval War College Review
22 (September 1969) : 65.
Note: Figures are read left to right as follows: number
graduates/number selected for flag-general rank/percentage
selected.
general belief that, in fact, the service colleges reinforce the
images of the various services and thus not only lean more in the
direction of training than of education but in the process hinder
the cultivation of bold, independent, and imaginative thinking in
their students. While apparent indications show that academic
freedom may exist in a technical sense, such a factor is normally
72
the victim of conformity. Because of this possible paro-
chialism, manifested by the lack of original thought in the
fields of military strategy and tactics, civil-military relations,
and national security matters, it is possible that the military
educational system, and more specifically the service schools






failed as centers for original thought.
Other criticism leveled against the service colleges
includes what Masland and Radway classify as a lack of apprecia-
tion of an intellectual approach to problems of military and
73
national strategy. There is also an absence of concern for
the historical and theoretical aspects of problems, which leads
to a low level of analytical abstraction. Theoretical proposi-
tions are sacrificed for a great interest in the operational
74
aspects of policy issues. Edward Katzenbach notes that "the
high demand for war college graduates derives more from the pro-
fessional qualifications that led to their initial selection
75
than from the instruction they receive."
On the other hand, the service colleges have been
criticized for concentrating on numerous subject areas to the
exclusion of professional training. Because these colleges offer
what is basically a year-long course on the problems of national
defense, some criticism of the past curricula was made of the
lack of professional subjects at the service colleges. Since
the senior military schools are designed to meet the needs of
both the government as a whole and the armed services, these pro-
ponents of professionalism believe that there should be a return
to emphasis on professional subject matter. One of the leaders





75Katzenbach, "Demotion of Professionalism," p. 35,
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the Naval War College, who restructured the entire curriculum of
both the senior and the junior courses along more professional
lines. Concurrent with this, Admiral Turner terminated (1973)
the war college cooperative graduate program with George Wash-
ington University because he thought it detracted from the pro-
fessional aspects of the war college courses. The National War
College is also phasing out its cooperative program in inter-
national relations with George Washington University. The
Department of the Army in reviewing Army officer schools in 1966
recommended that both the Army Command and Staff and the Army
War College reconsider its cooperative graduate programs with
the possible motive of eliminating these programs because of
7 fi
their incursion into the students' time.
These numerous changes have resulted in a composite
service college curriculum which has been summarized in Table 20
below.
What is readily apparent from Table 20 is the wide range
of professional course emphasis both overall and at the command
and staff levels. Also evident is the low percentage of instruc-
tion time allocated to the study of civil-military relations and
American government/theory areas, in neither area ever exceeding
six percent of the total academic time. This is too low a per-
centage for a profession whose basis is necessarily a proper
understanding of the normative issues that characterize the
relationship of the military to its parent society. An
7 department of the Army, Report of the Army Board
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Source: U. S., Department of Defense, National War Col-
lege, Curriculum Outline 1974-75 (Washington: National War Col-
lege, 1974); U. S. , Department of Defense, Armed Forces Staff
College, Catalog-Class 54 (Norfolk, Va. : Armed Forces Staff
College, 1973) ; U. S., Department of the Army, Army War College,
Curriculum Pamphlet-Academic Year 1975 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
Army War College, 1974); U. S., Department of the Army, Army
Command and Staff College, Catalog, 1974-75 (Fort Leavenworth,
Kan.: Army Command and Staff College, 1974); U. S., Department
of the Navy, Naval War College, Syllabus for College of Naval
Warfare (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1973) ; U. S.,
Department of the Navy, Naval War College, Syllabus for the Col-
lege of Naval Command and Staff (Newport, R.I. : Naval War Col-
lege, 1973); U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air War College,
Curriculum Catalogue, 1973-1974 (Montgomery, Ala.: Air Univer-
sity, 1973); U. S., Department of the Air Force, Air Command and
Staff College, Curriculum Catalog: Class ACSG-74 (Montgomery,
Ala.: Air University, 1973)
.
Note: Because all students generally take the same basic
course at the service colleges, the curricula was analyzed in
terms of percentage of course work emphasis in each of the sub-
curriculum areas. In each case, the designation of Other
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generally includes course instruction in such areas as economics
and decision making. Elective course offerings in the sub-areas
are indicated by parentheses.
understanding of these issues seems to be required in order for
the most benefit to be gotten from all other course offerings in
the service colleges. Without this background, studying the
other sub-areas is conducted in somewhat of an intellectual
vacuum.
Little has been mentioned thus far about officer graduate
education conducted at civilian institutions and its overall
impact on the military. From the very nature of the program,
either at the masters level or the doctoral level, it is evident
that there are relatively fewer professional courses studied
under this program than at the service colleges, and thus the
evaluation of the program is made on the basis of the utilization
of these officers within the military establishment, the logic
being that if the military funds the studies for selected offi-
cers, it must intend to utilize the officers produced through
this program, even though the education received may be anti-
thetical to military culture. The validity of such an inquiry
might be made more evident by the money spent on such education,
which is summarized in Table 21 below.
The purpose of sending officers to non-military graduate
programs is to educate military officers to fill validated posi-
tions within the defense establishment. Where graduate education
is needed to prepare officers for teaching at the military




OFFICER POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION COSTS (Millions)
Fiscal Year 1973 Fiscal Year 1974
Participants Cost Participants Cost
Graduate Education at 4,595 80.6 4,611 82.0
Civilian Institutions
Graduate Education at 1,916 49.3 2,143 60.4
Militarv Institutions
Total 6,511 129.9 6,754 142.4
Source: U. S., Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
,
Officer Graduate Education Study (n.p., 1973), p. 7.
validation is made quite simple. In areas outside of teaching,
the process of validation is many times made the subject of a
personal judgment. It is generally in the latter areas that the
education requirement is not institutionalized and thus made vic-
tim of annual appropriation battles. Other problems experienced
by the utilization of non-military graduate program are that
despite the fact that the main criteria for selection to civilian
education subscribed to by all services is alleged to be pro-
motability, performance, and academic record, officer avail-
ability and interest in advanced education continues to outweigh
the factor of the value of the officer's education to the service.
Also the relationship between promotion and educational expe-
rience is neither legislated nor predetermined. Even if it were,
it would necessarily change from time to time because of the
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needs of the service.
Because the program is subject to congressional funding
and is extremely costly as indicated in Table 21, most investi-
gations of the program are conducted on a cost-effective basis.
The latest investigation was conducted by the General Accounting
Office in 1970. During its investigation, the GAO cited the
Joint Chiefs of Staff policy established in 1964, which promul-
gated criteria for determining officer graduate education
requirements. The report criticized the military for the follow-
ing reasons: validating criteria of positions requiring graduate
degrees had become so broad that almost any officer position
could be validated; positions being validated may not require the
education called for or could be filled by utilizing qualified
civilian or military officers, who did not have the academic
credentials but had the necessary experience; of the approxi-
mately 33,000 officers with graduate degrees, many were not
77being adequately utilized in their assignments. In more specif-
ic terms, the GAO reported in one instance on 714 validated bil-
lets at 14 military installations. Of the 506 officers at these
installations who had a masters degree or higher, only 162
were assigned to validated positions. Thus 344 officers or 68
percent of those with advanced degrees were not being utilized in
7 8jobs consistent with their education. One of the implications
to be drawn from this under-utilization is that there i3, in fact,
77







in progress an inter-service "numbers" game in which the prestige
of the officer corps is determined by the number of academic
credentials which can be displayed. Thus it seems doubtful that
in many cases, where education in the humanities and social
sciences is concerned, that the supposed education is, in fact,
required for validated positions.
As a result of the GAO investigation of 1970, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
conducted an Officer Graduate Education Study in 1973. Some of
the more significant conclusions reached are noted as follows:
significant numbers of officers educated through fully-funded
graduate programs are apparently not being utilized by the
services; utilization and career management of graduate educated
officers needs to be improved; seventy-five percent of the partic-
ipants surveyed indicated that they undertook off-duty education
programs for personal reasons not directly related to their mili-
tary jobs; fourteen percent of the officers who took graduate
education in the humanities found that their advanced education
79had no impact on making them more effective officers. In a
survey conducted by Cecil Hurst and James Shaddix in 1973 of
1265 naval officers who had received a Navy-sponsored post-
graduate degree, 817 responded. Of this number, 322 or 39.4
percent indicated that their basic reason for attending graduate
school was to remain competitive for future assignment and
7 9 .
U. S. , Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) , Officer
Graduate Education Study (n.p., 1973), pp. 17, 63, 81.
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promotion, or as the authors noted, to have their "tickets
punched." Only 218, or 26.7 percent, indicated as the reason for
taking graduate studies to become a more capable officer, and
only 199, or 24.4 percent, indicated as their reason to fulfill
8
educational aspirations. Thus the demands of the profession
and the parameters of the military established the reasons for
socialization which stressed promotion over capability or edu-
cational aspirations. From all the evidence noted, it is
apparent that the very factor of under-utilization of officers
with advanced degrees indicates the military's reluctance to
allow the results of an education attained in a liberal environ-
ment to bring about any major philosophical changes within the
military establishment.
With the return to an objective control model in the
post-Vietnam War era brought about largely by the modern volun-
teer army concept, the military will likely become relatively
more isolated from the civilian society than it has since World
War II, and thus it is very likely that the military educational
curriculum, which is an integral part of the officer sociali-
zation process, will become even more professionally oriented
than civilian oriented in the future. This should not be the
least surprising in view of the historical and theoretical nature
of the dichotomy of the civilian society and the military estab-
lishment in the civil-military equation in American society.
Cecil Roy Hurst, Jr. and James Delano Shaddix,
"Opinion Survey of Naval Officers Who Have Received a Navy
Sponsored Graduate Degree" (M.A. thesis, Naval Postgradfiate
School, 1973), pp. 32-33.

PART III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS
To prophesy is extremely difficult—especially
with respect to the future.
Anon
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The major problem which has remained philosophically and
historically endemic to American civil-military relations has
been the antithetical nature of the military establishment to its
parent civilian society. Evolving from this relationship are
natural limitations placed on the efforts to make the military
more relevant to society. These limitations continue, as they
have in the past, to affect any attempted liberalization of the
military establishment.
The problem is deeply rooted in the seventeenth century
Puritan tradition which among other beliefs posited that material
success was indicative of divine favor. Warfare, which would
either impede or reduce prosperity, was considered anathema to




from Old World persecution and we find implanted within the
American governmental system the rudimentary ideas of both
liberalism, which was manifested in the overtones of John Locke's
"natural rights doctrine," and its corollary concept of an anti-
military ethos. By not being "tied" to Old World institutions,
such as feudalism, clericism, and socialism, the American
government developed into a "unique" system, which as Daniel
Boorstin notes had a "seamlessness" about its culture. Both
Boorstin and Louis Hartz recognized that the American experience
had been unique in its conception with the subsequent evolution
of a distinct genus of American political thought.
The result of the Puritan experience was manifested in
America's greatest liberal document, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which declared America's orientation toward the free
individual along with its dislike and distrust of things mili-
tary. Following the Revolutionary War, the colonists continued
to identify themselves with the "citizen army" concept, while
at the same time realizing that the seeds of military profes-
sionalism had been sewn by the very fact that an army had to be
raised to fight the Revolutionary War. Thus was spawned a
double but unequal military legacy that was articulated first in
the Articles of Confederation under the rubric of the spirit of
state cooperation, and second in the Constitution of 1787, which
institutionalized the role of the military establishmer t within
a federal system (Art. 1 sec. 8, 12-16). Subsequent to the
Constitution came the Bill of Rights, which again reaffirmed the
basic liberal rights of the American people as juxtaposed to the
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limiting nature of the ethos of the Constitution. Amendments
II and III are specifically directed toward civil-military
relations.
Within the restrictions of the Constitution and basically
until the United States entered World War II, the basic model of
American civil-military relations was designed around the con-
cept of a subjective civilian control model and the lack of an
external security function, both of which led to a military
establishment that was small and completely responsive to the
American liberal tradition. Except for singular occasions where
armies were temporarily raised to meet the enemy threat in the
War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-
American War, the American liberal tradition remained paramount
with little if any fear of an expanding military establishment
which could interfere with the liberal ethic. This civil-mili-
tary relationship conceived by the Puritans and institutionalized
through such documents as the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights was to remain basically
unchanged until World War II. Without an external threat to
national security, the security function was assigned mainly to
the state militias. Such an arrangement was incorporated into
the Militia Act of 1792, which remained as the basic national
military policy until 1903, when the "Act to Promote the
Efficiency of the Militia" was passed by Congress. Among other
provisions, the 1903 Act provided for the federalization of the
state militia (now called the National Guard) in time of emer-
gency or war. This was undoubtedly a radical policy change, in
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that it gave the professional military control over all the
military manpower of the nation and created a de facto standing
army for the first time in American history.
Nineteenth century America found the military establish-
ment completely subordinate and responsive to the liberal
imperative. The occasion of war necessitated the use of force,
but once the hostilities were terminated, military demobili-
zation quickly followed, and the military once again was relegated
to a state of benign neglect. Although the Spanish-American War
was the first major war in which American troops fought overseas,
it was not until World War I that liberalism was given a security
function which necessitated the raising of an army to launch the
crusade that, in Woodrow Wilson's words, would make "the world
safe for democracy." What happened, first in World War I and
then in World War II and thereafter, is that the historically
rooted societal imperative of liberalism was being challenged by
the functional imperative of security.
The second major turning point in American civil-military
relations, the first being the National Defense Act of 1903,
came after World War II, when the cold war and nuclear weapons
necessitated the eventual abandonment of a complete military
demobilization, the instituting for the first time in United
States history after the cessation of hostilities of conscription,
and the maintaining of a military force-in-being. The result of
this major realignment of civil-military relations, institu-
tionalized first in the National Security Act of 1947, was a
fusion of military and political functions, necessitated by cold
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war exigencies and the intensification of the policy of subjective
civilian control, wherein the military was becoming more of a
"mirror" of society. Out of this fusionist policy came the prob-
lem of rectifying the inherent, dichotomous values of the civilian
and military ethic. More specifically, it was at this juncture
that the problems encountered when the military establishment is
exposed to a high degree of civilianization became manifest.
These are the problems that have been investigated in the pages
above under the function of recruitment and socialization.
While both the military and civilian societies could
co-exist under conditions in which the military establishment
was maintained at a minimum manning level and subjected to the
societal imperative of liberalism, once they began to function
as co-partners in the making and execution of national security
policy, conflict between them became inevitable because of the
theoretical and historical differences in values and tenets. As
a result of this new civil-military relationship, the military
fell more and more under the influence of civilianization and
in the process its military professionalism suffered. The decade
of the 1960s found the civil-military equation further exacer-
bated by the social revolution that was part of the larger unrest
of the American populace spawned in part by the Vietnam War.
Thus by the latter half of the 1960s the military establishment,
which had largely ignored the tenets of the historical dichotomy
between itself and civilian society, found itself the primary
target of societal dissent over the war and the victim of
methodical civilianization efforts that had gone on unabated
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since World War II. In addition to this, the military was
divided into many factions over whether the proper reaction was
to revitalize its professional military posture or to continue
to "humanize" its policies, always under the threat of further
compromising military standards.
One possible result of the unsettling effect of the war
was that in 19 6 7 Congress was amenable to the suggestion that
conscription had possibly outlived its effectiveness and that
some form of lottery system might be more feasible for recruit-
ing military manpower to fight the Vietnam War. Following on
from this were President Nixon's policy statements favoring an
all-volunteer military (1969) and foreign policy statement of
1970 which further delineated his Guam doctrine of 1969, noting
that the United States will not unilaterally defend the free
nations of the world. Both statements in effect aided the mili-
tary establishment, in that reduced commitments would generate
a reduced, but more professional, military force free of con-
scription. A prognosis of the 1970s would tend to indicate that
the fusionist, civilianization trend of military policy is at
least being re-examined, if not reversed. The normative values
thus far discussed, which define the parameters of American
civil-military relations, seem best to describe a governmental
system in which the relationship between the civilian and the
military society is governed by a pattern of co-existence and not
co-partnership. The historical and contemporary nature of
American civil-military relations confirms the fact that the




To understand better the civil-military equation, the
functions of recruitment and socialization as they occur within
the military establishment must be examined in order to deter-
mine whether they have any effect on the "root" differences
between the two societies. The institution of UMT, which compels
civilians to undergo military training for a specified period of
time, is by far the most extreme anti-liberal recruitment method.
This fact alone may explain why the American people have rejected
it on three separate occasions when it became a national issue
—
in colonial times, and in the periods bracketing World Wars I and
II. Although there were numerous colonial laws and regulations
which required male colonists to perform military service within
the colonies, the laws were enforced with discretion depending
greatly on the amount of time that a colonist could spare from
making a living to provide for local defense. There was no
traditional military obligation created under these conditions,
a legacy that was carried over into the Constitution. The Knox
Plan of 1790 and the Militia Act of 1792 both indicated that
males should be borne on the rolls of the militia. Such an obli-
gation was seldom observed, however, and if it was it was at the
convenience of the male population.
The concept of UMT was seldom mentioned in the nineteenth
century, and it was not until the establishment of volunteer
citizen training camps in 1913 that the UMT concept was again
made a national issue. For the first time in the era of modern
warfare UMT was considered by the Congress and rejected, first
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in 1916 at the height of wartime sentiment and again in 1920
under the more sober conditions of peacetime in which normalcy
and the liberal ethic again became dominant political factors.
The last debate over the concept of UMT began in the waning days
of World War II, when it became evident that the United States
had to consider in the future a security dimension to its defense
policy. The concept of UMT was then thrust into congressional
debate and presented to the American people as the hope for
future national defense. Five separate congressional hearings
were held on UMT legislation and by June, 1948, the final pro-
posed UMT legislation was defeated. Every defeat was based on
the historical fact that UMT was antithetical to the nature of
American liberal society. The UMT issue lay dormant for almost
twenty years until 1967 when both the National Advisory Commis-
sion on Selective Service and the Civilian Advisory Panel on
Military Manpower Procurement concluded that UMT was not the way
to enlist manpower for the Vietnam War. Both groups again fol-
lowed the basic American belief about UMT—the public simply
would not tolerate its use. It is now very likely a dead issue
in America.
Unlike UMT, selective service has had a varied and at
times a violent history of use in the United States. Like UMT,
the institution of selective service has polarized the public
debate on conscription around such issues as, is it part of the
American heritage, what are citizen's duties versus citizen's
rights under the Constitution, and, is it democratic to con-
script? The utilization of conscription in America can best be
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described as initially provoking violent internal reactions and
later being used because the pragmatics of the situation left no
other option for raising armies to counter an enemy threat or
attack. The Constitution is vague on whether the Congress has
authority to "force" one into military service, and until the
national debate on conscription surfaced for the first time in
the War of 1812, it had never been a national issue. Even when
that war was going badly and the British had destroyed the
Capital and burned the White House in August, 1814, Congress was
reluctant to authorize national conscription. Legislation to do
so which it had drawn up and debated was rendered moot by the
ending of the War in December, 1814.
When conscription was introduced into the Civil War by
the North in 1863, after the failure of the Militia Act of 1862
to provide adequate numbers of military manpower, it provoked
such a violent reaction from the public because of its invasion
into the privacy and rights of the citizens, that riots broke
out in many cities, and the desertion rate soared to an unpre-
cedented high level. In retrospect, Section Thirteen of the
Conscription Act of 1863, which provided for an acceptable sub-
stitute or cash payment in lieu of service, may have prevented
the conscripting of troops from being a total national disaster.
In the summary total of troops who served in the Northern armies
in the Civil War, approximately 160,849 out of 2,213,365 troops,
or seven percent, were conscripts.
When the nation decided to wage a crusade in World War I
to preserve democracy, it accepted the National Defense Act 6f
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1916, which made every male adult a militiaman with a national
obligation. A Supreme Court decision (1918) upheld the right of
the national government to draft military manpower, and the
Espionage Act (1917) and Amendments (1918) made, among other pro-
visions, refusal to serve in the military a punishable offense.
In conscripting citizens, the government had the cooperation and
blessings of liberals to fight a crusade against an enemy that
threatened democracy. Thus in time of national peril, con-
scription was finally successfully utilized. On the other hand,
in keeping with the liberal American tradition, by 1921 the mili-
tary machine was again dismantled for lack of a function, and
the military establishment once again took up its garrison duties.
The history of World War II conscription begins with the
passage of the first peacetime conscription law in September,
1940, and continues for all intents and purpose until 1 July
1973. Within this thirty-three year period, conscription was
institutionalized first as a necessity to carry out the liberal
crusade against world fascism and then in response to the cold
war policy as a force-in-being preparedness policy against com-
munism. Through the decades of the 1940s, 1950s, and into the
1960s, the draft was seldom debated in Congress, and a pro forma
renewal was seen every four years. Over the years, the liberals
tacitly agreed with the national conscription policy vis-a-vis
its military commitments, but as national assets became more
and more diverted to military purposes and the nature of war grew
"colder," liberals began to become more vocal in their dissent
over the draft. Such dissension and disenchantment reached a
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crescendo in the 1960s, assisted by the social revolution and
the Vietnam War. The system, which had been based on the
Jeffersonian concept that the best government is that which
operates at its lowest feasible level (nearly 4,100 draft boards),
finally became a victim of change. This happened when inequality
was injected into the system through what many viewed as an
inequitable deferment system. The system, by following such a
policy, was in effect violating the basic liberal tenet of
equality. President Nixon's policy statement in 1969 that he
would propose the lottery system as a means that would hopefully
lead to the "principle of a no draft in peacetime," indicated
the possibly numbered days of the conscription system. In
December, 1969, the lottery system was instituted, and it cor-
rected the inequities that had plagued the old draft system. By
July, 1973 the selective service system was terminated after
over thirty years of almost continuous use and was replaced by a
system more in keeping with American liberalism—the modern
volunteer army.
The appeal of the modern volunteer army (MVA) to the
American political system and more specifically to American
civil-military relations is that it is based on the realization
that such a concept is in consonance with the basic theoretical
and historical civil-military relationship as it was established
in early colonial times and has remained as part of the normative
American tradition. When it was established in July, 1973, MVA
was a return to the basic liberal tenet of individualism and
individual choice. Complaints leveled against the MVA by its
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critics, in essence, manifested a realization that there are
"root" differences between the civilian and military societies.
The charge that the MVA will produce a more self-contained and
thus isolated military establishment is only a realization that
the two societies have dissimilar values and tenets because of
historical and theoretical reasons. The exception stated is no
more than a realization of the rule governing civil-military
relations. The additional complaint that under the MVA concept
the military will eventually be largely comprised of minority
groups, particularly the blacks, is not a rational reason for
refuting the utilization of the MVA. It is in fact an indi-
cation that the military establishment is open to any who may be
denied access to other sectors of society. The last complaint
normally lodged against the MVA is that it further weakens every
citizen's obligation to serve his country. Whether this obli-
gation is as valid in peacetime as in wartime is a matter of
debate, but under the MVA concept the selective service system
remains in existence, to be reinstated in time of national
emergency.
In the area of officer recruitment, the investigation
delved into the effect of different methods of officer recruit-
ment on the "root" differences between the civilian and military
societies. It was hypothesized that the recruitment of officers
within the liberal environment has not had the liberalizing
effect on the military establishment that one would expect. The
pattern analyzed was that the source of officer procurement (and
retention), the military academies, the Reserve Officer Training
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Corps, and Officer Candidate Schools in that order, is inversely
related to providing the most liberal input into the military
establishment. Added to this pattern is the factor of self-
selection, in which the prospective officer, by voluntarily
choosing a recruitment source in effect reinforces his military
ethic with the conservative tenets of the military institution.
The liberal input into the military from the sources of ROTC
and OCS is not only limited by the self-selection factor but is
further restricted by the draft-avoidance factor which, prior
to the MVA, literally forced a great percentage of future
officers "involuntarily" to join one or the other programs.
Other than the attitudes and motivations of the student who is
recruited into one or the other officer programs, the very
nature and mission of each program and the military establish-
ment as a whole establish the parameters which limit to a very
great degree the extent of liberalization within the military
establishment. In opposition to the theoretical limits estab-
lished by its missions, the military academies, and to a lesser
extent the ROTC program, started to add in the late 1950s and
early 1960s non-professional courses to their curricula in a
mass effort to become relevant to changing American society and
to attract their share of prospective college students. In the
process, the military academies were investigated in 1967-68 by
a House subcommittee to determine whether the academies were
carrying out their mission of producing career military officers,
Although the academies were commended for their efforts in this
direction, they were reminded that the American people expects
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no less than a maximum effort by the academies in producing
career officers and not intellectual philosophers.
Concerning the OCS and ROTC programs, the recruitment
of officers through the former does not produce large numbers of
career officers but instead an officer who usually serves one
tour of military duty C2-3 years) and then resigns his commis-
sion. Such a source, though often considered the best liberal
input into the services, produces, in reality, a small part of
the total career officer corps. The liberalization efforts of
the ROTC program are not only hampered by the self-selection
syndrome but by the operation of the program on college campuses
as essentially a training and recruitment device rather than as
an educational program. These tenets are antithetical to the
nature of liberal academe. The shift of ROTC programs, for
various reasons, from more liberal, established colleges to ones
which have less renouned academic credentials further dilutes
any liberal influence which the college has over the ROTC
program. Because of both internal (self-selection) and external
(mission of the program and the entire military establishment)
factors, the liberalization process that could be transferred
from the liberal society to the military establishment is more
of an illusion than a fact.
The final area of investigation concentrated on the
professional socialization of the military officer in the con-
text of three factors that vitally affect that socialization
and the overall ramifications of formal education as it is con-
ducted at the military academies, ROTC, service colleges, and
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civilian institutions. The factor of fusion is concerned with
an analysis of the quandary experienced when the professional
military is trained in both military and non-military subjects.
Out of World War II came a recognition of the need to reorganize
both the defense establishment and its involvement in American
society at-large. Concurrent with this was a reorganization of
all military academic curricula in order to emphasize the sub-
stantive matter of political-military relations, national
security policy, and international relations. With greater
emphasis being placed on the teaching of what had heretofore been
considered non-military subjects, the military began to suffer a
"professionalization gap" and a loss of a certain amount of
expertise. Thus what has continued on almost unabated since
World War II has been an attempt by the civilian society to
exert extensive subjective control over the military establish-
ment to the degree of confusing its identity with other bureau-
cratic institutions. The one who suffers in this situation is
the officer who becomes confused as to what is his mission--
prepare for battle or administer a bureaucracy?
Between the military establishment and its civilian
society is an inherent conflict. From the very nature of Ameri-
can society education is more than likely to instill liberal
tendencies within officers and thus naturally conflict with the
conservative nature of the military establishment. The fusion
factor has certainly exacerbated this situation. Differences
that are manifested by this conflict include the creation of a
heroic model by the military versus the education of the
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individual by the civilian college; the dependence on ceremonies,
rituals, and honors by the military versus the instilling of
rationality by the civilian institution; the conflict with liberal
standards when the military education exceeds its fixed para-
meters; conformity in military instruction versus the free
spirit of a liberal education; incompatibility of ROTC with the
other functions of a liberal college campus. In essence, the
conflict factor determines to a large extent the limits of any
socialization effort connected with a military education.
The final factor discussed was the role which military
education^played in developing a "proper" attitude necessary for
the officer to carry out the mission of national defense. Such
an attitude must not be confused with the military way, the
particular method by which the military carries out its mission,
nor with the military mind, a term pejoratively used to generalize
about the military manner of thought rather than describing a
mind conditioned by the functional imperative of the military pro-
fession. As in the cases of fusion and conflict, the attitude
factor is largely determined by the historical and theoretical
differences between the two societies. Thus if the military
attitude is to be perpetuated, there is no better institution
ready to act as the repository for military ideals than the mili-
tary academies. It is normally through these institutions
rather than through ROTC and OCS that the military elite rise to
the top of the military hierarchy. If a proper attitude is not
instilled within the cadet or midshipman, then the very founda-
tions of military tradition could be considered to be in danger.
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The creation of such an attitude is not part of a liberal edu-
cational experience nor does it reflect an image of academic
excellence. Attempts to supplement this attitude with an
academic curriculum has often brought the criticism that the
professional aspects of the academies' education are being neg-
lected. The creation of an attitude is equally important in
the ROTC, whose task is made more difficult by its very location
within an academic atmosphere.
Once the factors which influence any military educational
institution were noted, then the ramifications of education at
the various service schools and colleges were examined to deter-
mine its impact on officer socialization. The fusionist policy,
followed since the end of World War II, has certainly influenced
socialization, in that academic curricula became more and more
civilian oriented in the area of political-military matters,
international relations, and defense economics. Such a shift was
balanced by either an elimination of or de-emphasis on the teach-
ing of professional subjects such as strategy and tactics as well
as teaching courses in American government, American political
theory, and civil-military relations, all three of which are
considered important for an understanding of the relationship of
the profession which the officer is about to enter to its parent
civilian society. Such a long term trend produced a "backlash"
in the 1960s from both the military policy makers and civilian
planners as to the value to be gained from instruction in sub-
jects that have no bearing on military professionalism. It is
obvious from my comments that I consider the areas of civil-
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military relations, American government, and political theory
to have a tangible effect on such professionalism. The educa-
tional policies have in turn spawned an almost continual investi-
gation of the entire military educational system on the basis
of determining what should be its purpose.
Concomitant to this was a major concern about the
curricula used in military education. The results of the curric-
ula investigation revealed the following: while the military
academies' curricula indicate a fair amount of training in pro-
fessional subjects and military drill and training, there is a
marked absence of any mandatory definitive course in civil-
military relations and little preparation in the area of American
government and political theory—all areas that are important for
any rational understanding of the military establishment within
its parent society. In the ROTC programs, as at the academies,
there is a similar lack of required courses in the three areas
and thus an inadequate background is provided for the officer
who may elect to make the military his career. While the service
colleges have within the last three years begun to emphasize
the teaching of more professional subjects, there continues to
remain a dearth of instruction in the three areas of American
government, American political theory, and civil-military rela-
tions, all of which are vital to the officer, who at this stage
in his career is being prepared for greater responsibility
within the military establishment, for which it is almost impera-




A final area of military education to be investigated
was that conducted at civilian colleges and universities. It
is here that the civil-military conflict manifests itself in
the total envolvement of a military officer in true academic
pursuit. Realization of the impact of such an education on the
officer is made evident by the very fact that subsequent utili-
zation of officers with this education is often minimal. In
this case, true liberalization of the military establishment
is thwarted through non-utilization of educated officers. Such
a syndrome indicates the tacit acknowledgement that the military
establishment in fact does not opt to be liberalized—a reali-
zation that has its theoretical "roots" in the early Puritan
tradition, one that has dictated the future course of American
civil-military relations.
Conclusions
The historical attempts to liberalize the military
establishment are not only tempered by but regulated and sub-
jected to the normative nature of the American civil-military
equation. Because of the basic nature of this relationship,
ignoring its existence will produce inadequate and unrealistic
analyses of civil -military relations. Unless any analysis of
civil-military relations includes the concepts indicated in the
model noted in Figure 2 (p. 8) , the continual re-examination of
American civil-military relations will proceed in a philosophical
vacuum. Such a conclusion is based on the fact that there are
inherent differences between the military and civilian societies
in the United States, which are beyond the realm of any major
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reconciliation. Indeed, if such a reconciliation were undertaken,
it would necessitate changing either the basic nature of American
liberalism or the conservative posture of its military establish-
ment, or both. In both situations, the former is a way of life
chosen in the Declaration of Independence and the latter is
necessitated by the nature of the military task. Possibly the
most evident manifestation of the problem created by ignoring
this historical relationship occurred after World War II, when
the civilian society successfully invaded the domain of the mili-
tary establishment and inculcated it with civilian values and
methods. Although this was possibly a necessary adjunct of cold
war policy making, both the civilian and military societies neg-
lected to realize that any civil-military accommodation had its
philosophical limits. The realization of such limits may be only
now surfacing with the slow but perceptible shift from the
extreme utilization of subjective civilian control to one more
attuned to objective control and realization of the true civil-
military equation.
Recommendations
With the United States entering on what I consider a new
era of civil-military relations conditioned in a large measure by
(1) the negation of any further unilateral intrusion of the
United States into foreign domestic problems without sufficient
cause, (2) Congressional indication of limiting in the future the
President's war making powers, and (3) the ending of conscription
and the creation of a modern volunteer army, there are new and
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hopeful opportunities for effectuating a more valid civil-military
equation than the one that has been in operation since World War
II. Much of the success of any revitalized civil-military rela-
tionship depends to a great extent on a realization that the two
societies , in order to continue to function in the way they were
created to function, must realize and respect each other's
theoretical bases. Such a realization can precipitate a limited
accommodation between the tenets of the two societies. Necessary
for any accommodation is resolving the confusion between a
civilian-controlled military and a civilian-oriented military.
The former concept is found in the Constitution and has been an
accepted keystone of American civil-military relations by both
civilian and military. The latter concept has been the subject
of not only this investigation but one which has continually
plagued the observers of civil-military relations.
Much of the empirical evidence used in this investi-
gation has indicated at least a definite if not a conclusive
pattern that the two societies are best analyzed in a co-exist-
ence context and not a co-partner context. Such a pattern would
tend to disprove the concept proposed by Morris Janowitz that
the two societies must operate in a closer, uniform effort.
Likewise, it would tend to lend credence to Samuel Huntington's
concept that there are differences between the two societies
which must be recognized and respected. Whether, as Huntington
notes in The Soldier and the State , "America can learn more from
West Point than West Point from America," is a point that may or




This investigation has delved into American civil-
military relations from the viewpoint of what effect the liberal
society has on the military establishment, and has concluded
that whenever civilian society has attempted to change the deli-
cate philosophical balance, the society and the military profes-
sion have suffered dire consequences. Either society ignoring
the other will not resolve the conflict. In addition to each
side understanding the other's ethos, the following recommenda-
tions are submitted on what the military can do to better the
relationship.
1. Continue to reinstitute the teaching of professional
subjects at all levels of military instruction to the end of
creating viable professional career officers, not professional
dilettantes
.
2. Educate all military officers in every recruitment
source in the rudiments of civil-military relations, American
government, and American political theory so as to create a
normative base for the officer to use in analyzing his role
within the larger American society. Reinforce this education
at all levels of academic socialization with the hope of pro-
ducing future military leaders who have a sound philosophical
basis on which to direct the American military establishment.
3. Direct both the professional and academic educational
standards to the goal of producing "in-house" authors who could
contribute more to the field of seminal military literature.
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In conclusion, it is through the educational process that
the military can best learn its proper relationship with the
civil society. By institutionalizing such an effort, the proper
relationship between the American military establishment and its
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